スハルト政権崩壊後のインドネシア地方社会に関する文化人類学的研究

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平成 13 年度～平成 15 年度科学研究費補助金（基盤研究 (A) (1)）研究成果報告書

平成 16 年 5 月

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はしがき

「スハルト政権崩壊後のインドネシア地方社会に関する文化人類学的研究」と題する研究プロジェクトは、平成 13 年度から平成 15 年度にかけておこなわれた。研究組織は人類学者を中心に、経済学、生態学、民族音楽学を専門とする 9 人の日本人研究者から構成され、スハルト政権崩壊後のインドネシアの地方社会において生起する社会・文化現象について、フィールドワークにもとづく実証的な資料の蓄積を主たる研究活動とした。この報告書では、こうした研究活動のなかから浮かび上がってきた主だった現象の記述と分析がおこなわれる。

「安定と開発」を標榜するスハルト政権は 2 つの政策を強力に実施した。そのひとつは大衆を政治的に無力化する政策であり、中央集権的な国家体制を確立するとともに、地方社会からわき起こる政治的自己主張とスハルト政権に対する批判を抑圧した。スハルト政権のもうひとつの政策は中央政府主導による開発政策であり、この政策はインドネシア経済を急速に成長させた。しかし，その一方で、中央政府に対する不満と不信を鬱積させ，その暴力的な噴出とそれにともなう社会不安は経済危機を招来し、スハルト政権は崩壊した。

本研究プロジェクトでは、出発点において、つぎの 3 つの目的を措定した。①スハルト政権後崩壊後に制定された「地方行政法」の施行にともない、地方政治にどのような変化が生じているかを明らかにする。②スハルト政権崩壊後の混沌とした状況を生きる地方社会の住民が、それに対応して、どのような生活を営んでいるかについて具体的な調査資料を蓄積する。③地方社会の住民がどのようなアイデンティティ構築にもとづいて、来るべき地方社会の姿をどのように構想し、その実現にむけて現在どのような活動を展開しつつあるかを把握する。

本報告書は、研究組織構成員 9 人によって、それぞれ一編ずつまとめられた論文からなり、全体は 2 つの部に区分されている。第 I 部「流動する地方政治」(Part I　Local Politics in Flux) には、①の目的に力点をおいた論文がおさめられている。また、第 II 部「地域住民の応答」(Part II　Local People's Response) には、②に焦点をあてた論文が配置されている。③については各論文の端々で触れられているが、3 年間の研究活動をとおして明らかになったのは、「伝統的慣習」(アダット) に回帰ないしは依拠しようとする地域社会住民の多様で、未組織の動きであり、こうした動きが将来的にどのような方向にむかっていくかについては、現時点では判断を保留せざるをえなかった。

各論文の内容を手短に紹介しておくと、第 I 部「流動する地方政治」の鏡味論文と水野論文は、それぞれバリ州と西ジャワ州の事例にもとづき、新たな地方行政法のもとで生じた行政機構の変化と、それが地方社会におよぼしつつある様々な影響を細密に描きだしている。つづく福岡論文はスハルト政権期には不可能であったスンダ人による文化復興の動きとそれに呼応する西ジャワ州政府の文化政策の変化について、梅田論文はスハルト政権期の宗教政策のもとでは排除されていたある儀礼の復活とその背景にあるバリ州における

宗教政策の大きな変貌について詳細な報告をおこなっている。そして、第1部末尾の杉島論文は、歴史人類学的な視点から東ヌサ・テンガラ州のエンデ県政府が「伝統的慣習」（アダット）に大きな関心を向けるようになった状況を全体として把握する試みを展開している。

第II部「地域住民の応答」（Part II　Local People's Response）の石川論文は、西カリマンタン州のマレーシアとの国境地帯に焦点をあて、インドネシアにおける経済危機とは裏腹に、マレーシアへの商品と労働力の移出を活発化させることで経済的に潤う地域住民の姿を鮮明に描きだしている。つづく阿部論文は、スハルト政権期に中カリマンタン州でおこなわれた大規模な泥炭湿地林開発が頓挫した後で、入植者たちが生活のための戦術として展開する不法伐採について報告している。また、中村論文は、スハルト政権崩壊後の言論統制の撤廃にともなってバリの地方紙が急増した状況に焦点をあて、本報告書末尾の中川論文は東ヌサ・テンガラ州エンデ県の事例をもとに、近年、地域経済振興のために村落社会に直に投下されるようになった開発援助が地域社会にどのような影響をおよぼしているかを明らかにしている。

すでにのべたように、本研究プロジェクトはフィールドワークにもとづく実証的な資料の蓄積を主たる研究活動とし、その継続期間中、研究組織構成員は、インドネシアの9つの州（正確には州および州レベルの行政単位）内の20を上回る県（正確には県および県レベルの行政単位）で調査をおこなった。だが、インドネシアには26の州がある。また、精細な調査資料を収集するには、県や県内の末端の行政区で集中的にフィールドワークをおこなう必要があった。その意味で、本研究プロジェクトがカバーしえた地理的範囲は限定されている。くわえて、現代のインドネシア地方社会で今まさに生起しつつある新たな社会・文化現象をどう理解すべきかについては、しばしば大きな困難を感じた。だが、今回の研究プロジェクトをとおして、そうした現象について実証的な資料を蓄積できたことの意義は大きい。それらは、今後の研究において活用されるべき言葉の真の意味での現代史資料といえるからである。

なお、平成13年度から平成15年度にかけて、本プロジェクトの研究組織構成員がおこなったフィールドワークの期間と調査地（いずれもインドネシア）は以下のとおりである。

平成13年度

杉島敬志	2001/8/1～2001/9/30	Nusa Tenggara Timur 州（Ende 県、Sikka 県）
阿部健一	2001/8/1～2001/9/23	Riau 州（Indragiri Hilir 県）
福岡正太	2001/7/31～2001/9/1	Jawa Barat 州（Bandung 市区、Bandung 県、Cirebon 市区、Cirebon 県）
中川　敏	2003/8/1～2003/8/31	Nusa Tenggara Timur 州（Ende 県）
鏡味治也	2001/8/3～2001/9/25	Bali 州（Gianyar 県）
中村　潔	2001/8/5～2001/11/6	Bali 州
梅田英春	2001/7/31～2001/10/10	Bali 州（Denpasar 市区、Badung 県、Gianyar 県、

		Tabanan 県）
石川　登	2001/8/1～2001/9/9	Kalimantan Barat 州（Pontianak 県、Sambas 県、Sanggau 県、Sitang 県）
水野廣祐	2001/11/3～2002/2/1	Jawa Barat 州（Bandung 県、Bandung 市区、Tangerang 県、Karawang 県）
平成 14 年度		
杉島敬志	2002/7/15～2002/9/30	Nusa Tenggara Timur 州（Ende 県、Sikka 県）
阿部健一	2002/7/31～2002/8/25	Riau 州（Indragiri Hilir 県）、Jawa Barat 州（Sukabumi 県）
福岡正太	2003/7/13～2003/8/9	Jawa Barat 州（Bandung 市区、Bandung 県）、Sumatra Barat 州（Padang 市区、Padang Pariaman 県、Padang Panjang 県、Bukittinggi 市区）
中川　敏	2002/7/30～2002/8/29	Nusa Tenggara Timur 州（Ende 県）
鏡味治也	2002/8/3～2002/9/21	Bali 州（Gianyar 県）、Sumatra Barat（Padang 県）
中村　潔	2002/6/30～2002/0815	Bali 州、Nusa Tenggara Barat 州
梅田英春	2002/7/22～2002/10/4	Bali 州（Denpasar 市区、Badung 県、Gianyar 県、Tabanan 県、Karagasem 県）
石川　登	2003/3/16～2003/3/23	Kalimantan Barat 州（Pontianak 市、Pontianak 県、Sambas 県、Sanggau 県、Benkayang 県）
水野廣祐	2002/7/13～2002/8/25	Jawa Barat 州（Bandung 県、Cianjur 県）Banteng 州（Tangerang 市）、ジャカルタ首都圏（北ジャカルタ区、西ジャカルタ区）
平成 15 年度		
杉島敬志	2003/7/13～2003/9/27	Nusa Tenggara Timur 州（Ende 県、Sikka 県）
	2004/3/17～2004/3/25	ワークショップ開催
阿部健一	2003/8/2～2003/9/5	Kalimantan Tengah 州
	2003/12/27～2004/1/6	Kalimantan Tengah 州
福岡正太	2003/7/13～2003/8/9	Jawa Barat 州（Bandung 市、Bandung 県）Sumatra Barat 州（Padang 都市区、Padang Pariaman 県、Padang Panjang 都市区、Bukittinggi 都市区）
中川　敏	2003/7/28～2003/8/27	Nusa Tenggara Timur 州（Ende 県、Ngada 県）
鏡味治也	2003/8/11～2003/9/24	Bali 州（Gianyar 州）
中村　潔	2003/11/29～2004/3/29	Bali 州、Nusa Tenggara Barat 州
梅田英春	2003/12/17～2004/1/7	Bali 州（Denpasar 都市区、Tabanan 県）
石川　登	2003/1/12～2004/2/2	Kalimantan Barat 州（Pontianak 市、Pontianak 県、Sambas 県、Sanggau 県、Benkayang 県）

本研究プロジェクトは国立民族学博物館の客員助教授であった中村潔氏（新潟大学人文学部教授）を研究代表者（副代表：福岡正太氏、国立民族学博物館助教授）とする国立民族学博物館の共同研究「ポスト『新秩序体制』インドネシアにおける地方的アイデンティティの人類学的研究」との密接な連携のもとでおこなわれた。本プロジェクトの研究組織構成員の全員がこの共同研究のメンバーとなり、そこで調査の事前準備と、調査成果の発表および議論がおこなわれたのである。平成 12 年度から平成 14 年度まで継続された、この共同研究における発表者と発表タイトルは下記のとおりである。なお、リスト中の金子正徳氏（金沢大学大学院）、松井一久氏（アジア経済研究所）、西芳実氏（東京大学大学院）は特別講師として発表したいただいた方々であり、共同研究の構成員ではない。

平成 12 年度

2000/7/8	鏡味治也	「地方分権のゆくえ」
2000/10/21	中村　潔	「アガマ・アダット・ディナス」
	中川　敏	「町と村 — 東インドネシアの村の近代」
2001/2/3	全 員	「2000 年度研究会の総括と次年度の研究打ち合わせ」
2001/2/24	全 員	「調査許可申請打ち合わせ」
2001/3/3	全 員	「調査許可申請打ち合わせ」

平成 13 年度

2001/5/26	金子正徳	「結婚に見る社会文化変化 — ランプン・プビアン社会の事例」
2001/6/16	松井一久	「スラウェシから見た地方分権化」
	西芳実	「飼い馴らされないエスニシティ」
2001/7/7	水野広祐	「インドネシア地方分権化における地方財政」
	梅田英春	「現代バリにおけるダランの宗教性」
2002/1/26	杉島敬志	「2001 年 5 月の『人身供犠』事件をめぐる考察 — 東ヌサ・テンガラ州・中部フローレス」
	福岡正太	「国際スンダ文化会議をめぐって — 地方分権化の中の『スンダ文化』」
2002/3/8	中川　敏	「出稼ぎと婚資 — ＮＴＴ州エンデ」
	中村　潔	「地方分権化における慣習村と行政村 — バリ州カランガスム」
2002/3/9	梅田英春	「文化審議育成委員会の諸活動とその成果」
	鏡味治也	「新地方自治法実施初年度のバリ州・県政府の実情」
	阿部健一	「泥炭湿地林の新たな町（パンカラン）？」

平成 14 年度

2002/5/25	石川　登	「ぼやける国のかたち：西カリマンタン国境地帯からの報告」

水野廣祐　「西ジャワ農村における行政組織と住民組織 ― 民主化と地方分権化のなかで」

2003/3/8　全 員　「研究会の総括と成果出版のための打ち合わせ」

また、中村潔氏を代表者とする国立民族学博物館の共同研究が終了したのち、国立民族学博物館地域研究企画交流センターの連携研究「地域連関の構図」の一環として、以下のような公開の研究会を開催し、科学研究費補助金による調査研究の成果を発表するとともに、その内容について参加者と議論をおこなった。

タイトル：　インドネシア地方社会のミクロロジー

日時：　2003 年 6 月 21 日 10:30～18:30

会場：　京都大学東南アジア研究センター 東棟２階 第１教室

題名：　福岡正太　「地方分権化の中のスンダ芸能」

鏡味治也　「バリにおける村落行政／自治の現状」

中川　敏　「内の財と外の財――エンデにおける贈与・送金・援助」

杉島敬志　「現在を理解するための歴史研究 ― 中部フローレスの土地、慣習法、首長」

なお、本報告書の各論文は、リライトと編集作業をおこなった後、英文の論集として 2005 年中の出版を計画している。また、この論集の内容に一般読者のための補足的情報をくわえ、インドネシアの地方社会の現状を明らかにする日本語による論集をまとめ、これも 2005 年中に出版することを予定している。

研究組織

研究代表者　杉島敬志　京都大学大学院アジア・アフリカ地域研究研究科　教授
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交付決定額（配分額）　（金額単位：千円）

	直接経費	間接経費	合計
平成 13 年度	10,700	3,210	13,910
平成 14 年度	10,100	3,030	13,130
平成 15 年度	9,400	2,820	12,220
総計	30,200	9,060	39,260

研究発表

（1）学会誌等

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（2）口頭発表

科学研究費補助金を得ておこなった 3 年間の調査成果をインドネシア人研究者と討議することを目的に、以下のワークショップを開催した。

タイトル：　The Micrology of Indonesian Local Societies
開催日：　2004 年 3 月 23 日
開催地：　インドネシア、ジャカルタ
開催場所：　インドネシア国立科学院（Indonesian Institute of Sciences）
Auditorium Widya Graha
参加人数：　約 90 名（うち外国人 80 名）
共同主催者：インドネシア国立科学院（Indonesian Institute of Sciences）、ボゴール農科大学（Bogor Agricultural University）、インドネシア国土地理院（National Coordination Agency for Surveys and Mapping）、京都大学大学院アジア・アフリカ地域研究研究科、京都大学東南アジア研究所
趣旨：

The Micrology of Indonesian Local Societies:

This workshop intends to present and discuss the results of a research project carried out for three consecutive years from fiscal year 2001 until March 2004, receiving financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). This project aimed at affording a factual understanding of socio-cultural phenomena that emerged in Indonesian local societies after the implementation of the decentralization regulation. Our research area, however, covers only a minute part of Indonesia. In addition, many things in flux there are too elusive to identify. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is likely that we have not strived in vain. If microscopic attention is focused on details in a comparative perspective with the period of the New Order, it is not infeasible to collect substantial data on a few aspects of present-day Indonesian local societies. We would like to present interim analyses of those materials in order to invite your perceptive comments. We expect that this workshop will be a vital forum for exchanging views.

発表者と発表題名

Noboru Ishikawa, "Commodity and Labor on the Move: Borderlands of West Kalimantan as Economic Infrastructures of Sarawak, East Malaysia."

Ken'ichi Abe, "From Mega-project to Illegal Logging: Forest Resources and Decentralization in Central Kalimantan."

Kosuke Mizuno, "Musyawarah-mufakat or Representative Assembly System?: Governance Changes in Rural West Java in Democratizing Indonesia."

Yulfata Raharjo, "Humanitarian Action in Time of Crisis: Lessons Learned from Social Safety Net Programs (JPS)."

Takashi Sugishima, "Where Have the 'Entrepreneurs' Gone?: A Historical Comment on Adat in Central Flores."

Satoshi Nakagawa, "From Paddy to Vanilla, from Elephant Tusk to Money: Influence of Development Assistance upon Traditional Economy among the Ende People of Flores, Eastern Indonesia."

Haruya Kagami, "Regional Autonomy in Process: A Case Study in Bali 2001-2003."

Kiyoshi Nakamura, "Local Press in Bali in the Era of "*Reformasi*": An Appraisal of New Directions of Research."

Hideharu Umeda, "The History on Deprivation of Religious Role of *Dalang* in Bali and Its Indication of Restoration in 'Transition Period' in Indonesia."

Shota Fukuoka, "Cultural Policy on Sundanese Performing Arts at the Turn of the Century."

なお、上記発表者のうち、Yulfita Raharjo 氏はインドネシア国立科学院から発行される調査許可上を取得するうえでカウンターパートになっていただいたインドネシア国立科学院人口研究所に所属する人類学者である。

（3）出版物

Lye Tuck-po, Wil de Jong, and Abe Ken-ichi (eds.), *The Political Ecology of Tropical Forests in Southeast Asia: Historical Perspectives*. Kyoto University Press, 293p., 2003.

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研 究 成 果

『スハルト政権崩壊後のインドネシア地方社会に関する文化人類学的研究』

Anthropological Study on Local Societies in Post-Soeharto Indonesia

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A Case Study in Bali 2001-2003

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Introduction

Regional autonomy (*Otonomi Daerah*) is no doubt one of the most important keywords characterising the political scene of post-Soeharto Indonesia.[1] The term catches the liberal and anti-authoritarian atmosphere of the period, and has won the acclaim of the people who demand and yearn for a reformation, or even a deconstruction, of the highly centralized government system of Soeharto's New Order regime. If the word 'reformation' (*reformasi*) was and still is the most popular political slogan in this transitional period, 'regional autonomy' continues to indicate the desirable direction of the political reformation.

The word 'regional autonomy' in this context covers a wide range of current topics. Because it relates to the national governmental structure, the term was often referred to and advocated in the debates concerning federalism that once flourished in the president Habibie era. These debates ended in the moderate consensus among political leaders that a unitary government had to be maintained while the extent of regional autonomy had to be broadened.

The increase of regional autonomy was first realised in the form of two new laws concerning the decentralization of the domestic government system. Law No. 22 1999 on the devolution of governmental authority and Law No. 25 1999 on fiscal decentralization were both enacted in 1999 and have been implemented since 2001. These new laws obviously reflected the political climate of the period and have served as the founding stone for the subsequent policies on domestic governance.

Along with this schematical change of the domestic government system was carried out the transfer of a part of the national government staff to provincial or district (*kabupaten*) governments. Most of the transferred staff had been posted at provincial/

[1] There have already been many academic publications on this subject. Schulte Nordholt has surveyed this trend and has briefly commented on some of them [Schulte Nordholt 2003a].

district branches of state ministries, so that the policy might seem to have caused only an administrative change of status. Nevertheless, it brought about a significant structural change of regional government, especially at the district level.

While the reformation of the domestic fiscal system and the transfer of a part of the national government staff to regional governments were enforced in 2001, the implementation of some policies prescribed in the newly enacted laws was delayed because the laws had to be supplemented in detail by a series of government regulations (*Peraturan Pemerintah*) which themselves needed considerable time to be prepared. Such was the case of the renewal of the village government system, which was only briefly outlined in Law No. 22. The related articles in the law can be read as the official recognition of local traditional institutions as alternative governing bodies in the newly planned village government. This, however, was a highly sensitive issue, as the legal status of these local customary institutions had long been neglected ever since the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. The government regulations prescribing anew village government structure were not enacted until 2001. As a result, some district governments delayed the preparation of the district regulations on that matter, waiting for the enactment of the government regulations, while some others soon enacted such regulations without referring to the prescriptions of the national regulations which had not yet been sentenced.

Thus, the three years from 2001 to 2003, the period of my research on this subject, were the very beginning and trial stage of the realisation of the regional autonomy plan in the post-Soeharto era. The rail has already been set by the two laws, some policies have been enforced, but some others are not yet fully operative. During my three research visits to Bali between 2001 and 2003, I collected data at several sections of the Bali provincial government office and Gianyar district government office, and also at some village government offices in the district of Gianyar. In addition, in 2002 I made a short visit to the West Sumatra province to obtain data concerning the policies on the new village government system, hoping to compare them with the Balinese data. Throughout this research period, I often visited the village of Bona in the Gianyar district, where I once stayed for a year to conduct anthropological field research, and obtained various informations and opinions on the current regional autonomy policies through conversations with the villagers.

This paper analyzes some provisional results of the on-going decentralising policies of the domestic government system and the accompanying changes brought about at the province, district and village levels. The next section summarises the structural and financial changes in the provincial and district government which took

place in the first year of the enforcement of the two laws of the new regional autonomy plan by presenting and analysing the data from the Bali provincial office and the Gianyar district office.

The second section presents a comparison between the national regulation and the district regulations (of Gianyar in Bali and of Agam in West Sumatra) of the new village government system, and discusses the expected progress in village level democracy.

The third section focuses on the Balinese traditional village system which needs to be restructured in accordance with the newly constructed government village. In this Regional Autonomy era, the centuries-old traditional village system is highly evaluated by the Balinese people themselves as the fundamental base of their culture, and is hoped to play a supplementary but indispensable role in the village administration. Under such pressure the local traditional village system, too, is forced to reform its structure and function.

Thus, at least in Bali, regional autonomy policies following the newly enacted two laws have brought about fundamental changes in the administrative, budgetary and social system at the provincial, district and village levels. The final section discusses the significance of these political reforms for local people in terms of 'democratization', 'modernization', and 'civil society'. Decentralizing policies and village government system reforms obviously highlight an important part of the on-going vast and rapid social change in Indonesia. The influences of these reforms are far-reaching and fundamental because they not only follow the political urge of the current Reformation Era but also concern some principal matters of a nation-state: the imagined unity of uneven populace and regions, integration and power distribution, and the domestication of indigenous social systems into a modern bureaucracy.

1. Regional government reform

In view of the exploding antagonistic sentiment towards the highly centralized state system of Soeharto's New Order, decentralization has no doubt become the most urgent political task. President Habibie's government quickly prepared the basic two laws on decentralization and enforced them in 2001. The time of the change in regional politics and governance system came out decisively and rather abruptly.

The main issues of the reform concerned the rearrangement of the regional chief-parliament relationship, the establishment of an autonomous government body at the district level, and the change of the state subsidy system to regional governments.

Politically the most drastic change brought about by Law No. 22 was the power relationship between the regional chief and parliament. The law gave regional parliament the full rights to elect the regional chief and also to request his/her dismissal to the Minister of Domestic Affairs. The regional chief-parliament power balance thus became parallel with that of president-supreme advisory council (MPR) at the center. Another aim of this arrangement was to prevent the central government's intervention into regional politics, which had been a dominant feature of the regional political scene in the New Order Era.

While these prescriptions gave decisive power to the regional parliament, the chief was not given the right to dissolve the parliament. This condition put the regional chief in a quite vulnerable position, subject to the will of the dominant political parties in his/her regional parliament. These nation-wide political parties currently still have a highly centralised structure. Consequently, the central political leaders still have a strong voice in regional political matters and have preserved channels to access the regional economic resources through the party organization.

Since the enforcement of the new law, some regional parliaments have asked for the dismissal of their regional chiefs who had been nominated in the Soeharto Era, but their requests have not always been accepted for various reasons. Meanwhile, in some recent regional chief elections the candidates nominated by the regional branch of the dominant party were rejected by the central body of the party and instead the ones favoured by the center were appointed as the sole candidates of the party (the recent election of the governor of Bali province in 2002 was such a case). These cases show that current regional politics are still being controlled by the center to a considerable degree. In these conditions it is understandable that large scale money politics have prevailed in many regions.

The impact of the new law in the administrative domain, at least in Bali, was not so drastic, because the province of Bali was chosen as one of the model provinces in the pilot project of the administrative decentralization (*Proyek Percontohan Otonomi Daerah pada Daerah Tingkat II*) implemented in the 1990s, and the establishment and operation of regional government agencies (*Dinas*) at both the provincial and district levels had already been partly realized at the time of the enforcement of the new law. This does not mean, however, that there was no structural change in the regional government body. The Bali provincial government had no new agency set up, but the secretariat composed of four sections was restructured into three sections in 2001. The Gianyar district government set up five new agencies and three sections of the secretariat were reorganized into two sections in the same year.

A more troublesome issue was brought about by the transfer of a considerable number of national government staff to provincial and district governments enforced in the same year. Most of the transferred staff had worked at the regional branches of state ministries or were school teachers and administrators. Table 1 shows the increase of government personnel in the Gianyar district between 2000 and 2001. The total number of staff increased more than 50%. While the transfer of the school teachers and administrators was a matter of change of status, most of those who had worked at the state ministry branches were absorbed into newly set up district agencies. At the provincial level, the transferred ministry staff were posted in the existing provincial secretariat and agencies. These transfers caused not only a structural change of the regional government body but also resulted in a strong competition for high-ranked official positions.

Table 1. Increase of Government Personnel in the Gianyar District

[2000]		**[added in 2001]**	
District secretariat	198	District agencies	503
District agencies (12)	588	Kindergarten teachers	83
District units (Bappeda, DPRD, etc.)	390	Junior high school teachers	1008
Sub-district offices	144	Senior high school teachers	674
Ward offices	26	Administration staff of JHS	208
Public health offices	375	Administration staff of SHS	176
Primary school teachers	2146	School inspectors	9
Religion teachers	385	**Sub-total**	**2661**
Sports teachers	201		
Primary school guards	145		
Total	**4598**		

(Source: Gianyar district office and Gianyar district agency of education)

The most remarkable result of the regional government reform can be found in the financial domain. Law No. 25 prescribes a new tax distribution system and state subsidy system to regional governments. The former offers more proportion of tax revenue to regional governments, while the latter rearranges the various kinds of state subsidy to regional governments and integrates them into two kinds, that is, freely used general funds (*Dana Alokasi Umum*, DAU) and use-specified special funds (*Dana Alokasi Khusus*, DAK). Furthermore, the new domestic government policy, which lays importance to the district level autonomy, caused a greater financial flow from the central

government to the district governments than to the provincial governments.

Table 2 and 3 show the Bali provincial government budget and the Gianyar district government budget in 2000 and 2001. Since the new fiscal year system, which replaced the old one starting April until March with the new January-December system, was adopted in 2001, the figures for 2000 in these tables cover only a three-quarter year long period. Even considering that, the change of regional government budget was conspicuous.

Except for the balance previous year, the figures of the receipts of the Bali provincial government show a slight increase, but in reality there was a substantial decrease in both the province's own receipts and the state subsidy if we consider the different length of these periods.[2] The new tax distribution system has brought no beneficial results to a resource-poor province such as Bali. The amount of newly invested general funds (DAU) roughly corresponds to the total amount of routine funds and development funds of the previous year, while the provincial government did not receive any special funds (DAK) from the central government.

The expenditures of the Bali provincial government nearly tripled between 2000 and 2001, caused mainly by the swelling of routine expenditure, especially of personnel and of subsidies for districts. The increase of personnel expenditure can partly be explained by the increase of the provincial government staff caused by the transfer of state staff. The expansion of subsidies for districts includes the increasing motor vehicle tax distribution and the re-distribution of a part (30% in 2001) of hotel and restaurant taxes collected in the Badung district and Denpasar city to the other districts in Bali.[3]

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[2] Jayasuriya and Ketut Nehen [1991: 335] cited the Bali provincial budget 1971/2 and 1984/5. If we compare these figures with those in Table 2 above, we notice the following financial changes at the provincial level during these thirty years: (1) In 2000, the province's own receipts increased enormously to the extent that they exceeded the subsidies from the central government; (2) The development funds also increased so as to exceed the routine funds in the 2000 receipts; (3) The expenditures for personnel and materials only slightly increased from 1984/5 to 2000; (4) While the expenditures for economic development have sharply risen since 1971/2, those for social development continued to decrease in proportion during the same period.

[3] The redistribution of hotel and restaurant tax revenues among the districts is a policy to average out the benefits of tourism within the province, and has been carried out by the Bali province since 1998.

Table 2. Bali Provincial Budget, 2000 and 2001 (Rp million)

	2000	2001
[Receipts]		
Balance previous year	100,261	171,123
Province's own receipts	237,915	268,875
Subsidy from central government	102,550	103,105
Tax distribution	12,178	10,135
Routine funds	30,699	(DAU) 91,170
Development funds	57,982	
Others	1,691	1,800
Total receipts	**440,726**	**543,103**
[Expenditure]		
Routine	131,371	354,349
Personnel	30,770	110,100
Materials	15,653	20,599
Subsidy for districts	55,371	160,926
Others	29,577	62,724
Development	120,600	193,506
Economic	42,321	85,426
Social	26,310	45,615
General	31,841	48,471
Subsidy for districts	20,128	13,994
Total expenditure	**251,971**	**547,855**

(Source: Bali provincial office)

The budget of the Gianyar district shows a much bigger change between 2000 and 2001. Both the receipts and the expenditure increased more than 100% from 2000 to 2001, even if we adjust the difference of the length of these fiscal years.

The main contribution to the swelling of the receipts came from the enormous increase of state subsidy. The freely used general funds (DAU) alone equalled almost twice the total amount of routine funds and development funds of the previous year. In addition, the district government received use-specified special funds (DAK) which covered nearly three-quarters of the development funds of the previous year.

The increase of the receipts was used for both routine and development expenditures. Among them, routine expenditure for personnel, subsidies for

sub-districts/ villages, and the expenditure for economic, social and general development almost doubled or more than doubled. The increase of the expenditure for personnel includes that for newly transferred staff. Most of the subsidies for sub-districts and village governments are salaries of their staff. The increase of the development expenditure shows the direct impact of the new domestic policy which gives priority to the district level autonomous management.

Table 3 Gianyar District Budget, 2000 and 2001 (Rp million)

	2000	2001
[Receipts]		
Balance previous year	6,024	10,021
Province's own receipts	25,145	38,519
Subsidy from central government	92,714	233,981
Tax distribution	4,376	8,529
Routine funds	38,189	(DAU) 182,460
Development funds	46,252	(DAK) 42,992
Others	3,897	0
Total receipts	**123,883**	**282,521**
[Expenditure]		
Routine	62,244	142,090
Personnel	41,837	99,288
Materials	10,497	10,789
Subsidy for sub-districts/villages	5,487	12,896
Others	4,423	19,117
Development	65,264	153,788
Economic	48,594	116,063
Social	5,357	15,849
General	1,313	21,876
Total expenditure	**127,508**	**295,878**

(Source: Gianyar district office)

When we take a look at the village government budget, we find the lowest level of government finance. Table 4 shows the Bona village government budget in 2001, 2002 and 2003. As data on the budget of 2000 could no be obtained, we cannot trace the budget change at the beginning of the new autonomy policy. Nevertheless, the figures

in the table demonstrate the current financial condition of the village government in the Gianyar district, Bali.

More than 90% of the receipts comes from state and regional government subsidies. While the amount of state subsidies remained unchanged during these three years, those from both the provincial and district government doubled from 2001 to 2002. This, however, is mainly caused by the increase of the village government staff salaries. The only income source of this medium size (781 households in 2001) farm village are administration fees which account for less than 3% of the total receipts.

As the composition of the subsidy indicates, the bulk of the routine expenditure is spent to staff salaries. Relatively large amount of the expenditure for equipments from the routine section and that for the renovation of the village head office from the development section can be explained by the recent establishment of this administrative village which seceded from the village of Belega in 1999. The actual development expenditure is an annual infusion to village funds which accounts to only a few percent of the total expenditure. These figures demonstrate that while the economic condition of the village government staff has fairly improved because of the financial support from the relatively rich provincial and district governments, village development is still limited to providing public equipments.[4]

Table 4 Bona Village Budget, 2001, 2002 and 2003 (Rp thousands)

	2001	2002	2003
[Receipts]			
Administration fee	1,162	1,421	1,907
Interest	1,200	2,143	1,977
Subsidy from central government	11,920	11,920	11,920
Personnel	1,920	1,920	1,920
Development	10,000	10,000	10,000
Subsidy from provincial government	14,767	30,463	25,500
Personnel	13,557	25,167	25,167
Tax distribution	1,210	5,296	332
Subsidy from district government	16,856	35,722	41,427
Personnel	9,423	24,573	35,853
Tax distribution	7,433	11,149	5,575

[4] In 2003, the monthly salary of a village head in the Gianyar district amounted to Rp. 650,000 and that of village secretary to Rp. 575,000. This amount is still small in comparison with that of other government staff but bigger than the average earnings of a non-skilled laborer.

Donation	1,545	1,984	2,091
Total receipts	**47,450**	**83,653**	**84,822**
[Expenditure]			
Routine	38,554	72,614	80,332
Personnel	25,110	51,660	63,660
Materials	4,120	2,354	1,450
Equipments	4,664	6,700	7,800
Traveling expenses	650	850	550
Activities	3,610	5,450	5,750
Subsidy for villagers' activities	400	5,600	1,122
Development	9,002	11,039	4,490
Infusion to village economic asset	1,200	1,393	1,227
Renovation of village head office	5,659	9,646	3,263
Arrangement of public health center	1,500	0	0
Others	643	0	0
Total expenditure	**47,556**	**83,653**	**84,822**

(Source: Bona village head office)

2. New village government system

The reform of the administrative village government system is another controversial issue of the new regional autonomy policy. The village government prescribed in Law No. 5 1979 on village governance, enacted by Soeharto's regime, was a highly centralized system in which the village head had monopolistic power. The village government was composed of the executive body, consisting of a village head and administration staff, and the Village Deliberation Council (*Lembaga Musyawarah Desa*, LMD), but the latter was headed by the village head and was supposed to play only a consultative role in village governance. Later it was supplemented by another administrative body called LKMD (*Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa* or village society's resilience council) which was also headed by the village head and was established to support village development planning. Such a centralized structure was suited to, and was exactly planned as such by, the top-down style of Soeharto's regime and functioned effectively in spreading his development programs at the grass-roots level throughout the country. After the fall of Soeharto's regime, however, the

centralized structure itself has become the target of criticism by the 'reformist' politicians.

Another debated point in the revision of village governance was the uniformly imposed village administrative system of the former law. Before the enactment of Law No. 5 1979 each region in the country had its own local administrative units which had originated from local customary tradition and had been rearranged under the Dutch colonial rule. The model system and the names of functional bodies prescribed in Law No. 5 1979 were taken from Central and East Javanese cases which were fundamentally different in name, structure and composition of village administrative unit from those in outer islands. As the New Order government imposed Javanese style village government in all regions of the country, the policy created serious confusion especially in the outer island regions.[5] As a result, an urgent requirement of the Reformation Era regarding village government system was its adaptation to the local customary tradition of each region.

Although the speedily enacted Law No. 22 1999 includes only a brief outline of village governance, it did not mention the key points of reform as noted above. Village government is planned to consist of an executive body (a village head and administration staff) and a Village Representative Council (*Badan Perwakilan Desa*, BPD) which replaces the former LMD and LKMD (Article 94). While the word 'desa' is used as the official term for administrative village, the name of the village head can be variable according to local tradition (Article 95(1)). The village head is elected by the villagers as it was in the previous era (Article 95(2)) but the term of office is shortened from 8 years to 5 years (Article 96). The required qualifications for a village head are nearly the same as in the former Law No. 5 1979, except that the new law prescribes a minimum age of 25 for a village head (Article 97) while the old law stipulated an age between 25 and 60 years old.

The important change of the village head's position is that, while the former law located it within the regional government official rank system and prescribed the village head to be responsible to the district head, the new law demands the elected village head to be appointed by BPD and only to be confirmed by the district head (Article 95(3)), and the village head to be responsible to the village residents (Article 102a). Furthermore, the new law includes the possibility of dismissal of the village head, not only by the district head who appoints him officially, but also by BPD via a proposal to the district

[5] On the negative impact of the implementation of Law No. 5 1979 on the outer island regions, see for example Kato [1989].

head (Article 103(2)). This change of power balance between the village head and the village council obviously reflects the antagonistic mood of the early Reformation Era to the centralised New Order regime.

Another important point of the new village government plan is the establishment of the Village Representative Council (BPD) as a fully autonomous legislative body. The council's function is to protect local customs, issue village regulations, represent villagers' aspirations and supervise the village executive body's activities (Article 104). To realize these tasks, the council should be separated from the executive body consisting of the village head and administration staff. Law No. 22 does not offer any further prescriptions, but leaves it up to the district government to determine the detailed regulations (Article 111(1)).

To supplement the general plan of the new village government, outlined by Law No. 22, the Minister of Domestic Affairs Decision No. 64 1999 on the guidelines for village government regulations was announced in the same year. This decision offers concreter and more detailed stipulations for a desirable village government. The size of a village is set at more than 1500 residents or 300 households (Article 6b). The setting up of village sub-units is freely decided by the regional government according to each local tradition (Article 4(1)). As for the possible dismissal of the village head by the village council (BPD), the Decision specifies that if the council twice rejects the head's annual report of activities it can propose the dismissal of the village head to the district head (Article 19 (2)). The village head and administration staff are not allowed to be members of the village council (Article 41). Village regulations, prepared by the village council and enacted by the village head, need not be confirmed by the district head (Article 50 (2)), and the district government can cancel them only if they are in conflict with public interests or national laws (Article 70 (1)). These instructions clearly reflect the direction of government reform at the time and show the efforts to establish an autonomous village government adapted to each local situation.

Under these circumstances, regional governments started to prepare regional regulations of their own. As a general legal procedure, a national law should be supplemented by government regulations before its implementation. In this case, however, the enactment of the related government regulations were delayed until November 2001. Some regional governments quickly responded to the promulgation of Law No. 22 and enacted regional regulations on new village government before the government regulations were enacted.

Such was the case in the West Sumatra province. The province is the heartland of the Minangkabau people who traditionally had the *nagari* system as the local political

and economic unit. *Nagari* roughly corresponds to a Javanese village in size but has its own tradition in structure and composition. It was used as the smallest governmental unit in the province since the Dutch colonial period until the implementation of Law No. 5 1979 by the New Order government.[6]

When the implementation of the new uniform village government system, prescribed in Law No. 5, was carried out in 1983 in the province, the provincial government did not choose *nagari* but its subdivision (called *jorong* and so on) as a 'village (desa)' unit. Some say that this was to maximize national government subsidies to the region. The subdivision of *nagari*, however, was neither autonomous nor functional in local affairs and did not work well as an effective village government body through this period.[7]

This regrettable trial of an 'enforced' national village government system under the Soeharto regime perhaps explains the quick response of the province to the newly enacted Law No. 22 1999).[8] The provincial government launched the slogan, 'Return to 543 *nagari* ', which meant that the New Order's Javanized village government would be replaced again by the indigenous *nagari* of which 543 units existed at the time of enforcement of the New Order village system. Soon after, the provincial government issued the West Sumatra Provincial Regulation No. 9 2000 on general stipulations of the *nagari* government in 2000. This Regulation does not use the word 'desa' at all and replaces it by the word 'nagari'. Also the village head is called *Wali Nagari* and the village council *Badan Perwakilan Anak Nagari*. The use of these local terms, together with the references to the Customary and Islamic Council (*Badan Musyawarah Adat dan Syarak Nagari*) and Customary Law Organization (*Lembaga Adat Nagari*), obviously demonstrate the eager aspiration to revitalize the traditional local government system. It was decided that this Regulation would be applied to the whole region, except town areas and Mentawai island.

District governments then followed the provincial decision to prepare district regulations of their own. Agam District Regulation No. 31 2001 on nagari government is one of these regulations. The new village government outlined in the regulation mostly follows the provincial government's plan and the Minister of Domestic Affairs Decision No. 64 1999 mentioned above. A village is called 'Nagari' and its subdivision

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[6] See Mohammad Hasbi, et. al. [1990].

[7] See, for example, some articles in the local journal *Genta Budaya* No. 3, especially those by Andrinof & Edy Utama [1996]; Emeraldy [1996].

[8] The early phase of West Sumatran responses to the regional autonomy policy is briefly sketched by Ismet [2003].

'Jorong'. The size of a village is more than 1500 residents or 300 households. The village head, called 'Wali Nagari', should be more than 25 years old, have a higher education than junior high school, and should be elected by the residents. His term of office is 5 years and reappointment is allowed only once. He is responsible to village residents and can be dismissed by a proposal of the village council to the district head. Administration staff should be between 20 and 60 years old, have a higher education than junior high school and be selected from among the applicants by the village head. Village subdivision heads are elected by the residents and have a 5-year term of office. They compose the village executive body and are not allowed to be members of the village council.

The village council is called 'Badan Perwakilan Anak Nagari' (Nagari People's Representative Council). The members should be more than 25 years old and have a higher education than junior high school. The term of office is 5 years. The members may be elected or appointed. In the latter case, they should be nominated from among the various traditional officials or functional groups such as Ninik Mamak (lineage seniors), Alim Ulama (religious teachers), Cadiak Pandai (learned men), Bundo Kanduang (senior women) and village youth.

The Customary and Islamic Council (Majelis Musyawarah Adat dan Syara' Nagari) supervises customary and Islamic affairs, and the members are composed of Ninik Mamak, Alim Ulama, Cadiak Pandai, Bundo Kanduang and the representatives of other social groups. The Customary Council (Kerapatan Adat Nagari) is composed of lineage seniors and customary officials and arbitrates matters of inheritance. The Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Nagari), consisting of religious teachers and experts in the village, judges on religious matters.

A rather extraordinary prescription in the regulation limits the candidates for village head as well as for village council members to muslims. Although this may be suited to the West Sumatran social situation and their local tradition, it seems quite odd when we consider it in terms of Western democracy. This may be seen as one of the results of the impatient entrustment of governmental tasks to customary organizations.

The issue of the integration of the administrative and traditional village became a source of debates in Bali, too, in the early stages of preparation for new village government system. Contrary to the West Sumatran *nagari*, the Balinese traditional village is smaller than the average (Javanese model) administrative village in size and its organization is based on Hindu principles. Since the Dutch colonial rule was established at the beginning of the 20th century, a new administrative village system was set up to govern the Balinese people, while the traditional village system was left to

function only in the religious domain.[9] This double-village system continued after independence, and the New Order government's Law No. 5 1979 caused no drastic change in village administration. This does not mean, however, that Balinese people were satisfied with the double-village system. For them, the traditional village still offers the communal norms and is the socio-cultural field in which their daily activities take place. Thus, during the New Order period, the provincial government made great efforts to revitalize customary organizations with legalizing the existence of traditional villages by the Bali Provincial Government Regulation No. 6 1986).[10]

With the coming of the Reformation Era and the enactment of Law No. 22 1999, serious debates on the rearranging plan of the village government system flourished among politicians, bureaucrats and opinion leaders. Some asserted that administrative villages should be abolished and replaced by traditional villages, while others feared that traditional villages would turn political if placed within the regional government structure. The debates urged the provincial government to revise the regulations on traditional villages to make them more adapted to the modern situation, but did not reach the consensus that the double-village system should be integrated into traditional villages.

Accordingly, the district governments in Bali started to prepare district regulations on the new administrative village government. Since they waited for the enactment of government regulations, the procedure took more time than in West Sumatra. A series of Gianyar district government regulations concerning the new village government system, for example, was enacted as late as 2002).[11]

The prescriptions of the Gianyar district regulations are very similar to the already mentioned Agam district regulations except for some points noted below. Villages are still called 'Desa' and village heads 'Perbekel', reviving the title of the colonial period. The age of village heads is limited to between 25 and 60 years old, as was the case in the previous New Order period. Administration staff should be between 21 and 40 years old and have a higher education than senior high school. A village subdivision is called 'Banjar Dinas' and its head (Kelihan Banjar) should be between 21 and 50 years old and

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[9] See Warren [1993].

[10] See Kagami [2003].

[11] These are: Gianyar District Government Regulation No. 6 2002 on the election of village heads; No. 7 on cooperation among villages; No. 8 on village social organizations; No. 9 on village subdivisions; No. 10 on village government; No. 11 on village finance; No. 12 on administration staff recruitment; No. 13 on the establishment, elimination and merger of villages; No. 14 on the village council; No. 15 on village resources; No. 16 on village regulations; No. 17 on the rewards for village heads and administration staff.

is elected from among Banjar members. The village council is named 'Badan Perwakilan Desa' and its members are composed of Banjar representatives elected by each Banjar. The age of the members is limited to between 25 and 60, and not only village executive staff but also public officials in general are not allowed to be members.

As the new administrative village structure is separated from the traditional village, there are no prescriptions on the village head's religion. The same reason explains why the village council members' composition is based on the village subdivision (Banjar). As a result, this new village government system does not substantially differ from that in the former period, except for the independence of the village council from the control of the village head and the resultant change of power balance between the village head and the village council promoted by Law No. 22 1999.

According to the district regulations, the existing administrative villages in the Gianyar district were to be shifted automatically to the new village government bodies. The offices of village head were to be held by the former village heads until the end of their term of office. So, too, were the administration staff.

The main change was the replacement of the former village council (LMD) by the new one (BPD), whose members was elected at all the villages of the district in the summer of 2003. Some villages conducted the actual election by following almost the same procedure as that of the general election. The election committee was composed of the former village council and Banjar heads, and the committee asked the residents of each Banjar to nominate candidates. Polling places were set up at each Banjar meeting hall. On the day of polling, Banjar residents came to the polling place, registered at the reception, received voting papers and polled. After the polling was closed, the polling box was opened on the spot and the votes were publicly counted by committee members. I had the opportunity to observe such a counting of votes at the village of Sukawati and was impressed by its highly democratic and transparent procedure.

In some other villages including the village of Bona, however, the village council election was more obscure. Some informants from Bona said that only one candidate was nominated for each Banjar and that the voting was conducted through a Banjar meeting and not through polling. They even suspected that the nomination had been controlled by the village head. The elected members were all young and highly educated men, but they had little experience in village affairs and had scarcely shown opinion leadership at village meetings. The village head himself tried to justify the election without polling, saying that the shortage of village funds made it impossible to conduct polling. Though this sounds fairly plausible if we consider the village's financial condition discussed above, financial reasons cannot be used as an excuse

against doubts about the new village council's legitimacy. Whether or not the new village government system can prove to be trustworthy will depend on the newly established village council's activities.

Two years after the enactment of Law No. 22, the central government announced the enactment of Government Regulation No. 76 2001 on the guidelines of the village government regulations. While as a whole it confirms the guidelines drawn by the Minister of Domestic Affairs Decision No. 64 1999, it shows some minor differences.

The most important revision is the elimination of the article mentioning the village council's right to propose the village head's dismissal to the district head if the council twice rejects the head's annual report of activities. Although the prescription of possible dismissal is retained, the revision clearly exhibits a small retreat from the Minister's Decision. In fact, many actual confrontations between the village head and the village council have taken place in several regions since the enactment of Law No. 22 and the Minister of Domestic Affairs Decision No. 64. It is plausible that the central government worried about the instability of village governance caused by the possible dismissal of the village head as prescribed by the Minister's Decision. Although it does not mean that district governments are not allowed to include this prescription in their own regulations, the elimination of the prescription from the government regulation still puts some pressure on the regional governments' decision. An official of the governance section of the Gianyar district office expressed his disappointment about this point and worried about the necessary revision of the newly enacted district regulations.

Another important revision found in Government Regulation No. 76 is the elimination of the article which allows a district head to annul village regulations. This coincides well with the current regional autonomy policy which negates the vertical relationship between district governments and village governments.

These revisions may indicate that the central government's intention to promote regional autonomy has been decreasing. It is true that many troublesome cases, such as the village head's confrontation with the village council and the uncontrolled spread of village regulations, have occurred in various regions since the implementation of the new autonomy policies. These cases, however, do not invalidate the importance of regional autonomy itself. Many members of the Agam and Gianyar district government staff whom I interviewed, especially of the younger generation, did not hide their eagerness to prepare and establish a new village government system. This indicates that the new policy is highly welcomed by the regional governments.

3. Modification of the Balinese traditional village system

Contrary to the West Sumatra province, where the administrative function of the village government was entrusted to the traditional *nagari* system, the Bali provincial government decided to keep the traditional and administrative village systems separate. This does not mean, however, that the traditional village system was left untouched. Urged by the critical opinions toward the remaining institutions of the previous period, the provincial government prepared to revise the provincial policy on Balinese traditional villages, and enacted Bali Provincial Regulation No. 3 2001 on Desa Pakraman to replace Provincial Regulation No. 6 1986 on the status, function and roles of traditional villages.

The new regulation introduces some significant changes in the traditional village organization and management. First, the term for traditional village was changed from 'Desa Adat' to 'Desa Pakraman'. Since the colonial period, the Balinese traditional village has been referred to as 'Desa Adat' in both official and ordinary use to differentiate it from the administrative 'Desa Dinas'. Not only the term *dinas*, originating from the Dutch 'dienst' (service), but also *adat* (of Arabic origin), were borrowed words for the Balinese. In daily conversation among villagers, a traditional village was, and still is referred to simply as 'desa'.

The wish to use the term 'Desa Pakraman' to refer to Balinese traditional village was already voiced by Hindu intellectuals in the 1990s. For example, I Ketut Wiana, a senior official of the Indonesian Hindu Council, in a column essay in the local newspaper Bali Post, explained the historical origin of the word *pakraman* and proposed to replace the name 'Desa Adat' by 'Desa Pakraman'. According to this account, the word *pakraman* can be found in Balinese palmleaf documents and means 'works' or 'behaviour').[12] Though the word is seldom used in daily conversation nowadays, its root word *krama* is a very common word meaning 'member' and is generally used to refer to traditional village members. Historical analyses and ordinary (non-) use besides, the word *pakraman* sounds more familiar and indigenous for the Balinese than the word *adat*.

During the provincial council's preparatory session for the revision of the provincial regulations, a member of the dominant party (POI-P) proposed a revising plan including the change of the term for traditional village, with the support of a professor of law from the Udayana State University. The debate during the session of course

[12] See Wiana [1997].

reflected the political dynamics of the time. The result was the new Regulation No. 3 2001 which aims to wipe out top-down style government interventions in customary affairs, typical of the former period, and to establish Balinese traditional villages as fully independent local indigenous organizations.

Although the old regulations recognized the autonomous status of traditional villages, they still stressed the coordinative role of the regional government. In 1979, the provincial government set up a supervising committee of local customary organization (*Majelis Pembina Lembaga Adat*), headed by the chairman of the provincial council, and ran various government programs to give guidelines for the management of customary organizations and the arbitration of customary conflicts).[13] This top-down style policy obviously did not fit well with the political situation of the Reformation Era.

The new regulations include provisions to abolish the supervising committees and replace them by coordinating committees (*Majelis Desa Pakraman*) at the provincial, district and subdistrict levels in order to arrange inter-village affairs. These committees are to be composed of representatives of each traditional village. A similar kind of organization was once tried in the 1990s in Gianyar at the advice of the district head. In some subdistricts committees called 'traditional village head forum' (*Forum Bendesa Adat*) were actually set up. Under the centralized power system of the time, however, these forums existed only as nominal consultative bodies and did not function effectively to handle inter-village problems.

The organizing procedure of the new committees was conducted in plain bottom-to-top style. In the Gianyar district, for example, the district government arranged the first meeting at the subdistrict level and asked each traditional village to send the traditional village head (*Bendesa*) and one more representative to the meeting. At the first meeting the chairman and managing staff were elected from among the participants. Then, each subdistrict committee sent representatives to the district level meeting to elect the chairman and managing staff of the district committee. These procedures were conducted fully independently from the supervision of the regional government. The old supervising committee and its district branches were finally abolished in 2002 and the new coordinating committee at the district level was set up in 2003. The provincial level committee is however not yet organized at present (beginning of 2004).

Although they are organized from bottom to top, there still remains doubts whether these committees will be effective in arbitrating and dissolving inter-village conflicts,

[13] See Kagami [2003].

because the committees have no other legitimate rights than to discuss and advise. It will take a few more years before we can evaluate their efficiency.

The revised provincial regulations include some new prescriptions on the structure and composition of traditional villages. One deals with guest membership, especially for non-Hindu residents. The Balinese traditional village essentially was, and still is, a Hindu organization based on religious activities where there is no room for non-Hindu residents. Its main activities are the organization of village temple festivals and the management of the village cemetery where only village members can bury their family members and conduct funeral rituals. In these days, however, an increasing number of non-Hindu residents actually live within the traditional village's boundary, especially in town areas and tourist spots. The new prescription regarding guest membership was intended as a measure to adapt traditional villages to the contemporary situation. In practice, the provincial government urges traditional villages to register non-Hindu residents as quasi-members (*krama tamiu*) of the village who are exempt from religious duties but should participate in communal works and pay some portion of the annual village fee. In this way, the regional government in Bali expects traditional villages to play a role of surveillance over the increasing number of new-comers to Bali.

Another additional prescription concerns the setting up of village guards called *pacalang*. This measure perhaps reflected commonly observed communal responses to socio-political disturbance in other regions of the country at the early stage of the Reformation Era. Faced with the decreasing power of surveillance by police and army, many local communities set up local guards to maintain communal security. According to the new regulation, village guards are responsible for maintaining security and order during customary and religious events. Generally, they are in charge of traffic control at temple festivals and customary rituals. But I observed an unusual case at a village where these guards not only handled traffic jams, which often occurred at the village's main road where popular restaurants were located, but also managed the roadside parking and collected parking fees. This arrangement was permitted by the district's transportation agency, which has the jurisdiction of public parkings, in order to cover the shortage of official traffic controllers. According to the traditional village head, the collected fees were given to the village guards as daily rewards. Whatever the reason may be, this case shows that the borderline between the customary and governmental sphere has become blurred in contemporary Bali.

In addition to revising the regulations, the provincial government has been offering all kinds of financial support to traditional villages in recent years. In 2001, for example, the government loaned a motorcycle for free and started to give a monthly

reward of Rp. 75,000 to each traditional village head throughout the province. At the same time the government decided to provide annual funds to each traditional village, which amounted to 10 million rupiah in 2001 and was raised to 25 million rupiah in 2004.

In parallel with the provincial government policy, some resource rich districts also started to offer financial support to traditional villages. The Gianyar district government, for example, decided to distribute 15 percent of hotel and restaurant tax revenue to traditional villages in the district in 2000. In 2001 the percentage was raised to 25 percent, and in 2002 to 30 percent, which amounts to roughly 15~20 million rupiah for each traditional village per year.

Behind these governmental policies lies the common opinion among Balinese that the success of tourism development in Bali depends on lively activities of traditional villages which sustain tourist attractions such as performing arts and rituals. From this point of view the regional government's financial support of traditional villages seems quite reasonable. As a result, traditional villages have much larger financial funds than administrative villages. As is the case with the development funds of administrative villages, however, traditional villages tend to use these funds for the construction and renovation of village facilities such as temples and meeting halls. Thus, the traditional village of Bona spent the funds from the district government in 2000 for the construction of a new storehouse at the Village Central Temple (*Pura Puseh*), and those from both the provincial and district governments in 2001 for the renovation of the Village Meeting Hall (*Wantilan*).

As these recent regional government's policies indicate, the Balinese traditional village has changed significantly in response to the changing socio-political dynamics of the Reformation Era. While this local communal organization receives a considerable amount of financial support from the regional government, it is required to play some roles in government administration. Although it is undoubtly segregated from administrative village in ideological domain, in practical domain its role comes to melt into that of administrative village. The regional government's policy to maintain the double-village system brings different sorts of problem to Balinese local community from those found in West Sumatra.

4. Toward a new village democracy?

In response to the changing socio-political circumstances, not only the structure and

composition but also the management of traditional villages went through some striking changes. This trend seems to be related not particularly with the post-Soeharto reformistic atmosphere but rather with the general modernization process.

The most commonly observed change in management is the adoption of documenting minutes of village meetings and financial reports. Recently, some 'modern' traditional villages document the proceedings and decisions at village meetings and then circulate them to the villagers. Annual or seasonal balance sheets are presented at meetings to be discussed and confirmed by villagers. This innovation concerns not just the efficiency of procedure but also the legitimacy of decisions and agreements. At a village meeting of Bona, which I observed, the seasonal balance sheet of the traditional village presented by the traditional village head was criticized by the attending villagers as being too general and not minutely recorded. Though the head responded by explaining the minute items of payment and thus avoided to be blamed, he surely seemed to have lost the trust of the villagers. As this case indicates, the documentation in traditional village management claims the accuracy and transparency of procedure.

Another innovational managing method was adopted by the same traditional village head of Bona. He activated the traditional village council (*Sabha Desa*), which was only mentioned in the guidelines prescribed by the former provincial regulation No. 6 1986 but had never been actually set up in Bona. He proposed the idea at a village meeting and asked each of the village subunits (*Banjar*) to select three or four representatives. The council was composed of these subunit representatives as well as subunit heads (*Kelihan Banjar*) and of representatives of the village youth organization. This composition closely resembles, and even preceded, that of the newly organized administrative village council. The selected members were relatively young people who often voiced their opinions at village meetings. The village head's idea was to manage customary affairs mainly through council meetings to reduce the time and frequency of whole village meetings. The council was set up in 2002 and remained active for almost one and a half year, but its activities declined toward the time of the new village head election. I once observed a council meeting in 2002 and was impressed by the quite frank and lively atmosphere of discussion. The decline of the council's activities may have resulted from the decreasing reliability of the village head caused by his opaque financial management.

These modernizing reforms of traditional village management can partly be explained by the village head's career. The village head of Bona was a retired government official. It is highly plausible that he obtained his reforming ideas from his

experiences at his government office. To recruit the traditional village head and managing staff from among those who have worked at modern institutions such as government offices, schools and business companies is common practice in contemporary Bali. This practice surely promotes the tendency toward a modernized style of management in Balinese traditional villages.

Despite this modernization, there often remains a traditional element of local community, namely, the power relationship among residents based on social rank of birth. While this has been outspokenly criticized as a feudal legacy in Bali and in Indonesia as a whole since the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, the hierarchical social norms still persist in the daily behaviour of villagers and especially in customary affairs. Whether and to what extent the villagers can free themselves from this hierarchical system depends on the political and economic power which former village lords can demonstrate.

For example, the traditional village head of Bona, mentioned above, is a member of a prestigious noble family in the village which owns about two hectares of rice land but has no other economic resources nor socio-politically influential positions. He was nominated as a candidate for the position of traditional village head because of his career at the government office, being praised for his efficient managing style but criticized for the lack of transparency in his financial management. In short, he was esteemed as traditional village head not because of his family background but because of his management ability. Nevertheless, he once told me that his duty as the traditional village head was to maintain and revitalize customary norms. He mentioned the recent trend among villagers to have their children wear ceremonial costumes at ritual occasions, explained it as a sign of the increasing religious piety among villagers, adding that in the old days villagers used to wear such costumes as well to visit nobles' houses. Although he did not state it directly, he seemed to think that the revitalization of customary norms would be coterminous with that of feudalistic social norms.

The more powerful noble families still have a dominant voice in customary affairs. The most conspicuous case is that of the royal families in the village of Ubud. Holding large areas of rice land and controlling the tourism business, and also because of their generous financial patronage of rituals, they still maintain a high prestige and social status not only among the Ubud villegers themselves but also among the residents of the surrounding villages which were once ruled by the Ubud royal family).[14]

The office of traditional village head of Ubud has continuously been occupied by

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[14] See MacRae [1999].

members of the royal families. The secretary of Ubud, himself a nephew of the village head, once explained to me that the task of a traditional village head these days covers a wide range of matters. The daily offerings villagers put on the pavement in front of the houseyard gate, for example, may obstruct the flow of rain water. The head has to instruct the villagers about the proper way to put such offerings, and also has to negotiate with the government about the desirable form and shape of village pavements. In ritual matters, too, the religious requirements must be adjusted to the modern circumstances of the village. Thus, the height of a funeral tower should not exceed the height of the electric wires that cross the village roads. These examples show that a traditional village head functions as a kind of negotiator between customary affairs and the modern world.

The traditional village head has negotiating power in inter-village affairs as well. The secretary mentioned a recent case in which young men from a neighbouring village injured an Ubud villager after a quarrel about a trivial matter. The assailant was surrendered to the police on the spot. Worried about the expansion of inter-village antagonism, the village head called both village subdivision heads and urged them to calm their residents. He also requested the subdivision head of the assailant to hold a purification ritual to cleanse the ritual pollution of the village caused by the blood of the victim. This kind of settlement was possible because both villages were once ruled by the Ubud royal family and the villagers today still recognize its power in the region. "The words of the Ubud traditional village head are still respected by the villagers. If he says 'shut up!', the villagers won't dare to speak", said the secretary.

As both the Bona and Ubud cases illustrate, the revitalization of customary norms contains a fundamental dilemma. The more obediently they are followed, the more easily can intra- and inter-village matters be settled properly and effectively. On the other hand, this may also mean the revitalization of old feudal power and prestige. While the managing methods of traditional villages can be, and actually have gradually modernized in recent years, the power structure in local communities may not. To realize true autonomy and democracy at the local community level, the modern doctrine must grapple with the inveterate habit of hierarchical social relationships that are maintained under the name of local customs.

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Table 5. Comparison of village government systems

Law No. 5 1979	**Law No. 22 1999**	**M. of Domestic Affairs Decision No. 64 1999**	**Gov. Regulation No. 76 2001**	**Agam district regulation No. 31 2001**	**Gianyar district regulations No. 6~17 2002**
village: Desa	Desa	Desa	Desa	Nagari	Desa
subdivision: Dusun	free	free	free	Jorong	Banjar Dinas
village head: Kepala Desa	freely named	Kepala Desa	freely named	Wali Nagari	Bendesa
8 years office	5 years office	5 years office	5 years office	5 years office	5 years office
25-60 years old	25~ years old	25~ years old	25~ years old	25~ years old	25-60 years old
responsible to district head;	responsible to village residents;	responsible to village residents;	responsible to village residents;	responsible to village residents;	responsible to village residents;
dismissal by district head	dismissal by district head based on village council proposal	dismissal by district head based on village council proposal after rejecting twice the annual report	dismissal by district head based on village council proposal	dismissal by district head based on village council proposal	dismissal by district head based on village council proposal after rejecting twice the annual report
staff: Sekretariat Desa	Perangkat Desa	Perangkat Desa	Perangkat Desa	Perangkat Nagari	Perangkat Desa
Kepala Dusun	subdivision heads	subdivision heads	subdivision heads	Kepala Jorong	Kelihan Banjar Dinas
village council: Lembaga Masyarakat Desa	Badan Perwakilan Desa	Badan Perwakilan Desa	Badan Perwakilan Desa	Badan Perwakilan Rakyat Nagari	Badan Perwakilan Desa
headed by village head		village head and staff not allowed to be members;	village head and staff not allowed to be members;	village head and staff not allowed to be members;	village head and staff not allowed to be members;
members representing customary/ religious/social/ vocational groups		members representing customary/ religious/social/vocational groups	members elected among residents	members representing customary/ religious/social/vocational groups	members elected among each Banjar Dinas
supplementary body: LKMD	freely organized	customary/social organization freely organized	social organization freely organized	KAN, MUN	Desa Pakraman
village regulations: legalized by district head		need not be confirmed by district head but can be cancelled by district government	need not be confirmed by district head	need not be confirmed by district head but can be cancelled by district government	need not be confirmed by district head but can be cancelled by district government

Musyawarah-Mufakat or Representative Assembly System?
Governance Changes in Rural West Java in Democratizing Indonesia

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1. Introduction

In the process of democratization and social reformation since the step-down of President Soeharto, Habibie Administration promoted the decentralization policy, and passed an important law on autonomous local administration, Act No.22 of 1999 on Local Administration that abolished the Basic Act No.5 of 1974 on Local Administration. Act No. 5 of 1979 on Village Administration, which regulated the village administration system of the whole country since 1979 was also abolished in this move, and new village administration system is now being created. The Act No.22 of 1999 on Local Administration stipulated basic structure of village administration. However, in the move to local government autonomy, many parts could be adjusted by the District (*Kabupaten*) Administration as well as the village itself.

Village administration system during Soeharto Regime was characterized by top-down structure, where the Village Head took the responsibility to the District Head (*Bupati*), not to the people at the village. Local people had little opportunity to check the village administration although local leaders of religion, customary law, and youth had relatively more opportunity to check the village administration. Principle of unanimous agreement after discussions and deliberations *(Musyawarah Mufakat*) was emphasized in the system, for example the Village Consulting Body- a village assembly- agreed unanimously and was expected to avoid the act of voting. Head of sub-district (camat) or its representative attended the assembly, and took the lead when consensus was not reached although the voting was done. The decision of the assembly was recognized by the head of Distinct (Bupati) [Mizuno 1998].[1]

Act of 1979 on Village Administration stipulated that Village Consulting Organization was an organization of unanimous agreement after consultation and deliberation (*permusyawarahan/permufakatan*). A set of words "M*usyawarah/*

[1] Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor: 3 Tahun 1981 tentang Keputusan Desa.

Mufakat" was used many times in the text. Some scholars emphasized that the way to decision-making among the villagers according to the principle of *Musyawarah/Mufakat* was the tradition of Indonesian Villagers. For example, Soetardjo emphasized that all decisions had to be made, agreed or rejected, unanimously among villagers according to the Indonesian customary law. The voting system, in which the majority of voters win, was not known in Indonesia. Consultation and discussion had to be continued so that all attendants agreed or rejected unanimously, under the name of *Musyawarah Mufakat* (Soetardjo 1984:154).

Decree No. II/MPR/1978 of People's Consultative Assembly (*MPR, Majelis Permusyaratan Rakyat*) on Propagation and Implementation of *Pancasila* (P4) stipulated that consultations and deliberations should be done to reach an unanimous agreement (consensus) at the time of decision-making, and Indonesian people should respect the consensus and are responsible to accept and implement it.

However, in Act No.22 of 1999 on Local Administration, there are no words of *Musyawarah Mufakat*, or *Musyawarah* in the text. The Act says basic ideas for the regulation of Village Administration are variation, participation, original autonomy, democratization, and empowerment of the people.[2] And Decree No. XVIII/MPR/1998 revoked the 1978 Assembly Decree No. II/MPR/1978 and ordered the Government to stop the compulsory P4 propagation program.[3] A regulation of Cianjur District surveyed area, according to Act No. 22 of 1999 stipulated that Village Representative Body – new village assembly- could take a decision with the votes of 1/2 members plus one person who attended the assembly.[4] This new system can be called as representative system.

Tjondoronegoro [1984:227-228] stated based on research in 1970 at West Java and Central Java that *Musyawarah* and *Mufakat* were done at the time of important decision-making among the leaders of the villagers. However the system lacked structured representation of various interest groups so that popular opinion of the village community failed to be properly channeled. He felt that important decisions had been made collectively in the *balai desa* (village hole) under the system of Badan Musyawarah Desa that existed among villagers during the Soekarno Administration

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[2] Part 9 of Explanation on Act 22 of 1999.

[3] Decree No. XVII/MPR/1998 on human rights stipulated that Indonesian people adapt the human rights adjusted to Pancasila as people's natural perspective on life, and every person has the rights to express his own ideology and opinion according to one's consciousness. According to the *Musyawarah Mufakat* practice based on P4 principles, people seemed not to be able to oppose the decision after a consensus was reached.

[4] Tata Cara Pembuatan Peraturan Desa, Bagian Pemerintah Kabupaten Cianjur, 2001

before 1965 [Tjondoronegoro 1984:250).

Koentjaraningrat illustrated based on field research in Central Java in 1950 that the Villagers Meeting at which all heads of households could attend without regular attendance of officers of local Government above the village level, seemed as if the head of Village decided everything in an authoritative way, and attendants only agreed. No opposition had been apparent there. However according to his observation, actually there were people who opposed. The Village Head exchanged opinions and negotiated with them informally, so that oppositions were not apparent at the meeting [Koentjaraningrat 1964:163).

This paper tries to point out the main difference between village administration under the Soeharto Regime and that of today. To what extent, the top-down characteristics of old village administration have changed in the move to democratization and social reformation in rural areas? How does the new representative system at surveyed village work? Has the principle of *Masyawarah Mufakat* been replaced with system of Parliament democracy in which the voters who get majority votes win? Is there similarity between the new system with the one of 1950 ? Fieldwork has been done at Kemang Village (Desa), Bojongpicung Sub-District (Kecamatan), Cianjur District, West Java Province in 1998-2001.

2. Village Administration

2.1 Village Office

Major change taking place in the new Administrative system is that Village Assembly is separated from the Village Office (*Pemerintah Desa*). In the old system, Village Assembly named as Village Consulting Organization-*Lembaga Musyawarah Desa (LMD)*, was a part of Village Office. However, in the new system, Village Assembly named, as Village Representative Body- *Badan Perwakilan Desa (BPD)* is independent of Village Office. Act No.22 of 1999 on Local Administration stipulates that Village Administration (*Pemerintahan Desa*) consists of Village Office and Village Representative Body; on the other hand Act No. 5 of 1979 on Village Administration stipulated that Village Office consisted of Head of Village and Village Consulting Organization.

Village Office itself has changed to new system, where Village Head takes responsibility to the people who are represented by Village Representative Body; on the other hand in the old system Village Head took the responsibility to the Head of District (*Bupati*). Duration of Village Head position is 5 years; on the other hand in the old

system duration was 8 years. Village Head can be elected at the most twice in both the new system and the old system.

At Cianjur District, Village Office consists of Village Head and Village Officers comprising of Village Secretary (*Sekretaris Desa*) including Staff (*Unsur Staf*), Managers (*Unsur Pelaksana*), and Territorial Officer (*Unsur Wilayah*) (Chart 1).



Chart 1 The Old Structure of Village Administration
(Struktur Organisasi Pemerintah Desa-Lama)

In the new system, Village Agricultural Manager (*Urusan Pamong Tani Desa*), Irrigation Manager (*Urusan Pengairan*) and Village Police Manager (*Urusan Polisi Desa*) are stipulated as village officers. On the other hand in the old system Irrigation Officer was part of a section of Village Secretariat who resembled the Staff mentioned above, and there were no Agricultural Officers and Police Officer as formal Village

Officer (Chart 2)(Civil police-HANSIP- was an informal village organization which supported the Village Office in the old system).

Composition of Village Officers can be adjusted to the situation of each District in the new system. On the other hand, composition of village officers were stipulated by Government regulations, and there was no room for Local Government to make its own system.



Chart 2 The New Structure of Village Administration

(Struktur Organisasi Pemerintah Desa-Baru)

Today's composition of Village Officers in Cianjur District is one Village Head, one Village Secretary, 7 Heads of Section (*Kepala Urusan*), 3 Managers, and the Heads of Sub-Village (*Dusun*). There are 15 village officers at Kemang Village, Cianjur District that include 3 Heads of Sub-Village.

3. Musyawarah System in Kemang Village

3.1 Village Representative Body

New Village Representative Body has many important functions such as legislative body, which decides the regulations, accepts and speaks out the opinion of the people and checks the implementation of Village Administration. According to Act No.22 of 1999 on Local Administration, Village Representative Body will decide the Village Regulations in consultation with the Village Head.

The Regulation at Cianjur District[5] stipulates that Village Representative Body can propose the draft of Village Regulations. The draft proposed by the Village Representative Body as well as the one proposed by Village Office will be discussed at the Assembly of Village Representative Body in which members of Village Representative Body and Village Officers will attend. Assembly of Village Representative Body can be held with attendance of at least 2/3 members, and Village Representative Body can approve the draft with the votes of 1/2 members plus one person who attends the assembly.

These stipulations are totally different from the old system, where old Village Consulting Organization did not have the right to propose the draft of Village Regulations, old Village Consulting Organization in principle decided anything with the consent of all members unanimously, and old Village Consulting Organization was expected not to engage in the act of voting. This system reflected one of the national ideologies (principles) at that time; to consult and agree unanimously *(Musyawarah Mufakat*). Consensus after consulting and deliberation had to have the consent of the head of District.[6]

This paper will show how the new representative system works, and how the principle of Musyawarah Mufakat has changed. Firstly, let us see the composition of the new Representative Body.

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[5] Tata Cara Pembuatan Peraturan Desa, Bagian Pemerintah Kabupaten Cianjur, 2001

[6] Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor: 3 Tahun 1981 tentang Keputusan Desa, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 2: Tahun 1983 tentang Tata Tertib Lembaga Musyawarah Desa

3.2 Members of the Village Representative Body

Members of new Village Representative Body were to be elected directly by the people, and member of the Village Officer could not be elected as member of Village Representative Body, and also member of Community Empowerment Organization (*Lembaga Pemdayaan Masyarakat*, discussed later) could not become member of Village Representative Body. Member of Village Representative Body should elect the Chairperson and the Secretary of Village Representative Body from the members.

These regulations are totally different from the old system, in which Village Head was the Chairperson of old Village Consulting Organization, and Village Secretary was the Secretary of old Village Consulting Organization. Head of Sub-Village (*Kepala Dusun*) who was Village Officer also became the member of Village Consulting Organization automatically. This was not direct election by the people to choose the member of old Village Consulting Organization. Some member of the old Village Consulting Organization was appointed by the Village Head after he/she consulted with local informal leaders.

New Village Representative Body has the right to propose to District Head to sack the Village Head. Village Representative Body could propose it when Village Head is regarded to have violated the regulations and/or norms in the community. Village Representative Body will have the authority to accept or to reject the proposed candidate of Head of Neighborhood Organization (*RT*, and *RW*) as well as the Head of Sub-Village (*Dusun*) who will be elected by the members of the community. It also has the right to accept or to reject the candidate of Village Officers as well as Community Empowerment Organization member.[7] In the old Village Consulting Organization, there were no rights to propose to sack Village Head and no rights to accept or reject the proposed candidate of Head of Neighborhood Organization (*RT*, and *RW*) as well as the Head of Sub-Village (*Dusun*), although old regulation stipulated that Village Head selected the candidate of Village Secretary, or Head of Sub-Village after hearing the opinion of Village Consulting Organization[8].

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[7] Tata Cara Pembuatan Peraturan Desa, Bagian Pemerintah Kabupaten Cianjur, 2001, Decision of Ministry of Interior Affairs No. 64 of 1999 (Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 64 Tahun 1999 tentang Pedoman Umum Pengaturan Mengenai Desa) stipulates that Village Representative Body can propose to sack the head of the village to head of District (*Bupati*), and will agree on the selection of village officers. This decision does not mention the selection of heads of neighborhood organizations. Cianjur District seemed to make the rule themselves.

[8] Peraturan Menteri Dalam negeri Nomor 8 Tahun 1981 tentang Persyaratan, Tata Cara pengankgatan dan Pemberhentian Sekretaris Desa, Kepala Urusan dan kepala Dusun.

3.3 Village Representative Body at Kemang Village

New Village Representative Body has quite a strong authority in the Village Administration system. The authority somewhat resembles the authority of People's Representative Assembly (*Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat*) at the national level. New Village Representative Body can propose to sack Village Head; on the other hand Village Head has no right to resolve the Village Representative Body.

At Kemang Village, election of member for new Village Representative Body was held in March 2001. 13 members were elected according to the number of votes (persons who got more than 150 votes were elected), while 25 candidates ran for election. The way of election and a democratic atmosphere at that time resembled the one at the general election in June 1999.

An elected member of Village Representative Body who was a teacher of a primary school said that they were requested to run for election by the Village Officers, so they ran for election. At that time, few people knew the function of Village Representative Body. After they were elected, they were invited to join the course held by District Government on the Village Representative Body, and at that course they knew for the first time the important functions of Village Representative Body. Currently Chairperson of the Village Representative Body is a principal of the primary school at the village, First Vice Chairperson is an Inspector of the primary school in this area, and Second Chairman and Secretary of Village Representative Body are also teachers of the primary school at the village. Besides teachers, 3 drivers of passenger motorbikes (*ojeg motor*), 2 farmers, 2 primary school guards, one manufacturer of furniture, and one trader of timber and banana leaves are present members of the Village Representative Body. Some members have affiliation to political parties, like Struggle Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P), Development and Unity Party (PPP), and so on. Religious leaders and heads of cooperatives did not become members of the Village Representative Body. A qualification to become a member of the Village Representative Body was having a diploma of junior high school; on the other hand, head of newly born Cooperative was a primary school graduate.

There are 3 Sub-Villages (*Dusun*), 3 upper-level Neighborhood Organizations (*RW*), and 28 lower-level Neighborhood Organizations (*RT*) at Kemang Village. Number of hamlets is 23. Some hamlets have a member of the Body who acts as representative of the people of the hamlet; however, many hamlets do not have members. For example, Beber hamlet that has the largest number of household has no members, because some candidates ran for election and all of them were not elected.

3.4 Village Office Auxiliary Body

Former name of *LKMD* (*Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa*, Village Community Development Organization) is changed to *LPM* (*Lembaga Pemdayaan Masyarakat*, Community Empowerment Organization). New *LPM* has a more important function to support the Village Office for example to make the draft of budget, and to implement the development program. According to the Chairperson of LPM, LPM is the implementation body of development program of the village, and Village Office is the body that guides the development. Some section of LPM changed its former name, for example P4 Section (*Pancasila*-State ideology- education section) was changed to the Organization Section (*Seksi Organisasi*). There are 13 members in the *LPM*.

3.5 Works and Function of Village Representative Body and Villagers Meeting

Village Representative Body implemented its function in 2002 mainly for preparing the Village Budget Plan. From the beginning of 2002 until April 2002, Village Representative Body had 3 meetings. Members of the Body, informal leaders of the community, heads of neighborhood organizations at lower level (RT) and upper level (RW), and heads of sub-villages attended the meetings.

At the meeting, new budget for 2002 was proposed by LPM. In the process of discussion, the leaders of the community made some proposals. One was for the improvement of the Village Officers' service to the people, and the other was the improvement of their pay. In order to raise the budget to improve the pay for Village Officers, some proposals were made in the meeting. One was to increase the levy from the traders who buy agricultural commodities such as banana leaves, timber, palm sugar and so on. According to the proposal, traders were expected to pay 2 % of the amount of the sales.

The meetings of the Village Representative Body were thought to be a preparatory meeting for the Villagers Meeting (*Rapat Desa*, *Ancurah* of local name). On April 25, 2002, Villagers Meeting was held, and around 50% of the local people including the Village Head, Village Officers, Members of Village Representative Body, heads of neighborhood organizations (RT) and sub-hamlets (RW), and heads of sub-village attended the meeting. Village budget plan was discussed again. In this meeting, some traders opposed the plan to raise the levy equivalent to 2 % to the amount of transaction, because they thought 2% was too high.

There appeared to be a consensus at the meeting and no voting was done. The mood of the meeting did not permit traders to continue the opposition. This time traders

disagreed silently. Some traders whom the author interviewed after the meeting mentioned that they would pay 0.5% of the amount of transaction. This consensus became the Village Decision, because the Village Representative Body recognized the consensus as the Village Decision at the time of Villagers Meeting.

On the 2 % levy to the trader, *LPM* modified the proposed 2% levy for agricultural traders. As a trial of the levy, Rp.200.000 would be levied from each traders assuming tariff of 2% is maintained. Actually there was compromise because Rp.200.000 of levy was far below the amount of levy once the tariff of 2% is applied. Finally thee Village Representative Body approved this plan in 2003.

Here we can understand the important function of the Villagers Meeting called *Ancurah.* Decision of the Minister of Interior Affairs No. 64 of 1999 stipulated that autonomy Government might be able to decide various policies to empower the customary institutions. However at this Villagers Meeting, there were no special stipulations. Under the system during the Soeharto Era, regulations stipulated that Village Office could hold the Villagers Meeting (*Rapat Desa*) to hear the opinion of the people at the time of making Village Budget plan. Head of sub-District or the representative would attend the meeting.[9] So Villagers Meeting was to be a meeting to hear the opinion of the people, and it had no right to decide the budget for example.

On the other hand, under the new system at Cianjur District, Villagers Meeting has the function to decide Village budget de facto, because the Village Representative Body recognized the decision as the Village Decision formally but almost automatically.

On the consensus to be reached among the villagers, traders silent disagree did not be neglected, and LPM modified the way to levy, respecting the Village Decision and the traders' opinions.

3.6 Village Office Budget and development programs

The amount of the Village Office budget at Kemang Village is increasing, and development program subsidized by the District Government is also increasing, Amount of revenue for the Village Office budget was Rp. 37 million for the year 2001. Rp. 10 million was the subsidiary given by the District Government named as Village Development Fund (*Dana Pembangunan Desa, DPD*). Rp. 27 million was the portion for the Village from the income of land and housing tax (*PBB*). The amount of land and housing tax that was given to the Village Office was increased this year because the

[9] Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor: 3 Tahun 1981 tentang Keputusan Desa, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 2: Tahun 1983 tentang Tata Tertib Lembaga Musyawarah Desa

value evaluated for the land in the village increased. Most of his revenue was spent for salary for the Village Officials and routine expenditure.

Besides these budgets, Social Safety Net Program (*JPS, Jaring Pengaman Sosial*) is still implemented. In 1998-99, *PMD-DKE* program (*Proyek Pemberdayaan Daerah Dalam Mengatasi Dampak Krisis Ekonomi,* the Regional Empowerment Project to Overcome the Impact of Economic Crisis) was implemented [Mizuno et al. 2001]. In 2000, P3DT was implemented, and Rp.135 million was spent for improving the road connecting Cimenteng and Kopea in the village. In 2001, P3DT program was still implemented and Rp. 175 million was to be spent. *LPM* would decide the use of the amount. For the time being, the improvement/construction of road is contemplated. Rice subsidiary to the poor program (named *Operasi Beras*) is sometimes implemented these days.

LPM has made efforts to improve the road connecting Bojongpicung – Kemang – Ciputir stretching 16 km. They made a petition to the Division of Public Works at the District Government, Assembly of District, Head of Sub-District (*Camat*). If this program became the District Government Program in 2002, District Government would bear 80% of the cost, and local inhabitants would bear 20% of the cost. This road would cover many villages; Kemang Village would bear Rp. 20 million while the whole cost born by local inhabitants would be Rp 200 million. Whole cost of the construction of the road would be Rp. 1 billion. Local people at the Kemang village would contribute to construct the road by having local people collect stones and sand with 4 days pay while they will work 5 days for example.

LPM succeeded to get a budget of Rp. 67 million to repair a primary school building in this village as a District Government Program in 2001. This budget was spent outside the Village Office Budget. These District Government programs reflected the local government's autonomous program.

4. Conclusion

Important social changes are taking place at the surveyed village, especially in Village Administrations. Head of Village should take responsibility to the local people through the Village Representative Body (*BPD*); on the other hand in the old system Village Head took the responsibility to the District Head. Now Village Representative Body is independent of the Village Office. No Village Officer and Village Office Auxiliary Body (*LPM*) member can become a member of the Village Representative Body. Village

Representative Body can propose and decide the draft of Village Regulations, propose to District Head to sack the Village Head, and accept or reject the proposed candidate of territorial leaders as well as Village Officers. Village Representative Body can decide anything with majority vote, not based on the unanimous consent principle. This is a great change, because the principle to consult and consent unanimously (*Musyawarah Mufakat*) was an important doctrine under the Soeharto Regime. These changes were mitigated by the change of Government Policy, and Government Act, and each District and Village Administration have the authority to make a system adjusted to each area.

It was not until last March 2001 that the members of the Village Representative Body were elected directly by the people. Among the members, there are many primary school teachers or those who work at school. Still impact of the composition is not apparent. However, this new Body can have an important impact on the Village Administration, for example to speak out the voice of the people, or to have strong linkage with political, religious and economic interest groups in the village. So far this linkage is not clear at the surveyed village. *LPM* is quite active these days, and has succeeded in making the District Government spend a lot of money for the construction of roads, and school that has been constructed with the Central Government/Presidential budget. This change reflects the change of policy in local Government Autonomy.

In implementation of the Villagers' Representative system, the Village Meeting where actually all members of community attended had the highest authority to decide the village budget. Principle of *Musyawarah* and *Mufakat* was applied at the meeting. However some people disagreed to the proposal made by *LPM*. They did not obey the decision of the Village Meeting. Present Village Meeting is different from the one during the Soeharto Regime, because present Village Meeting has the right to decide important issues de facto, because the Village Consulting Body recognized the decision as the Village Decision formally but almost automatically. Decision of Village Meeting need not be recognized by the head of District. Present Village Meeting is somewhat different from the one in 1950 because Village head had more power and authority in 1950 than at present. Present Village Meeting has failed to achieve an actual consensus, however *LPM* sought the compromise.

Village Representative Body at Kemang Village achieved quite modest performance, because this body vitalized the Villagers Meeting. This body is so prudent, that the members did not exercise their powerful authority, for example in deciding the village budget, and this body only recognized the decision of the Villagers Meeting. So we can say that the representative system where the majority will win was not applied at the surveyed village. *Musyawarah Mufakat* way is applied instead. However this is

totally different from the system under the Soeharto Administration, because principle of *Musyawarah Mufakat* is present at the Village Meeting, not the Village Representative Body. This system is different also from the one under the Soekarno Administration, because not Village Head but *LMS* negotiated the compromise.

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Cultural Policy on Sundanese Performing Arts at the Turn of the Century

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Introduction

One of the most remarkable changes in Indonesia after the "*Orde Baru*" is the decentralization as a process of reforming Indonesia's political system. It came into effect with the advent of the 21st century. The central government has decided to transfer more authority and budget to the local governments and to allow them wider independency in the frame of the united Republic of Indonesia. This paper aims to consider what the effects of the decentralization on the local people and culture would be, by examining the change of Sundanese people's attitudes toward their traditional performing arts and local government's policy which corresponds to them.

Indonesia is in a process of transformation from a highly centralized state to a state which consists of more independent local governments. In line with this process, people in the local societies want to get out of the severe control from the center and to conceive of more autonomous lives in their region. The change seems to have stimulated the rise of consciousness of people in the region on their traditional culture which could provides a basis for their sense of identity. Performing arts has played an important part in Indonesian culture and has been a major factor in representing an ethnic group and its culture. People's attitudes toward performing arts might reflect their sense of identity. That is the reason why I have continued to observe trends surrounding Sundanese performing arts.

In 2001, Yayasan Kebudayaan Rancagé held the first International Conference on Sundanese Culture (KIBS [1]). Attended by 634 people [Panitia KIBS I: 97 [2]] from around West Java and also from abroad, the conference has marked the rise of consciousness on Sundanese culture. In the first part of this paper, I would like to consider what makes Sundanese people to hold the conference by examining the article

[1] Abrebiation from Konferensi Internasional Budaya Sunda. Hereafter the name of the conference will be abbreviated as KIBS.
[2] On another page, the number of participants are referred to as 800 [Panitia KIBS I: 108].

by Ajip Rosidi, the founder of Yayasan Kebudayaan Rancagé, who took initiative in the planning of the conference. He states the reason for holding the conference and the purpose of it in his article.

Then I would like to describe what happened after the conference, especially some of the actions taken by the Culture and Tourism Office (Disbudpar) [3] of West Javanese Government. The West Javanese Government gave financial support to KIBS, and the Disbudpar has positively accepted what were discussed at the conference. This tendency also reflects the atmosphere of reformation of the political system. Some of the governmental officials are trying to listen to people's voices in the process of decision-making.

1. International Conference on Sundanese Culture

From August 22 to 25, 2001, Yayasan Kebudayaan Rancagé held the first KIBS on the theme of transmission of Sundanese culture within the trend of globalization at the Gedung Merdeka where the Asia-Africa Conference was held. KIBS was sponsored by the Toyota Foundation and also received financial support from the West Javanese Government, cultural organizations, university, business companies, individuals and so forth. Participants include professors and other intellectuals, artists, teachers, students, the clergy, the press and others (Panitia KIBS I). Most of them are Sundanese, but some foreign researchers also participated. Seven lectures were given and 68 papers were read at KIBS [Panitia KIBS I: 97], which were categorized into six topics as a. literature and language, b. history, archeology, and philology, c. religion, belief, and view of life, d. economy, society and politics, e. arts, and f. environment, architecture, food, and clothes. Participants were invited to dinner almost every night during the conference by the Governor of West Java, the Mayor of Bandung, and the Rector of Pajajaran University among others.

Ajip Rosidi explains why he decided to hold KIBS in his article titled "Why KIBS?" [Rosidi 2001]. He asserted that social unrest during Japanese occupation, the Revolutionary War, resistance movements, and political disorder caused the disappearance of tradition of custom, belief, performing arts, skills, wisdom and so forth. Performing arts like *pantun*, which had been related to the ritual based on the belief in Sanghyang Sri, lost its roots and have become mere entertainment. In addition, under

[3] Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata. Hereafter referred to as Disbudpar.

the "*Orde Baru*" regime, Sundanese traditional performing arts had been seriously damaged by negative influences of Westernization in the name of modernization, industrialization, and coming of other ethnic groups to West Java, and also by mass media backed up by a large amount of capital which provide neatly packaged popular arts. Disintegration of Sundanese society has, he says, not only changed cultural values that had sustained people's life, but also relegated institutions such as *hajat kariaan*, festivities held for wedding, circumcision and the like, which had provided a opportunity for people to cultivate the appreciation of traditional performing arts. Many people who have festivities no longer hire traditional artists to entertain guests. Thus far, there has been no serious attempt to provide another opportunity to appreciate performing arts in stead of *hajat kariaan*, be it in theater hall or at school.

He continues to claim that Indonesian government has never paid serious attention to culture as roots of identity of the nation. It is reflected in the establishment of the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, which means for him that they only try to sell culture to foreigners and miss the need for the deliberately planned process of transmission of culture. Regional cultures are resources for building the nation, but Indonesian had avoided discussing about cultures of ethnic groups, because issues concerning ethnic groups counted as the first of the so-called *SARA* problems. On the other hand, although S. Takdir Alisjahbana, who argued that Indonesian had to have "Western spirit", seemed to win the *polemic kebudayaan* (polemic about culture), there had also been no continuous efforts to teach "Western spirit". After independence, Indonesia has succeeded the basic framework of education established by the Dutch, and schools could not function as the institution for transmission of their own culture. Education has failed to make Indonesians with clear cultural roots.

I do not intend to testify the analysis of Ajip Rosidi here, but would like to see what he meant to do with KIBS responding the situation described above. In the article, he says that the political will of Sundanese people themselves is needed to save Sundanese culture from vanishing. The fundamental problem for Sundanese culture lies in its transmission not only of skills but also of appreciation. In order to find a way to transcend the problem, it is needed that not only professionals and bureaucrats but also artists, community leaders, youths, students and others will join to discuss it. He asserts that we could not wait the political will of the government in this critical period, therefore we have to do something before cultural treasure that still remains dies out. That is why he holds KIBS and the main purpose of KIBS is to make a map for actions to be taken based on the results of KIBS according to Ajip Rosidi.

Many of Sundanese paper presenters also expressed their concern for the future of

Sundanese culture at the conference, claiming that Sundanese traditional culture is in danger, since much of young generation does not pay attention to their own tradition. The claim was repeated in the articles of a local newspaper, *Pikiran Rakyat*, which reported or commented on the conference. For example, an article in *Pikiran Rakyat* of September 4, 2001 by H Usep Romli questions whether Sundanese still have Sundanese culture or not, and argues that Sundanese do not know exactly what Sundanese culture is like. He emphasizes the need to define Sundanese language, culture and tradition as a result of KIBS in order to know Sundanese themselves.

As we see from the paper of Ajip Rosidi, KIBS seems to represent the tendency that Sundanese people become more concerned about their own identity as Sundanese and emphasizes traditional Sundanese culture as the core of their identity. Bound by this rather essentialistic view of culture and identity, some people incline to confine Sundanese culture within the boundary already defined. Deni Hermawan, among others, criticizes so-called *musik kontemporer* (contemporary music) by some Sundanese composers for going too close to Western music beyond the boundary of Sundanese music. He argues, for competing in a free market in the era of globalization, new music must have Sundanese identity based on the tradition of Sundanese music, *i.e.*, it must retain Sundanese traditional music scales and so forth as characteristics of Sundaneseness [Hermawan 2001].

From an academic point of view, the result of the conference is ambiguous, because most of the audiences were not professionally trained researchers and the discussions were often not focused on the issues delivered by the papers. However, the success of the conference lies in stimulating people and the local government into actions in order to revitalize Sundanese culture. Participation of paper presenters from abroad including me tended to be perceived as a proof for the value of Sundanese culture, although Ajip warns that actually the number of foreign researchers who are interested in Sundanese culture is not so large compared to other ethnic groups in Indonesia. Some members of the executive committee told me that his statement and also the conference itself could not be allowed in the "*Orde Baru*" era. The conference was in line with the reformation of Indonesian political system and shared the spirit of decentralization to some extent. The conference should be evaluated as an event to mark the beginning of a movement to revitalize Sundanese culture in the new era of decentralization.

In the report of the discussion summarized and announced by the executive committee at the closing of KIBS [Panitia KIBS I: 97-99], they present the general conclusion of KIBS that the national education system has to be renovated as the

institution for transmission of their own culture in order to develop more independent and creative character of children. They also offer conclusions and recommendations in each topic of discussion. The conclusion in the topic of arts is almost the same with the discussion of Ajip Rosidi cited above and the recommendations are 1. construction of theater halls at the capital cities of the province and also of the regencies, and 2. cultivation of a healthy environment for artistic activity both by governments and communities in order to stimulate creativity of artists.

Many people admitted that they have to put the discussion into actions. The committee announces in the report that they organize a small team to form a plan for actions. Some articles in the local press also point out that it is of greater importance to plan a strategy how to bring the discussion into practice. For example, Ahda Imran argues that KIBS is only a beginning of the long, complicated process, which needs the participation of many people, not alone the elite. He cites opinions of several figures famous for their cultural activities which suggest different strategies. Acil Darmawan Hardjakusumah, Nano S. and Hawe Setiawan emphasize the importance of dissemination of the outcomes of KIBS to wide range of people, especially to people in the regions. Saini K.M. asserts there need to be advocacy groups, which mobilize all the stakeholders. The deputy governor of the West Java, responding these voices, promised to prepare programs based on the recommendations of KIBS [Anonymous 2001].

In the "*Orde Baru*" period, as Ajip Rosidi suggests, it was difficult to hold events discussing culture and identity of an ethnic group in detail. It has become possible because of the reformation of Indonesia's political system and transition to a decentralized government. In theory, the decentralization also makes it possible to develop the policy satisfying the needs of the people in local society. In the next section, I would like to see how West Java Government tries to follow people's voices in their decision-making.

2. The Culture and Tourism Office of West Java

"*Orde Baru*" was a highly centralized regime, which is often described as "authoritarian". Activities of performing arts in the regions were under the severe control of the central government. The Department of Education and Culture had offices at the province (*propinsi*) and regencies (*kabupaten* or *kotamadya*), and *penilik kebudayaan* as a local institution at the *kecamatan* level. Theoretically, activities of performing arts were fully controlled by the Department at the center. Artists should

have got permission to play from the authorities and had to be instructed by them based on the policy from the center.

After the fall of President Suharto, Indonesian people have struggled to reform the extremely centralized political system. Trying to disperse power once concentrated to the center, they are aiming at building a political system which could reflect the voices of wide range of people. The decentralization was placed high on the agenda of reformation and came into effect in 2001. Much authority and budget were transferred to the local governments. In line with it, the government is also trying to change its role as instructor into facilitator. Now, instead of the uniform policy from the center, it has become possible to develop a policy which conforms to the local conditions and reflects people's voices.

Here I would like to focus on the influence of this process of reformation on Sundanese performing arts. In the "*Orde Baru*" regime, traditional performing arts were conceived of as one of the most important factors that represent the diversity of Indonesian culture. However, people had deliberately avoided alleging their ethnic identity through them, since it might be regarded that strengthening of ethnic identity was to weaken the unity of the nation. In line with the decentralization, the situation seems to be changing. Indeed rising of the conflict between ethnic groups could be a critical issue for Indonesia, but it is clear that suppressing the expression of their identity could also have an undesirable impact on the nation. Sundanese people's attitude for their performing arts seems to be changing, and they are seeking for a system of the transmission of traditional performing arts as a core of their identity. We will see how the West Javanese Government responds to the situation.

The decentralization has transferred more authorities to the regencies than to provinces. However, the revival movement of Sundanese culture could not be confined to any one regency, as "Sundanese" discussed in KIBS was meant to reach throughout West Java including Banten and the participants came from all over these regions. A government which could most efficiently correspond the movement is the provincial government of West Java and, indeed, it received the results of KIBS most seriously.

The West Javanese government has established the Culture and Tourism Office, Disbudpar, following the regulation on the Offices of the Province of West Java (Perda 15/2000).[4] It has three divisions and one of them is the division of arts (Subdinas Kesenian), which has the staff of 21 people, who came from different governmental

[4] The status of Disbudpar will be changed into Badan according to a new law which defines the maximum number of Dinas of local governments.

offices.[5] In August 2001, the first year of the regional autonomy, the many of the staff of Disbudpar were not given their position or duty yet; even some of them did not have their seats in the office. Disbudpar, which was seeking to build its policies then, has taken many ideas and recommendations from KIBS into their agenda. Furthermore, it held a conference, Forum Dialog Peta dan Agenda Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata (Forum of Dialogue on Cultural and Tourism Maps and Agenda) attended by many stakeholders from the sectors related to culture and tourism, from November 5 to 8, 2001. They were ready to discuss concrete steps which had to be done by Disbudpar, because of a series of discussion begun at KIBS. I would like to describe some of the activities realized based on the recommendations.

3. The Establishment of New Regulations on Culture

One of the most important actions it took after the forum is the establishment of regulations on local culture. In August 2002 when I visited Bandung they finished a draft of the regulations to be subjected to the West Javanese Provincial Assembly and in February 2003, the Assembly enacted three regulations, that is, Perda 5/2003, Perda 6/2003 and Perda 7/2003. These regulations, which prescribe West Javanese government's policy on local culture, are results of the discussion in the forum. The drafts of the regulations were written by a team consisting of specialists of various sectors outside the government.[6]

West Java had regulations on local culture enacted in 1996, that is, Perda 6/1996, and Perda 7/1996. The new regulations were realized based on the reevaluation of the old ones. The drafting team pointed out problems of the old regulations and the change of situation that lead to the establishment of new ones as follows [Tim Kajian Perda-perda Kebudayaan 2003: 1-3];

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[5] The staff consists of nine from the former provincial office of the Department of National Education, four from the provincial office of the Department of Tourism, Arts, and Culture, four form the Education and Culture Office of the province, and four from the Tourism Office of the province. Disbudpar also has five Unit Pelaksana Teknis Dinas (UPTD), one of which is Balai Pengelola Taman Budaya consists of around 60 staff which was inherited from the Department of National Education.

[6] The team, Tim Kajian Perda-Perda Kebudayaan, consists of Dana Setia (head), Yayat Hendayana (Secretary), Karna Yudibrata, Tony Djubiantono, Nina H. Lubis, Gandjar Kurnia, Taufiq Rahzen, Diro Aritonang, Dloyana Kusumah, Nunung Ruliah, Indra Perwira, Memet Akhmad Hakim, Asep Warlan and Yesmil Anwar.

1. the lack of articles that provide bases for practical actions,
2. (a) the lack of sanction for violating the regulations
   (b) the lack of protection of copy-rights
3. not reflecting diversity of culture in the region, for regulation no. 6
4. (a) ambiguity of the word "*seni-budaya* (art-culture)"
   (b) paying no attention to contemporary arts
   (c) not all aspects of culture treated, like history, archeology, museum, traditional values
   (d) Dewan Kesenian (Arts Committee) prescribed in the top-down style, for no.7
5. (a) the change of governmental system by the decentralization
   (b) the establishment of Disbudpar based on the reorganization of Education and Culture Office (Dinas Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan) and Tourism Office (Dinas Pariwisata)
   (c) the need for regulations to coordinate regencies which has been given authorities by decentralization
   (d) the change of paradigm of the role of government, from practitioner to facilitator.

The team also had a discussion with the representatives from regencies, and it summarized what they desired for the regulations as follows (Tim Kajian Perda-perda Kebudayaan 2003: 4];

(1) applicable
(2) protecting traditional values
(3) actualizing Sundanese language, literature and letters
(4) eliminating negative influence of global culture
(5) reflecting the efforts of management across the region of West Java
(6) covering the efforts of management of culture all over West Java
(7) providing a model for regulation in regencies.

Based on these recommendations, the team decided to plan three regulations, each of which treats with 1. language, literature and letters, 2. arts, and 3. archeology, history, traditional values and museum. Here I would like to see the discussion by the team for the regulation on the arts (Perda 6/2003).

4. Opportunity for the Performance

In the conclusion of KIBS, they pointed out that opportunities of the performance of arts were reduced and young generations were not acquainted with traditional performing arts. One of the tasks of Disbudpar is to create opportunities of performance. The Perda 6/2003 mentions utilization of public halls, theater halls, and mass media as a strategy for cultivate arts. Disbudpar inherited Taman Budaya (cultural park) from the Department of National Education and has tried to invite artists from various regencies of West Java to perform there. Now Taman Budaya has a program of performance almost all weekends. Disbudpar has also built a small outdoor stage in the site of it. The production of the program there is trusted to specialists outside Disbudpar. In 2002, a specialist in theater, Arthur S. Nalan took the role. In addition to that, Disbudpar had been trying to revive a theater hall, Rementang Siang, in Bandung.

Rementang Siang was originally built as a movie theater and renovated as a theater hall in 1975. In the 1970s and 1980s, Rementang Siang had served as a center of the artistic activities, especially Sundanese drama in West Java. However, during the last quarter century, its facilities have gone out of date and both artists and audiences could no longer enjoy the performance there. In the Forum Dialog Peta dan Agenda Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, several participants regretted the situation of Rementang Siang and asserted the need for renovation. Following this urging, a seminar was held in March 2002. In the seminar, four presenters[7] read papers on revitalization of Rementang Siang followed by discussion. Recommendations discussed in the seminar were summarized by a team consisted of 4 persons [Tim Perumus Saresehan 2002].[8] In July 2003, when I visited Bandung last time, the management of Rementang Siang was soon be taken over by the team headed by Yayat Hendayana and physical renovation was negotiated between the team and Disbudpar.

We could know from these two examples of the actions that Disbudpar is seriously trying to act based on the people's voices. It seems they succeeded in transforming their attitude from practitioners to facilitator. There is no conspicuous figure from Disbudpar to lead the movement, however, the results are prominent. It is people outside Disbudpar that actively play the leading role. It seems that their style of

[7] The paper presenters in the seminar are Saini K.M., Wahyu Wibisana, Benny Johanes and Herri Dim.

[8] The team consisted of Yayat Hendayana (head), Yesmil Anwar, Benny Yohanes, Arthur S. Nalan.

administration is changing from the old one in which they take a leadership to promote cultural activities to the new one in which they support people taking initiative. At this point, Disbudpar could be evaluated as an example of succeeding in the transformation. Hereafter it is important for them to keep their administration transparent in order that people remain trust their work.

Conclusion

In KIBS, there seems to be some people who wanted to define Sundanese culture and confine cultural activities in the boundary. In other words, they are trying to exclude cultural activities or artistic works which do not have seemingly "Sundanese" factors. It could suppress free activities on their own initiative. At least the government should not take this kind of idea. It is not the role of government to restrict people's activities but to hear people's voice and to guarantee their activities. The government must provide facilities for various activities, and need not to circumscribe or instruct them as long as they do not violate social ethics.

In addition, excluding the artistic works without Sundanese elements possibly confine the activities of Sundanese artists into a closed world. The artists could active not only in the local society, but also in national or international society. It depends on their own decision to bring an explicitly "Sundanese" element into their works. The decentralization weakens the control of the center over the local society, but that does not mean the local societies are separated from the national society. Cultural isolation does not yield positive results. It could diminish the ability to respond to globalization. On the contrary, the interactions with the outside world often stimulate the cultural activities.

On the other hand, the heterogeneity in the local society will inevitably increase. Ajip Rosidi argues that coming of other ethnic groups is one of the factors to disintegrate Sundanese society. Apparently, it has a negative impact on the local society, if the new comer brings a hierarchy among ethnic groups there. However, Bandung, the capital city of West Java, is one of the major cities of Indonesia and is a center of education, trade, and industry. Influx of people to Bandung could not be rejected. Although Sundanese form the majority in West Java, they could not neglect other minorities. Sundanese has to admit people of other ethnic groups and seek a way to coexist in West Java. Education and promotion of culture of Sundanese who form the majority in West java have to be done on the premise of multicultural society. Knowing

other people help deepen the understanding of one's own self.

Cultural diversity could be recognized even within Sundanese society. Priangan area, north coast, and the outskirts of Jakarta have different tradition of culture. There are also many differences between culture of Sundanese who live in the urban environment and those in the rural area. We could not define Sundanese culture without knowing its internal diversity. The decentralized government system has a possibility to treat with those subtle differences.

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Perda 7 2003: Peraturan Daerah Propinsi Jawa Barat Nomor 7 on pengelolaan Kepurbakalaan, Kesejarahan, Nilai Tradisional dan Museum.

The History of Deprived "Religious" Role in Balinese *Dalang* and Signs of Restoration in the "Transition Period" of Indonesia[1]

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Introduction

Sapu leger[2], an exorcism ritual by *dalang* (performer of Balinese *wayang)*, was featured in the August 2003 issue of *Warta Hindu Dharma*, the monthly journal of *Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia* (the religious institution administering all Indonesian Hindu communities; hereinafter referred to as *Parisada*). The article outlined the ritual, and affirmatively spotlighted its cultural significance in Bali. The bulletin has continued since the 1960s, and is subscribed by a great number of Hinduism believers and Hinduism-relevant institutions in Indonesia.

Sapu leger is a purification ritual for children born in the week of *wayang* (*wuku wayang*[3]) in the 210-day calendar *Wuku*[4], in which *dalang* performs special *wayang* for the purifying ritual that follows. The ritual is characterized by Balinese native belief including the idea of impurity coupled with particular birthdays and ritual commitment by *dalang*. Although many a Hindu divines appear in the *wayang*, *sapu leger* was hardly ever introduced as a Hindu ritual, owing to its native colors of Bali. Much less a favorable article in *Parisada's Warta Hindu Darma* which leads Hindus in Indonesia. The article is a surprise itself in the light of longstanding ambiguity between pan-Indonesian Hinduism and regional *sapu leger*. Although *sapu leger* ritual had been denied as a "religious" rite from days back, a change was under way since the latter

[1] I am grateful to the Indonesian Institute of Science (*LIPI*) for sponsoring the field research (No.:4454/II/KS/2001, No.:4495/SU/KS/2002, No.:7219/SU/KS/2003), on which this paper is based. The field research conducted in Bali during 2001, 2002 and 2003, was funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (*Monbu-kagaku-sho*), through Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research of the Japan Society for the Promotion.

[2] *Sapu* means sweeping. *Leger* means dead leaves caused by illness, or derived from *reged*, which means unclean. In either case, *sapu leger* means sweeping away something unclean.

[3] *Wuku wayang* is also called *wuku ringgit*. *Wayang* week is the twenty-seventh week in the *Wuku* calendar.

[4] In Bali, three calendars, i.e. the lunar calendar, the *wuku* or Javanese-Balinese calendar and the Gregorian calendar are utilized in different contexts.

1950s, as Bali-Hinduism was upgraded into a national religion.

The writer aims to clarify the changing process of *dalang*'s religious role and status by viewing the cultural and religious policies in Bali since the 1950s. The writer also considers what the abovementioned article (on *sapu leger* ritual in *Warta Hindu Dharma)* means in the present chaos that Hinduism faces in Bali.

The historical progress of Indonesian Hinduism as a national religion has been discussed frequently. Bekker was the first to research the history of Hinduism in Bali during the 20th century (Bekker 1993). He clarified the development of modern Hindu thinking in independent Indonesia based on broad-scoped historical sources, documents and interviews. Furthermore, Rudyansjah contributed to studies on the foundation of *Parisada* (Rudyansjah 1986). *Parisada* also published a booklet on the early history of *Parisada* since establishment in 1970 (Parisada 1970).

Although the theatrical aspect of Balinese *dalang* is frequently studied, *dalang* as a purifying priest is hardly focused upon. However, Hooykaas made a great contribution to this field of research (Hooykaas 1957, 1960, 1973a, 1973b) by clarifying the "religious" aspect of *dalang* through studies in the contents of Balinese manuscripts. In addition, Hinzler's fieldwork in Bali gave a fairly comprehensive survey in the "religious" aspect of *dalang* and *wayang* (Hinzler 1981). Through processed analysis of *sapu leger* ritual, "*dalang* as exorcist" was discussed by Bagus and Wicakasna from Bali (Bagus 1989, Wicaksana 1998).

However, modernization of Hinduism in Bali and *dalang*'s religious role has been taken up separately, when the two issues required comprehensive linkage. In other words, *dalang* and his "religious" character was understood isolated from modernizing Hinduism, even though *dalang* is a form of Balinese Hindu priest. The writer will expose *dalang* and his "religious" character to the light of transition in Bali today.

1. The Sapu Leger Article from Warta Hindu Dharma: "A wayang in Jakarta"

The article surveys the processes of *sapu leger* ritual performed in Jakarta in 2002. It comes from the reader's columns contributed to by Hindus nationwide, and is featured over three pages with photos. A summary of the article is as follows (Diya 2002:18-19, 35):

> On "*tumpek wayang,* "" the last day of the *wayang* week (August 17, 2003), *sapu leger* ritual was performed by a *wayang* group in Jakarta. The ritual was requested

by a married couple from the south Jakarta for a *tumpek wayang* born child to be purified with the holy water of *wayang* puppets.

The ritual started with *wayang* performance the first of all. According to the story[5], the elder brother god *Kala*[6] was chasing after his younger brother *Rare Kemara* to eat him up. *Kala* and *Rare Kemara* are sons of god *Siwa* and goddess *Parwati*[7]. They were both born on the *tumpek wayang*[8]. *Siwa* had permitted *Kala* to victimize a younger brother born on the *tumpek wayang*. Unable to help *Rare Kemara* out, *Siwa,* the father, advised that he should go down to *Kertanegara Kingdom* and hide away. *Rare Kemara* and his two followers thus took shelter in the Kingdom.

Kala found it out and attacked the Kingdom, which set *Rare Kemara* on the run again. On his way, *Rare Kemara* encountered a *wayang* performance, where a helping *dalang* made him hide in a musical instrument. Greedy *Kala* rushed in and ate all the *wayang* offerings up. In closing, *Kala* was forced to free his younger brother *Kemara* in compensation for the offerings.

In the *sapu leger*, *jero mangku* sanctified the birthday of *wayang* puppets. All the participants chanted *Trisandhhya* from the ritual prayers. The priest then sprinkled the holy water from *wayang* puppets over the child[9].

The ritual would make the audience of Jakarta understand the culture of Balinese *wayang*. Parents with a *wayang* born child would be especially interested. Furthermore, the *wayang* performance and the rite of purification would mean a lot to *wayang* born children in the audience. The event was planned to introduce the *wayang*-based Balinese culture in Jakarta. I hope that people will take the ritual positive, and understand Balinese culture in consequence.

The article indicates that *sapu leger* ritual is performed according to the *wuku* calendar that is still eligible in Bali. Also, the purification for *wayang* born child is focused as the ritual's core. The story of *wayang*, as well as the correlation with *sapu*

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[5] This story is called *Cupa Kala.*

[6] God *Kala* is called *Sanghyang Kala* or *Bhatara Kala*. *Sanghyang* is an honorific title for native gods and divinities in Bali, and *Bhatara* is an honorific title for gods of Hinduism. In addition, god *Kala* is also called *Kalamrtyu* or *Kalantaka*. Both *murtyu* and *antaka* mean death. God *Kala* is a fearful being, considered to link literally with destruction, unhappiness and death.

[7] In the *Cupa Kala* story, goddess *Uma* appears in lieu of goddess *Parwati*. The two goddesses are both married to god *Siwa*.

[8] *Tumpek wayang*, the last day of the *wayang* week, is considered the birthday of *wayang* puppets.

[9] The holy water prepared by *dalang* with *mantra*, flowers, incense, offering, water and specific *wayang* puppets.

leger, is presented. The purifying ritual is overviewed, in addition to the possibility for introducing Balinese *wayang* in Jakarta.

If the description on *sapu leger* ritual is carefully examined, readers will find differences from the original ritual of Bali. For instance, *Trisandhhya,* meaning "a prayer three times a day, " hardly appears in the Balinese *sapu leger*. It is newly applied to as Hinduism developed into a national religion of Indonesia. Actually, the prayer is practiced by people outside Bali studied with the doctrine of Hinduism (Stia 1994:426-427).

In addition, the priest is called *jero mangku* (meaning "temple monk") instead of *dalang* or *mangku dalang*, whereas temple monks are unable to perform *sapu leger* in Bali. Otherwise, *jero mangku* could have continued with *sapu leger* after *wayang* performance. Or *dalang* may have acted as *jero mangku*, while his "religious" role was omitted in the article (because it doesn't exist in the doctrine of Hinduism). Most importantly, however, the cultural significance of *sapu leger* ritual was underlined through detailed description of the ritual process, which had been neglected in the legitimate Hinduism.

2. Religious Role of Balinese Dalang

Balinese *dalang* is generally introduced as shadow play puppeter in *wayang* theatres. However, in Java and Bali, he is also a purifying priest. In Bali, *dalang* is called *mangku dalang* as a priest. *Mangku* stands for a priest from low castes who carries out temple ritual. *Mangku dalang* has completed an inaugural ritual *mawintan*[10]. He is thus able to make the purifying holy water from mantra, puppets, followers, incense sticks and offerings. According to C. Hookaas, *dalang* is not only a maker of holy water. He also performs puppet *wayang* dedicated to supernatural existence, divines, and the holy spirit (Hooykaas 1973:14-15).

In Bali, holy water prepared by *mangku dalang* is called *tirta ringgit* or *toya ringgit* (holy water of *wayang* puppets), or *tirta panlukatan* or *toya panlukatan* (holy water of purification). The water is effective on human impurity, as well as on the soul of the deceased. *Dalang* sprinkles the water repeatedly thorough rites of passage. *Mala*, the

[10] Hinzler points out that there are two inaugural rituals for *dalang*. One is *mawintan* as mentioned before, and the other is *masakapan ring wayang*, which means marriage with wayang puppets. According to Hinzler, the two rituals empower *dalang* to perform *sapu leger* and magic-relevant performances like *Calonarang* story.

impurity, can be both inborn (e.g. if you are born during the *wayang* week, which entails *sapu leger*) and acquired (e.g. mistakes you make through daily life and consequential *ila-ila*)[11]. Accordingly, *dalang* purifies the Balinese people off their *mala* at particular stages of life including death. The purification ritual is named *sudamala,* of which *sapu leger* is a part. If you pass away with *mala* on, *Mangku dalang* would purify you by means of *wayang* and *sudamala* ritual.

Impurity requiring *Sapu leger* is believed a curse of man-eating god *Kala*. Potential victims are the children born during the seven-day *wayang* week by the 210-day calendar in Bali and Java. Only *mangku dalang* can purify the curse of *Kala* off the children. In this context, the article on *Sapu leger* from *Warta Hindu Dharma* describes the purifying process for a *wuku wayang* born child, in which the curse of *Kala* is cast away by *dalang* and his holy water.

Purification is not the only role of *dalang* as a priest. He also dedicates *wayang* to the supernatural and the invisible (*niskala*). The practice, known as *wayang lemah* (i.e. "daytime *wayang*" or "*wayang* for Mother Earth"), is a theatrical aspect of his religious role. It is performed without screen, lamp nor the human audience[12]. *Wayang lemah* is paired with the religious practice of the highest priest *pedanda*. The performance ends disregarding the story the moment *pedanda* completes his rite of holy water making[13] (Umeda 2001:103).

As mentioned above, the religious role of Balinese *dalang* includes purification for men and the deceased and *wayang* performance for the supernatural and the invisible.

3. Short History of Balinese Hinduism—Way to a National Religion

Hinduism originates from ancient India. The religion had culturally influenced Indonesia, particularly Sumatra and Java since the fifth century, says a historical

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[11] According to the writer's research, *mala* is divided into five categories: impurity of soul, impurity of children born in the *wayang* week, impurity of psychopathic patient (both inborn impaired intelligence and acquired psychopath), impurity of physically handicapped person with deformity, Hansen's disease and goiter.

[12] Hooykaas notified "at the best attracts some stray children as the visible part of his [*dalang*'s] auditory."(Hooykaas 1973b:14)

[13] Mead describes that "There was a shadow play, but without the screen and the lamp. The *dalang* sat and recited and waved his figures in the dark and no one listening. And finally, late at night, there was an excited hush. The Regent was coming, the Regent came; he said "stop it" to the *dalang* and the shadow play that no one had seen was over."(Mead 1977:193)

epigraph. Hinduism had affected Bali since the eighth century[14]. Subsequently, Java-Hinduism streamed into Bali after the fourteenth century, as Islam became dominant in Java. Bali-Hinduism is a synthesis of Java-Hinduism and primitive beliefs in Bali, and thus distinguished from the Hinduism in India.

As Geertz points out, Bali-Hinduism was considered practical because the religion was practiced through religious rituals (Geertz 1987:301). In other words, Bali-Hinduism had continued without an organized doctrine, through religious "practices" and primitive beliefs. However, owing to the Bali-rooted characteristics, Bali-Hinduism was not recognized as *agama* (national religion) by the Indonesian government. The only official *agama* after the 1949 independence of Indonesia were sole-God worshipping Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. So remained the situation up until the middle of the 1950's.

Adat (local custom) is a conceptual counterpart of *agama* (national religion). Every belief, except for *agama*, was categorized as "local custom" for differentiation. Initially, Bali-Hinduism was also considered *adat,* a local custom. Although the writer would not specify the process in which Bali-Hinduism was converted into a national religion, a turning point came when the Ministry of Religion in Indonesia announced conditions for a national religion, i.e. it should have an official title, the idea of sole God and religious doctrine. (Sugishima 1999:311) In response, the philosophy and the doctrine of Bali-Hinduism was prepared by intellectuals, as Bali-Hinduism (*agama Hindu Bali*) became the official title of the religion. In 1958, Bali-Hinduism was thus upgraded from *adat* to *agama*. Representing Bali-Hindus, *Parisada Dharma Hindu Bali* was established in the same year, to enlighten Bali-Hinduism as a national religion. *Parisada* strived to coordinate all the religious activities of Bali-Hindus by regulating, promoting and developing the *agama* Bali-Hinduism. Awareness raising of Bali-Hindus in their religious and societal life was also sought for. (Bakker 1993:230-1) As Hinduism spreads all over Indonesia, *Parisada Dharma Hindu Bali* changed its name in 1986 to *Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia*. The organization continues to represent all the Indonesian Hindus to date.

4. Changes in Dalang's Religious Characteristics after Religious Policy

Parisada played a central role in the nationalization of Hinduism in Indonesia during

[14] Epigraphic dates indicate that Hinduism in Bali began at the eighth century.

the 1960s. The organization endeavored to separate the national Hinduism from so-called local customs. They also strived to harmonize the "religious" elements extracted from the "local customs."

How did *Parisada* deal with the religious characteristics of *dalang*? Instead of limiting *dalang* to a theatrical performer, *Parisada* opted to partially preserve the "religious" characteristics in the doctrine and guidelines. The policy shows from the Provision on Religious Regulations in the Guideline adopted in the 1968 Second Congress of *Parisada* in Indonesia (*Ketetapan Sabha Parisada Hindu Dharma ke II no. V/KEP/PHDP/68*).

Concretely, *Parisada* streamlined the versatility of priests into two ranks, i.e. *pendeta* (or *sulinggih*) and *pinandita*. Both *pendeta* and *pinantida* are authorized by *Parisada* at the time of induction. *Pendeta* is the highest priest in unity with *Siwa* and *Buddha*. He practices *mantra* and *mudra,* and makes holy water with sacred tools and flowers. In short, *Pendeta* cannot be missed in Bali-Hindu rituals. On the other hand, *pinandita* assists *pendeta* as a lower-ranked priest. He is in charge of periodical ritual in and outside the temple. (However, he must get the holy water from *pendeta*.) In the 1968 Provision of Religious Regulations, *Mangku dalang* is officially recognized as one of the six categories of *pinandita*[15]. However, his privileged role as a priest goes beyond the work of *pinandita*.

For instance, what *dalang* practices during the purifying ritual is out of the "religious" scope of *pinandita*. Note that *dalang* makes the holy water in the ritual without *pendeta.* Furthermore, *sapu leger* is performed by *mangku dalang* alone, again without *pendeta*. Consequently, *sapu leger* ritual is considered an "unreligious" local custom, according to the 1968 Provision.

Actually, performing *wayang lemah* for the supernatural is the only "religious" act *Parisada* authorizes for *mangku dalang*. In other words, *mangku dalang* is recognized "religious" only as a shadow puppet performer, with any of the rest categorized as *adat* (local custom). Table 1 indicates the ambiguous correlations, where *Parisada*-approved "religious" practices are shaded in black.

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[15] *Pinansita* is categorized into six categories: *pemangku, wasi, mangku balian/dukun, mangku dalang, pengemban* and *darma acarya*.

Religious roles of *mangku dalng*	*Wayang* performance for the supernatural	Rituals through theatrical performance	"Religious" practices (*Parisada*-approved)
	Holy water making with puppets, purifying ritual	Rituals through non-theatrical performance	"Customary" practices (*Parisa*da-rejected

Table 1: Religious Roles of *Mangku Dalang* (Existing versus *Parisada*-Approved)

The issue is featured at times in *Parisada*'s monthly journal *Warta Hindu Darma*. "Ritual, Wayang and Education (*Hubungan Upatjara, Wayang dan Pendidikan*, vol. 38, 1970)" is the first of such articles, in which *wayang* is explained to link with mysticism (*mystik*) and sorcery (*magis*), empowered by *sapu leger* ritual. How *dalang* makes the purifying holy water with Siwa puppet's stick is also introduced (Oka 1970:3). However, the article emphasizes the educational effect of *dalang's* performance, considering that *wayang* stories will teach moral, language, custom and classical literature. On the other hand, the "religious" aspect is described as "local custom" by non-religious terms such as "mystic," "magic" and "sorcery." In "Balinese *Dalang* and *Wayang* Stories Performed (*Dalang Bali dengan Lakonnya*, vol. 120, 1977)," Wungsu focuses on *dalang* and old Javanese literature, disregarding the "religious" characteristics (Wungsu 1977:7-8). Furthermore, in "Dalang as Mono-Actor (*Dalang sebagai Monoaktor*, vol. 293, 1991)," Eddy discusses *dalang* solely as a theatrical mono-actor (Eddy 1994, 23-4,42). Additionally, back cover photos (vol. 332, 1994) show *wayang lemah* performed by *mangku dalang*, where he is acting as *pinantida* the way *Parisada* takes it "religious."

Officially, *Parisada* commented on the issue during the 1976 All-Bali *Dalang* Congress (*Penataran Dalang Seluruh Bali*, Nov. 8-10, 1976) hosted by *Wayang* Foundation (*Yayasan Pewayangan Daerah*)[16]. During a presentation entitled 'The Role of *Dalang* and *Wayang* in Hinduism (*Peranan Dalang dan Pewayangan dalam Agama Hindu*)," *Parisada* defined the roles of *dalang* as follows: i. art, entertainment and

[16] The First Congress of All *Dalang* in Bali was held in 1975 when *Wayang* Foundation was established. However, the minutes were not issued. According to the activity report of the *Wayang* Foundation, the topics are assumed to include the scripture of *dalang, Darma pewayangan* and its variants, and music for *wayang* (Whindu 1978:8). In the Second Congress of All *Dalang*s in Bali, nine speakers presented papers on religion, *Darma pewayangan*, Bali language, *Kawi* language, media, technique of performance, and peculiar *wayang* performance, *wayang gambuh*.

moral education based on religion; ii. practicing rituals by performing traditional sets of stories, i.e. *dewa yadnya* (ritual for gods), *manusa yadnya* (ritual for human being), *Pitra yadnya* (ritual for death) and *Buta yadnya* (ritual against evil spirits) (Surpha 1976:8). Most importantly, *dalang* was defined as a ritual-relevant *wayang* performer. How would the "customs" be dealt with including the rite of purification? Actually, the issue was evaded by limiting *dalang* to a theatrical performer. Furthermore, in the precisely listed seven roles of *dalang* and *wayang* (Surpha 1976: 8-9), *dalang*, again remains a theatrical performer, as the ritual *wayang* performances are defined as an accessory to offerings (*upakara*). The rest of the roles assigned to *dalang* include commitments to moral education, entertainment, regional communities, Indonesian culture and identity.

5. Cultural Policy Accelerates Changes in Dalang's Religious Role

Looking at the cultural policy in Bali, particularly those dedicated to *wayang* and *dalang* originates in the *Suharto* regime. In 1960, the Conservatory for Traditional Balinese Music and Dance (*Kokar; Konservatori Karawitan*) was established as the first *wayang* specializing high school and the national educational institution for Balinese performing arts[17]. The high school has three specialties on Balinese performing arts, i.e. traditional music, traditional dance and *wayang*. In 1963, "*Knowledge of Dalang and Wayang* (*Ilm Pedalangan/Pewayangan*)" by Sugriwa, (a key person in *Parisada* and the Bali-Hinduism nationalization), was introduced into *Kokar* as a Balinese *dalang* textbook. This is the first publication on Balinese *wayang* issued in modern Indonesian language. It encompasses the history, categories and philosophy of *wayang* and *dalang,* as well as stories on various Hindu rituals, iconography of puppets, and theatrical knowledge required in the traditional performance. The *Dharma Pewayangan,* originally written in old Javanese language, is also translated by Sugriwa into modern Indonesian, while essential mantras are converted into alphabets. However, Sugriwa underlined the educational methodology for theatrical *wayang* performers, instead of the

[17] To establish the Conservatory for Traditional Music and Dance in Bali, which was already founded in Solo, the Ministry of Education and Culture in the Province of Bali requested establishment of the conservatory to the Ministry of Education and Culture in Jakarta. In 1960, the conservatory was established by permission of the central government. Competent teachers, dancers, musicians and *dalang*s were gathered from all over Bali. Graduates became public school teachers or introduced new *gamelan* pieces and dances in their native villages that were composed and choreographed in the conservatory.

"religious," purifying role of *dalang*. In short, the "customary" role of *dalang* was ejected from *wayang* education in Bali in the framework of *Parisada*-oriented cultural policy in Indonesia. To date, this has been the decisive position of *wayang* in the art educating institutions of Indonesia. Actually, the Sugriwa textbook has conceptualized Balinese *wayang* education not only in *Kokar,* but also in the Academy of Dance in Indonesia (*ASTI*; *Akademi Seni Tari Indonesia, Depasar*[18]), the college of arts established in 1962. Resultantly, *dalang* educated in the official institutions have missed the holy water ritual and other "customary" faces to date, although he is theatrically trained as a *wayang* performer.

The core of Suharto cultural policy has thus survived since the end of the 1960s. However, remarkable are the *wayang*-dedicated cultural programs enforced by the Commission for Evaluating and Promoting Culture (*Listibiya; Majelis Pertimbangan dan Pembinaan Kebudayaan*). Established in 1966 as a cultural agency in Bali, the commission fostered and promoted tourism-benefiting Balinese arts and culture, while it controlled communism-advocating cultural/artistic activities. A series of *wayang* contests and Bali-*wayang* studies publications stands substantially contributing.

Starting with a gamelan ensemble *gong kebyar* contest in 1968, *Listibiya* has hosted a variety of contests for Balinese performing arts. In the 1971 *Wayang* Contest for All-Bali *Dalang* (*Festival Wayang Kulit*)[19], *dalang* and his talent was evaluated in ten criteria, mostly from the theatrical aspect, i.e. the composition, puppets' handling, voicing and diction (Hinzler 1981:49). The only "religious" criterion was the knowledge of *Dharma Pewayangan*, although the "customary" rites including the purification with holy water were not counted at all. In the subsequent contests, *dalang* is continually valued as a theatrical performer, disregarding his "customary" nature.

Regarding the *wayang* and *dalang* studies, two important publications were issued by *Listibiya* for the 1974 Second Congress on *Wayang* in Indonesia. Interestingly, the "customary" roles of *dalang*, i.e. making the holy water with special puppets, are spotlighted, despite the *Parisada* doctrine. However, the publications are conscious to readers outside Bali. *Listibiya* seemingly stresses the primitive characters of Balinese *wayang* in the context of academic Indonesian studies. In contrast, it prefers "authorized

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[18] In 1986, *ASTI* changed the title to *Sekolah Tinggi Seni Indonesia* (*STSI*) to be upgraded into a college from a professional school. In 2003, *STSI* again changed the title to *Institut Seni Indonesia* (*ISI*).

[19] This was the first occasion in which *wayang* became the subject of assessment by the official organization. According to Windhu, thirty-six *dalang*s entered the contest from the district of Badung alone. The preliminary contest had continued for a week to select a representative from the district.

silence" (over "customary" arts of *dalang*) in the light of religion and cultural policies in Bali. The "customary" role of *dalang* has never appeared since in *Listibiya* publications.

On the other hand, the *wayang* studies and publication were wheeled by *Wayang* Foundation, which was established in 1975 with financial support from the local government of Bali. Organization-wise, the foundation is under the authority of *Listibiya,* although the source of budget differs. Essentially, *Wayang* Foundation published scenarios (*pakum*) performed by famous *dalang* and alphabetical transcriptions from *wayang* manuscript (*lontar*). However, the contents were limited to *dalang*'s theatrical performance by the *Parisada* doctrine. The foundation also hosted the 1975/1976 All-Bali *Dalang* Congresses and issued the minutes of presentations from the 1976 congress.

Since the end of 1970 's, *ASTI* has published studies on Balinese *wayang*. The contents are twofold: *ASTI* textbooks and seminar reports; faculty research papers for *ASTI* bulletins. The former conforms to the academy's educational policy by hardly referring to the "religious" role of *dalang*. In contrast, the latter has featured the "customary" role of Balinese *dalang* in recent years, as a personally researched topic. However, the educational and societal impacts are expected to be very little by the following reasons: i. the particular issue will be excluded from the curriculum, as long as the academy is nationally budgeted; ii. the bulletins are only read by researchers and a limited number of students.

6. Where Wayang Stands after the 1971 Seminar of Sacred and Profane Arts

Hosted by a project team from the Ministry of Education and Culture in Bali, the 1971 Seminar of Sacred and Profane Arts (*Seminar Seni Sacral dan Provan Bidang Tari*) met on the following two themes: i. tourism potential of Balinese performing arts; ii. classifying Balinese performing arts (mainly dance) into "religious (tourists prohibited)" and "profane (tourists accessible)" (Umeda 2003:80).

However, Balinese performing arts could not be divided into "sacred" and "profane" in dualism, be it for tourism. Introduced consequently were the three levels of sacredness, i.e. *Seni Tari Wali* (the most sacred, ritually indispensable, without stories), *Seni Tari Bebali* (sacred, ritual accompaniment, story-telling) and *Seni Tari Balih-balihan* (profane, independent from *wali* and *bebali*). Note that the story-telling ritual accompaniment *Seni Tari Bebali* cannot be performed without *Seni Tari Wari*

(projek...1971).

The classification encompasses not only dance (*tari*), but substantially all theatrical performances. Resultantly, *wayang* is classified as *Seni Tari Bebali*, the story-telling ritual accompaniment that Balinese ritual can exist without. However, examples like *sapu leger,* for which *wayang* is an indispensable ritual process, are ignored. According to the classification, *wayang* cannot be *Seni Tari Wali*, because *dalang* is a storyteller in *wayang* performances. It conforms to the religious policy of *Parisada*, where the "customary" faces of *dalang* are totally rejected.

Ketut Rota, an *ASTI* faculty member, claims in his book that the 1971 *wayang* classification is inharmonious. Rota re-categorizes the *sapu leger wayang* into *Seni Tari Wali* by indicating that *wayang* entails all the faces of *Wali*, *Bebali* and *Balih-balihan*, if all kinds of *wayang* performances are "carefully surveyed" (Rota 1977/1978:29-30). See Table 2 for how *wayang* is defined by the 1971 Seminar and Rota (1977/1978).

However, Rota underlines what *dalang* performs, and misses the purification ritual after the *wayang*[20]. In short, *dalang*'s "customary" commitment without theatrical performance is not referred to.

Table 2: *Wayang* Definitions by the 1971 Seminar and Rota (1977/8)

	The 1971 Seminar of Sacred and Profane Arts	Rota, *Pwayang*in *Pewayanagan Bali* (1977/78)
Wali	———	The *sapu leger wayang*
Bebali	Every *wayang* was defined as *Bebali*	*Wayang lemah, wayang sudamala*
Balih-Balihan	———	Independent from *Wali* and *Bebali*

7. Dispute and Schism of Parisada in Bali Province

After the three decades of Suharto regime collapsed in 1998, President Habibie has sloganed "reformation (*reformasi*)" to get rid of Suharto policies. As democratization accompanies reformation of the election system and freedom of speech, centralization is re-considered to establish the consequent new decentralization laws in May 1999, i.e. the Autonomy Law (Article 22, the 1999 Law) and the Inter-governmental Fiscal Balance Law (Article 25, the 1999 Law). Subsequently, decentralization of power starts out in January 2001, as authorities are transferred to

[20] Rota did not only give an account to the story of *wayang* performance in *sapu leger*, but referred to the holy water of *wayang* puppets prepared by *dalang*. He noted that impurity requires the holy water, even without the *wayang*. This is very important as a partial reference to the "customary" roles of *dalang*.

local governments, excluding foreign policy, national defense, jurisdiction, finance and religion.

Quint-annually convened, the 8th Congress of All *Parisada* in Indonesia (*Maha Sabha VIII Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia*) landed on the above-mentioned political map in Bali, September 2001. The slogan, "*Parisada* for All-Hindu Reform," reflects the rushing tides of political and economic reforms in Indonesia.

Fundamental policies and principles of *Parisada* were virtually "reformed" by congressional approval. However, dispute erupts in Bali Province *Parisada* immediately afterwards. In November 2001, *Bali-Parisada* splits into two schisms. Initially, approved modification of *Parisada*'s organizational infrastructure Section 20, Article 5 fired the controversy. Deregulated eligibility of the 22 non-priests of *Parman Welaka* (Council of Experts) as *Ketua Umum* (secretary-general) of the Highest Priests Council *Paruman Sulinggih* turned out particularly irritating (*Parisada*...2001:67). A reactionary sect of *Bali-Parisada* said strong "no" to the agenda, as dissatisfaction surfaced against "reforms" by the national *Parisada.* Furthermore, the national *Parisada's* "flexibility" for new religious movements *sampradaya*[21] dedicated to *Sai Babba* and *Krisna* accelerated the schism. The reactionary sect was strictly against reforms, which "spoil" Bali-Hinduism. Consequently, the reactionaries idealized the 1959 and 1961 principles at the early days of *Parisada.* Finally, *Bali-Parisada* split in November 2001, although the name and the logotypes remain shared. Each *Bali-Parisada* convened provincial congress *Lokasabha* after the schism. The reactionary *Bali-Parisada* met in Campuan Village, the venue of the pilgrim congress in 1961. The reforming *Bali-Parisada* selected *Besakih* Temple, which heads the Indonesian-Hinduism. This may well symbolize the courses to be taken by the two *Bali-Parisada.*

As *Parisada* began to represent all-Indonesian Hinduism, its doctrine distinctively isolated Bali-Hinduism and "religious" rites rooted in the villages of Bali. On the other hand, the schism of *Bali-Parisada* was pushed by "*reformasi* (reformation)" and "*otonomi daerah* (local autonomy)" that raved over Indonesia.

This schism is not merely a religious controversy, as it is starting to harness the Balinese "religious" rituals and performing arts. The *Warta Hindu Dharma* article the writer quoted from is a similar sign. The chief editor of *Warta Hindu Dharma* is a leading member of the reactionary *Bali-Parisada.* The article featuring "customary"

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[21] *Samperdaya* (Sanskrit and old Javanese) means tradition. Howe discusses Sai Babba devotionalism and Krisna devotionalism in this context (Howe 2001:163-198, 2004:264-280).

sapu leger ritual and the roles of *dalang* is an assumable consequence.

Conclusion

The Dictionary of Hinduism supervised by *Parisada* in 1991 defines *dalang* as "puppeteer and religious educator." His "religious" role for the purification ritual and making of holy water is totally neglected (Musna 1991:16). As Bali-Hinduism steps up to an authorized national religion, the essence of *dalang*'s "religious" role was deprived of, classified as "customary," and eventually neglected. According to Kagami, the rationalization aimed to "modernize Bali-Hinduism by eliminating the longstanding primitiveness in Balinese faith." (Kagami 2000:106) The framework of a "national religion" turned down the piousness and "customs" unique to Bali. Bakker points out that *Parisada* did not "intentionally deny the "customs" from the start," but "opted to abandon whenever they conflict with the idealized Indonesian-Hinduism (Bakker 1993:290). However, as the "customs" are not strictly prohibited but ignored, *dalang*'s "customary" rituals barely survive in the communities of Bali today.

The doctrine of Indonesian-Hinduism has deprived *dalang* of the essence of his "religious" role (by defining it as "customary.") Resultantly, the internal dispute split *Bali-Parsida* subsequent to the reformative 2001 resolution by the All-Indonesian *Parisada* Congress. The reactionary *Bali-Parisada* voiced return to Bali-Hinduism, for which the "religious" role of *dalang* is a part.

Subsequently, *Listibiya* presented the "religious" role of *dalang* as a special topic in the "December 2001 Seminar on Balinese Sacred Performing Art." The issue was spotlighted as "culturally degenerated" instead of "the doctrine degenerating."

Founded in 1967, *Listibiya* was inspiringly committed to the Balinese cultural policy and performing arts up until the 1970s. However, *Listibiya* has almost slept over two decades, as the Bureau of Culture established in 1986 replaced the active role. Accidentally, the chairman of *Listibiya* who took office in 1999 was a leader of the reactionary sect in *Bali-Parisada*. Thanks to his endeavoring commitment to the Balinese Government as a cultural policy maker, the financial assistance resumed for *Listibiya* in 2001. Subsequently, the *Bali-Palisada* successfully conceptualized restoration of the "religious" role of performing arts, where the re-started *Listibiya* worked as a cultural policy advocator. *Dalang* and his neglected "religious" role was a timely topic in focus.

In the "Seminar on Balinese Sacred Performing Arts," researchers of performing

arts, fine arts and religion made activating presentations. The "performing arts" was presented by a faculty member of the College of Arts in Bali (*STSI; Sekolah Tinggi Seni Indonesia*), who teaches *wayang* performance and theory in *STSI*. He underlined how the sacred *wayang* performance (e.g. *sapu reger wayng*) by *dalang* as a sacred performing priest has been ignored, and emphasized the necessity for *dalang* to be re-estimated, and for the sacred *wayang* to be authorized as a sacred performing art by the Balinese government. In 2003, *Listibiya* submitted the proposal to the Balinese Government.

"Reformation" and "decentralization" are the two major impacts on the politics and economy of Indonesia. They are catching hold of religion, which is seemingly off the scope of decentralization. Actually, the unrest has motivated reactionaries of Bali-*Parisada* to rise against Indonesian-Hinduism. Dissenting from the escalating religious rationalism, they idealized return to the Balinese-Hinduism, which *Palisada* pursued at the start. The reactionary *Bali-Palisade* is making serious attempts to restore the "customary" factors and "religious" elements long neglected as "unreligious." Resuscitation of the "religious" role of *dalang* will be truly epoch-making.

Will the "religious" role of *dalang* in Bali be restored from a "custom" to "religion?" When a *dalang* saves children from the curse of god *Kala*, how would you depict the act? Is it "customary" or "religious?" Time will answer the question, as the abovementioned signs of recovery are gradually taking root in the phase of transition Indonesia faces today.

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Where Have the "Entrepreneurs" Gone?

A Historical Comment on *Adat* in Central Flores

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Introduction

The surge of attention given to *adat* (custom) is one of the distinctive features of present-day Indonesian local societies. The Soeharto government enforced a paternalistic interventionist policy toward adat, because it felt adat had the potential to wield political influence or to hinder the successful realization of "development" (*pembangunan*). On the other hand, the decentralization regulation affecting local government (UU 22/1999), legislated after the demise of the New Order, rested on the two intertwined concepts of regional autonomy and social empowerment. In addition, this regulation also defined adat as the basis of village administration. Given that Indonesia is predominantly rural, it is hardly surprising that there has been a rapidly growing interest in adat among local people, especially local politicians and intellectuals.

This is the case with the administrative regency (*kabupaten*) of Ende in central Flores. In 2000, the government of Kabupaten Ende began enacting numerous administrative ordinances under the decentralization regulation. One of those ordinances (PDKE 25/2000) intends to afford protection and empowerment to adat, as if it were in danger of extinction in the tide of "modernization" (*modernisasi*) and "globalization" (*globalisasi*). Moreover, the Agency of Rural Society Empowerment (Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa) of Kabupaten Ende collected data on adat institutions in 2002, even though its research covered only a few areas because of its fiscal predicament. Accordingly, the Regent of Kabupaten Ende distributed to all village headmen (*kepala desa*) in the regency a questionnaire on the status, role, genealogy and territory of each adat chief. The headmen were ordered to return the questionnaire by 23 September 2002. It was appropriate for the survey to focus on chiefs and land, because both are of central importance to adat institutions in central Flores.

Adat also is a matter of concern in the few local offices of the central government that are left over after major downsizing in the past several years. The epitome of these is the branch office of the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional) in

Kabupaten Ende. Its heads, whom I interviewed during the administration of Soeharto, regarded "collective adat landownership" (*hak ulayat*) as an obstacle to "development", and one of them strenuously insisted that such a right must be abolished totally. Nowadays, however, the office expresses the opinion that even national land policy should be executed with due consideration to adat and adat chiefs (cf. Kantor Badan Pertanahan Kabupaten Ende 2001). It seems that such a change has derived from the alteration of national land policy. After the decentralization regulation was enacted, the National Land Agency invested local government with authority to implement land policy and to constitute ordinances demarcating areas of "communal adat land" (*tanah ulayat*) shared by a group holding hak ulayat (PMNA 5/1999; PPPMNA 400-2626). However, Kabupaten Ende, like other regencies in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur, has not yet constituted such an ordinance.

This article intends to carry out historical analysis in order to understand the present state of adat in central Flores. It will focus on Lise, a political domain in Kabupaten Ende. It might appear that such an enquiry is irrelevant to those recent moves for adat in the regency. This is not necessarily so, however.

Historical research, through exploring the vast network of causal nexuses that have brought the present into existence, aims to elucidate what the present, or a certain phenomenon observed in the present, really is. In this article, however, I deal selectively with only some parts of that network of causes and effects. Specifically, I explicate how the present state of adat in central Flores is causally connected with (*a*) the slave trade and warfare that took place in central Flores until the early 20th century, (*b*) Dutch colonial rule, which prohibited both slavery and warfare, and (*c*) the "development" policy that the Soeharto government executed from the 1970s until its downfall in 1998. I have chosen this focus not only for reasons of space, but also because doing so makes it possible to behold some aspects of the present state of adat that were neither conceived of in the "development" discourse that took place during the New Order, nor have been conceived of in the current political circumstances surrounding adat.

1. The Slave Trade and War

Flores is divided into the regencies of Manggarai, Ngada, Ende, Sikka and Flores Timur, which geographically correspond with the former Dutch administrative "subdivisions" (*onderafdeeling*) of Manggarai, Ngada, Ende (Endeh), Maumere (Maoemere) and Oost Flores en Solor Eilanden respectively. As in other regencies in Indonesia, Kabupaten Ende consists of *kecamatan* (sub-administrative districts) and *desa* (administrative

villages). Besides these, there are numerous non-governmental political domains in central Flores, designated *tana* (meaning land, territory, mud, or the earth).

Lise is the largest domain not only in Kabupaten Ende but in the entire Lionese-speaking area, which covers approximately three-quarters of Kabupaten Ende and the westernmost part of Kabupaten Sikka. The population of Lise exceeds 15,000 and makes up approximately seven percent of the total population of Kabupaten Ende (Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Ende 1984: 17-18). Lise's southern and northern ends reach to the Savu Sea and the Flores Sea respectively, and its east border almost overlaps the boundary between Kabupaten Ende and Kabupaten Sikka (see Figures 1 and 2).[1] In Lise, there are eight eminent chiefs (*ria béwa, mosa laki*) and approximately 100 subordinate chiefs (*bogé-hagé*), each of the latter being subject to one or another of the former. A subsistence economy, consisting of slash-and-burn agriculture whose staple crops were rice, maize and cassava, was predominant in central Flores through the 1970s, but since the 1990s the cultivation of perennial commercial crops, such as clove, vanilla, cashew, cacao, coffee and candlenut, has been an important source of cash income for local people.

Until the early 20th century, political domains in central Flores, especially around Lise, waged war against each other using firearms. Lise is a domain that developed unusually out of this situation; it formed rapidly through whole or partial annexations of about 15 domains that surrendered to, or were defeated by, the descendants of Woda from Lise Detu (see Figures 2 and 7). The people of Lise recount this expansion process in a series of oral histories. Although rich in variations, these histories consistently indicate that Lise's long-standing rivals were the domains occupying the south coast of central Flores. Late in the 19th century, while allied with Moni and Wolo Jita, Lise was at war with Ndori and gave support to Lise Detu in the latter's fight against Mbuli (Rasi Wangge 1946b). When Dutch authorities pacified the region in 1907 (discussed below), Lise was pursuing a war with Ndori over a tract of land, labeled Tana Lelu, on the border between them. This was the last war that Lise conducted using firearms (e.g. Rasi Wangge n.d., 1946b; van Suchtelen 1921: 12). But why were Ndori and Mbuli Lise's long-lasting enemies?

Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution of hamlets (*nua*) in Lise and its neighboring areas, and Figure 3 shows the population-density of each desa in Lise in 1983, as well as that of the same area in 1911. These figures clearly show a

[1] While hamlets within Lise are fixed in Figure 2 according to data I collected by using a handheld GPS, the positioning of hamlets outside Lise in this figure are based on a map (scale: 1/25,000) published by the Indonesian National Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping.

characteristic population distribution in which the high-density area lies to the south and the low-density area to the north. The northernmost area of Lise was no man's land and Kota Baru (literal trans.: New Town) did not exist as an administrative village or even as a place name before a spontaneous transmigration from the southern part of Lise was started for reclamation work there in the 1950s.

It would not be successful to explain such an uneven distribution of population-density in terms of natural environmental factors, such as differences in annual rainfall. Although the amount of annual rainfall in the northern area of central Flores has been smaller than in the southern area (see Table 1), it is unlikely that this has resulted in the north-south difference in population-density. Otherwise, the population density in the north of the neighbouring administrative district, Onderafdeeling Maumere, would be lower than its southern district. In fact, the opposite is true. The population-density in Desa Kota Baru is currently higher than that of Desa Hanga Lande (see Figure 3), and extensive rice paddy fields spread there. In addition, the supposedly anthropogenic grassy wasteland in Desa Kota Baru (see Fig. 2) that stretches seamlessly to Kabupaten Sikka along the north coast already existed at least late in the 19th century (Metzner 1982: 51-53, 112). Nonetheless, the northern area was more heavily inhabited than the southern area in Onderafdeeling Maumere.

According to the demographic statistics of Onderafdeeling Maumere in 1911, the most densely populated district in that subdivision was Ili, which probably encompassed at least the western end of the coast of Geliting or Bajo, one of the main points of trading activities conducted by the Bajau and Buginese in the Flores Sea area. The coast referred to as Geliting is actually far wider than the Geliting shown in Figure 4. Although Maumere also played a significant role in the commerce carried on in the Flores Sea area, Maumere probably would have been less prosperous than Geliting (Parimartha 2002: 208; Metzner 1982: 51-52; Veth 1855: 163-164).

It is widely known in central Flores that the ancestor of the raja of Sikka was originally from Sikka Natar, a hamlet that still exists on the south coast of Kabupaten Sikka.[2] According to the history embraced by his descendants, the raja expanded his territory toward the north and finally conquered Geliting and Maumere. Nevertheless, in fact, sovereignty over Geliting was not beyond dispute, and until the early 20th century the raja of Sikka, the indigenous people of Geliting and the raja of Larantuka (whose

[2] The word "raja" in this paragraph signifies the head of the rajadom which existed before the Dutch established the system of "self-governing districts" (*zelfbesturende landschap*) in and around Flores. As described later, each administrative district was "governed" by an indirect ruler designated raja or *zelf-bestuurder*.

base was Larantuka) struggled with each other over claims to Geliting and the taxation of trading activities carried on there.

The most densely populated area in Onderafdeeling Endeh in 1917 was the Isle of Ende, or Pulau (Poelaoe) Ende (see Figure 5). This islet and Ende, a harbor city on the south coast in central Flores, were the centers of the international slave trade conducted in the Savu Sea area, which reached a height of prosperity in the first half of the 19th century. The most important article of export was the slave, but livestock and rice were also probably sold overseas. On the other hand, imported articles were firearms, gunpowder, gold, elephant tusks and so forth. The main source of slaves was the island of Sumba, and slave-hunters from Ende frequently visited there to obtain their staple commodities (Needham 1983, 1987; cf. Dietrich 1983).

It seems that such business was carried out on a small scale in a number of places along the south coast adjacent to Ende, because the following pieces of information were acquired in Lise:

(*a*) although gold mining has never occurred in any form on Flores, gold treasures have been widely distributed in Lise;

(*b*) there were a large number of firearms on Flores before the Dutch authorities confiscated them;

(*c*) the price of guns was paid in slaves and gold;

(*d*) war captives were sold, making warfare a major source of slaves within Flores;

(*e*) until the 1910s, the eminent chiefs in Lise owned and put their sailboats on the south shore of Lise to transport trade articles; and

(*f*) the chiefs levied tax on commercial transactions conducted on the south coast of Lise until early in the 1910s.

In Kabupaten Ende 72 percent of current residents are Catholic (Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten End 2001: 133). This situation has arisen out of Dutch colonial policy, which promoted Christianity and controlled the increase of Muslims. It also stemmed from the dedicated cooperation of Pius Rasi Wangge, raja of Landschap Tana Kunu (Koenoe) Lima,[3] with Catholic missionaries.

According to population figures by religion in that "subdivision" from the 1910s, Muslims were not randomly distributed, but apparently concentrated along the south coast in Onderafdeeling Ende. Ndori and Mbuli were already under the influence of Islam in the purlieu of Lise (see Figure 6). In addition, there was a Muslim raja in Ende

[3] One of "self-governing districts" (zelfbestuurende landschap) constituted in Onderafdeeling Endeh after the pacification (Dietrich 1989: 157-161; Rasi Wangge n.d., 1946a; van Suchtelen 1921: 85-86).

who had been recognized by the Dutch long before the pacification, and that raja governed Ende and its neighboring areas.[4] It seems likely that all these things were closely connected with the slave trade, because this business was carried out mainly by the descendants of the Makassarese Muslims (who migrated to Ende from Sulawesi in the 17th century) and the Islamized Endenese.

Mbuli and Ndori probably came under the influence of Islam through business transactions with Muslims. Through these commercial relations, these two domains would also have acquired guns ahead of other domains and started to endanger their neighbors. In other words, they set a precedent for the cycle of prevailing over and capturing enemies through superior weaponry, obtaining more muskets and gold by selling their war captives as commodities, and further reinforcing their military strength.

It is easy to imagine that, in reaction to the serious threat posed by coastal domains such as Mbuli and Ndori, inland domains like Lise had to expand their territories northward in order to obtain military capacity comparable to that of their enemies. Otherwise, it would be difficult to understand why Lise, the largest domain in central Flores, exists just north of Mbuli and Ndori and why the inland domains are generally larger than those located in the south coastal area. The inland domains must have enlarged themselves in antagonism against the coastal domains. According to oral histories widely known in Lise, the founders of Lise were originally from Lise Detu, a tiny domain bordered on the south by Mbuli and Ndori. They expanded their territory northward first. After the successful annexation of Tana Kune Mara, which geographically overlaps Desa Tani Woda, they ventured on a series of wars to conquer the south coast.

As is shown in Figure 5, there was a gravitation of population toward the south coastal area adjacent to Ende at some stage in the past. This would have been a consequence of the long-term process of allocating human resources to offensive and defensive battles over trade profits on the south coast. This causal nexus seems to be the same as the underlying causality in which population-density became higher in the north, in the vicinity of Geliting and Maumere.

2. The Fragmentation of Causal Domination

One of the classic subjects of anthropological research in the Asia-Pacific region, including eastern Indonesia, is the dominance of the mother's brother (the wife-giver)

4 The raja's realm roughly overlaps the Endenese-speaking area, which comprises quarter of Kabupaten Ende.

and of "indigenous people" (Mabuchi 1974; Fox ed. 1980; Fox and Sather eds. 1996; Sahlins 1985; Sugishima 1983, 1987, 1994). In central Flores, like in other eastern Indonesian societies, this phenomenon inextricably links with the notion of causality in the following sense. Because the mother's brother (as the giver of a woman who brought ego into existence as his sister's child), and the "indigenous people" (as the donors of the land from which ego as an "immigrant" gets subsistence) are regarded as ego's "source/trunk" (*pu'u* or *pu'u hamu*), they exert a decisive influence on ego's life and work. Accordingly, ego must maintain good relations with them. When ego is distressed by incurable illness, childlessness, reiterative frustration and so forth, ego identifies, by means of divination, the "source/trunk" who yielded these difficulties and appeases the causer by making a sacrificial ritual. I refer to such a relationship of the "source/trunk" to ego as "causal domination" (Sugishima 2002).

In Lise, however, it seems that causal domination functions more strongly among patrilineal relatives than in other relationships. The eldest son, as his father's substitute (*dari nia*), succeeds to his father's title and estate. As a result, his younger brothers obtain their subsistence from their eldest brother's land. Most chiefs, whether eminent or subordinate, are the head of a localized patrilineage, designated *wewa* (gate). The relationship between the lineage head and the members of his lineage is modeled on the relationship between the eldest brother/father and his younger brothers/children. The latter are categorized as *aji-ana* (younger brothers/children) of the lineage head, and they make use of part of the land acquired by the apical ancestor of the lineage, which has been inherited by lineage heads from generation to generation. Accordingly, the apical ancestor and the successive lineage heads are regarded as the "source/trunk" from whom the lineage members are brought into being. Hence, lineage members who are caught in a serious predicament visit the ceremonial house in which the relic of the apical ancestor is enshrined, and perform appeasing rituals there.

Nevertheless, in Lise chiefs of a younger line exceed chiefs of the elder line in power in many cases. Ria béwa and *mosa laki pu'u*, for instance, are the primus inter pares among the eminent chiefs, but as Figure 7 illustrates, they are in the youngest line among Woda's descendents. In addition, indigenous people are in a small minority and are eclipsed by Woda's descendants in Lise. Woda's descendants seem to have driven most of the indigenous people out of their territories during Lise's formation through the annexation of neighboring domains. Furthermore, although kin terminology is prescriptive and matrilateral cross-cousins have been considered ideal marital partners for males in central Flores, in Lise there are only a few cases in which matrilateral cross-cousin marriage has been practiced between chiefs consecutively for a few

generations.

On the other hand, the eminent chief of Clan Jeke is the patrilineal descendant of Jeke and his father, Wawo, who provided Woda's father with a wife and land. Therefore, in Lise Detu where Woda was born, the eminent chief of Clan Jeke maintains a more fundamental right to the territory of Lise Detu than the descendants of Woda's elder brothers, namely Mboti, Pati, Mali and so forth (see Figure 7). Moreover, the eminent chiefs who represent Clan Mboti, Clan Pati, Clan Mali have never been eclipsed by chiefs of a younger line. These things suggest that causal domination is "fragmented" in Lise. In addition, this fragmentation of causal dominance is clearly recognized by the people of Lise.

Most of the "indigenous people" in central Flores, including Clan Jeke, are conceived to be the descendants of an incestuous pair of siblings who survived the deluge that destroyed the world. They are designated "the people who came down" (*ata nggoro*) from Mt. Lepe Mbusu, the highest summit in Kabupaten Ende. The political domains in which the ata nggoro causally dominate immigrants are referred to as "domains of descent" (*tana nggoro*) and are contrasted with "domains of merit" (*tana godo*) such as Lise, which came into being through the annexation of neighboring domains. Moreover, this distinction is rendered in the couplet, "powerful with body, strong with physicality" (*tego no'o tebo, mulé no'o lo*), which celebrates the ability to stand on one's own feet without relying on inheritance, and to obtain land through one's own exertions. This ethos of meritocracy with a hegemonic character is highly estimated in Lise, especially among the eminent chiefs of younger lines. In fact, ria béwa and mosa laki pu'u have ascendancy over other eminent chiefs in Lise precisely because their territory, as their politico-economic foundation, is far larger than that of the latter.

The aforementioned couplet, however, has an implication that cannot be translated merely as "meritocracy", since it is rephrased as "merit is gained by body, *bogo* is earned by physicality" (*godo to'o no'o tebo, bogo mbana no'o lo*). "Bogo" and its synonym, "*bugu*" signify property acquired by one's own labor, including commerce, and so closely connect with a notion analogous to the labor theory of property whose formulation is commonly ascribed to John Locke (Locke 1947; cf. Dumont 1977: 51). In this case, the spirit of "meritocracy" in Lise has been materialized through practicing acquisitive individual activities, and is not inconsistent with modern profit-making business activity.

3. The Impact of Pacification

In July 1907, the city of Ende was attacked and burned down by the inhabitants of its hinterland. The Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, J. B. van Heutz, dispatched a company of military police (*compagnie marechaussee*) commanded by Captain Hans Christoffel to take punitive action against those responsible for this subversive act and accomplish pacification in central Flores at once. From 10 August 1907 through February 1908 the company conducted military operations in a number of places in central Flores. During this period, approximately 1,000 local people who offered resistance against the troops were killed, and until the end of 1910, most of the firearms owned by the people were confiscated and destroyed (Jobse 1982: 36-75, cf. de Vries 1910; Dietrich 1989: 83-86; van Suchtelen 1921: 13).[5] Thus, warfare between political domains in central Flores was brought to an end.

Although the slave trade had been banned officially since the first half of the 19th century in the Netherlands East Indies (Needham 1983: 9-10), it only ceased completely in the same year as the pacification (van Suchtelen 1921: 93). Probably, this is not a coincidence. Warfare as the main source of slaves within central Flores was abruptly stopped by the pacification; rifles and gunpowder as the main imported articles became things that were worse than useless. Furthermore, in the previous year Dutch troops subjugated Mamboru, the center of the slave trade in northern Sumba (Needham 1983: 35-36, 1987: 6, 28).

After the pacification, the Dutch government reformed administrative units in central Flores and constituted two administrative "subdivisions", namely, Onderafdeeling Ende and Maumere. With regard to the former, numerous political domains were united into four "self-governing districts" (*zelfbesturende landschap*): Landschap Tanah Rea, Ende, Ndona and Tana Kunu Lima, over each of which a raja was assigned as head (see Figure 5).

In 1909, the Dutch government began sending children of eminent chiefs of each domain to a mission school in Lela in Onderafdeeling Maumere. Their purpose would have been to educate them as Christian raja and local administrators who could communicate with Dutch administrators in Malay. It was Pius Rasi Wangge, the eldest son of an eminent chief in Lise, who cut a conspicuous figure in this school. After receiving five years of elementary education, he was appointed raja of Landschap Tana Kunu Lima (Rasi Wangge n.d., 1946a). Early in the 1920s, the four self-governing

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[5] De Vries reported that the guns confiscated from the beginning of the pacification to 1 January 1910 totally numbered 5,385 (de Vries 1910).

domains in Onderafdeeling Ende were integrated into two districts, namely, Landschap Lio and Landschap Ende. Pius Rasi Wangge was appointed raja of Landschap Lio. This historical process was inseparably related to the Dutch religious policy, but this essay does not go deeply into this subject.

Before the pacification, adat chiefs acquired and amassed gold, land and slaves by conducting warfare in combination with trade, as well as investing part of these spoils into extending their military potential. One such investment was to purchase pieces of land around their territory so as to increase aji-ana whom they could mobilize according to need. As I will describe in detail in the next section, "aji-ana" denotes not only the members of a localized patrilineage represented by a chief but also those who get subsistence from the chief's territory. A chief with strong armed forces frequently took them off to fight as hired mercenaries, and received pay in the form of gold and a tract of land. In his autobiography, Pius Rasi Wangge recalls his boyhood when he accompanied his father and grandfather to engage in battles fought in many places in central Flores (Rasi Wangge n.d., 1946a).

The pacification not only put an end to such chiefs' entrepreneurial endeavors but also changed fundamentally the political situation surrounding chiefs, especially eminent chiefs. In the post-pacification context, where it was no longer a matter of life-and-death for a group of people to join forces in an all-out military or commercial effort, strong chieftainship turned out to be useless. In other words, it was no longer necessary for aji-ana to actively support their chief. In addition, the weakening of their economic foundation dealt chiefs a further blow. For a certain time shortly after the pacification, even though deprived of earning opportunities, chiefs would have been able to spend their hoarded gold on obligatory activities. After the coffer (*mbola kadho*) kept in their ceremonial house was emptied, they could not but ask for financial support from their aji-ana. All that the people were willing to bear, however, was a minimum amount of rice and livestock used in the performance of small-scale agricultural rituals. Thus, chiefs were reduced to priest-like functionaries presiding over rituals conducted according to the agricultural cycle, but they did not differ dramatically from their aji-ana economically (cf. Howell 1991: 230-231). This is revealed by the fact that large-scale offering ceremonies to "a pair of supreme beings" (*du'a ngga'é*) – such as *mopo*, *tasi rio weki*, *towa lima du'a* and *koé luwu oné* – to which more than 1,000 people were invited and which brought fame to chiefs through their ostentatious display and consumption of wealth, were hardly performed from the 1930s onward.

4. *A History of* Ngebo

Three patrilineages (wewa) whose apical ancestors are Sega, Paru and Laka (the sons of Nusa, an ancestoral hero who made a great contribution to the expansion of Lise), localize in Desa X, one of the eight administrative villages situated within Lise.[6] Lineage Sega is the largest among them. It segments into 16 exogamous *tuka* or sublineages (see Figure 11), and its members (including women who have married into the group) exceed 1,300. Although only 31 percent of the members of Wewa Sega inhabit Desa X, they comprise 48 percent of the total population of Desa X.

While the head of Lineage Sega is one of the eminent chiefs in Lise, the heads of Lineage Paru and Lineage Laka are subordinate chiefs. The area of Desa X is partitioned into three tracts of land (*maki*) called Maki Sega, Maki Paru and Maki Laka, the largest one of which, namely Maki Sega, has been inherited by the successive heads of Lineage Sega from generation to generation.

Desa X has an area of 1,900 hectares according to my provisional calculation based on a map (scale: 1/25,000) published by the Indonesian National Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping (Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional) in 1991. The head of Lineage Sega estimated Maki Sega at 800 hectares. This is not an unreasonable conjecture, because after subtracting a forest reserve, Maki Paru and Maki Laka the area of Desa X would be approximately 1,000 hectares.

As previously stated, the members of a wewa or localized patrilineage represented by a chief are referred to generically as the "younger brothers/children" of its head. This compound, however, is metaphorically extended to denote the long-term cultivators of a maki whose tenure is held by a lineage head. Speaking of adult males, they are analytically classified as follows:

a. Allies: The members of patrilineal groups that have maintained cooperation with a wewa for a number of generations.

b. Secondary members: The patrilineal descendants of slaves attain the status of "secondary member" within wewa nowadays. It is strictly taboo to mention their family background publicly and to use the term "slave" (*ata ho'o*) to refer to them. To my knowledge, there are no "secondary members" in wewa represented by subordinate chiefs. This suggests that slaves were the exclusive property of eminent chiefs in the past.

c. Uxorilocal residents: Men who marry a female member of a wewa and live with their wives' people.

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[6] All proper nouns that I use in regard to Desa X in this article are fictitious names.

d. Others: People who cannot be classified into the above three categories, such as schoolteachers, tentative residents and so forth.

Figure 8 is a tracing of the cadastral map which the headman of Desa X drew in August 2001 at my request. According to this map, the number of ngebo or land parcels which can be or have been used for cultivation amount to 395 in Maki Sega, and those ngebo are distributed to 142 persons. Maki Paru and Maki Laka were left blank in the original map because the village headman did not have a detailed knowledge of the ramifying situation of ngebo there.

Figure 8 appears to indicate that a number of ngebo aggregate into a maki in one plane. Nevertheless, it is misleading to conceive of such an image. The right to maki is clearly distinguished from the right to ngebo – at least by adat chiefs. In addition, the difference between them is rendered in terms of a layer metaphor: The right to maki is referred to as "right beneath land" (*hak ghalé wena tana*) and is distinguished from the right to ngebo, which is "right on land" (*hak ghéta wawo tana*). Furthermore, the former is subordinate to the latter in that the cultivators of every ngebo situated in a maki are obliged to involve themselves in rituals and taboos that the holder of the maki imposes in accordance with agricultural cycle. However, they have frequently ignored those obligations since the 1990s.

While the number of ngebo in Maki Sega amounts to 395 plots, there are only 11 ngebo of the head of Wewa Sega, namely those ngebo numbered from 1 to 11 in Figure 8. Although ngebo 4 and 7 are luxuriantly wooded, they cannot be opened, because they are the ngebo in which the aforementioned mopo (an offering ritual to a pair of supreme beings) was performed. It is prohibited to open such ngebo without performing the same ceremony once again. In addition, the head of Wewa Sega allows his aji-ana to work on ngebo 1 and 11. Thus, the land parcels that he can cultivate nowadays, contrary to expectation, form a small portion of the total number of ngebo within Maki Sega. This seems to be the consequence of the fact that the successive heads of Wewa Sega have portioned out land-parcels within the maki to their aji-ana.

Transactions of ngebo dating back at least as far as the late 19th century can be classified into the following types:

a. Distributing *ngebo podo* (*bagi ngebo podo*): In the past, every sublineage of Wewa Sega (except the sublineage of the eldest line represented by the lineage head) held a land parcel labeled *ngebo podo*. It was allocated to the sublineage's apical ancestor as his father's memento, which monumentalized the genealogical linkage between them. Part of the rice harvested there and cooked in an "earthen pot for boiling rice" (*podo*) had to be offered ritually to the apical ancestor and more remote patrilineal

ancestors. Nevertheless, the ngebo podo of four sublineages, namely ngebo 12, 15, 18 and 19, have already passed into other hands (see Table 2).

b. Giving dowry (*pati ngebo lawo lambu*): When a politically significant marital alliance was concluded, the wife-giver gave a ngebo as dowry (*lawo lambu*, literally meaning "female loincloth and upper garment") to the wife-taker, and the latter gifted gold treasures and livestock to the former as a counter-presentation (*nata bako*, or betel tobacco).

c. Asking forgiveness (*walé*): When a case of theft (*naka*) or illicit sexual intercourse (*péla* or *péla pani*) was brought to light, the perpetrator gave a ngebo and gold treasure to the victim in order to ask forgiveness.

d. Concluding a nonaggression pact (*rapa jaji*): When a chief concluded a political alliance with another chief who lived in the vicinity and posed a threat, the former gave a ngebo and his closest relative to the latter in order to monumentalize the pact.

e. Remunerating for military merit (*pati godo*): When he won a victory, the war leader (*ata pu'u*) who assumed full responsibility for a war that he projected, gave a ngebo or gold treasure to the leader of an auxiliary force which rendered distinguished military services.

f. Compensating for the war bereaved (*pati toko tuka*): When a fatality occurred on the battle field, the war leader had to compensate the war bereaved by giving a ngebo or gold.

g. Selling and buying (*téka geti*): All available data consistently indicate that it was possible to sell and buy ngebo by the medium of gold at least late in the 19th century.

A ngebo that has been alienated in any of the above ways is designated *ngebo ledhé* (literal trans.: clear ngebo) and is distinguished from ngebo in general.

The upper part of Table 2 shows which ngebo ledhé within Maki Sega have been transferred according to the various types of alienation mentioned above. The total number of those transferred ngebo does not exceed 20, and the successive heads of Wewa Sega handled most of them as either alienator or alienee. Moreover, they exclusively made the purchase and sale of ngebo. These things are true with six ngebo (I, II, III, IV and V in Table 2) which exist outside Maki Sega and have an area of about 120 hectares in all. Who held the 300-plus other ngebo that exist in Maki Sega?

The head of Wewa Sega, from his earlier years, made a memorandum of whatever village seniors told him about adat, land, history and so forth. A passage in this memorandum provides a precious piece of information to answer the above question. Ngebo Sipi, which is mentioned in that passage, geographically covers the ngebo numbered from 30 to 43 in Figure 8, which is currently conceived to be held by the

persons numbered from 30 to 43 in Figure 9. The passage runs thus:

> Information about Ngebo Sipi that *A* imparted in Wolo Ndopo [a hamlet in Maki Sega] on 19 April 1961: [...] This ngebo was originally [part of the land] conquered in the generation of Nusa. *B* had cultivated it [...] with the permission of *C* [who was in the position of the head of Wewa Sega until the 1910s]. When *A*, *D* and *E* were clearing farmland in that ngebo, *F* came and set fire [to dried hewn trees]. *A* caught and hauled *F* before *G* [who was the head of Wewa Sega until 1930], whereat *B*, *H*, *J* and *K* came over and asserted that Ngebo Sipi had been given as dowry from *C* when *L* married *B*. Over against this, *G* told them that he had never heard such a thing from his father and so it was a ngebo of his own. And he let *A*, *D* and *E* continue to work there. In succeeding years, *G* worked on the ngebo for himself and made a stone-fence along the Ria River. Subsequently, *M* made a ceremonial garden there [in order to perform agricultural rituals as the head of Wewa Sega]. Thereafter, *N* cultivated twice and planted coconuts there. After that, *O* and *P* opened rice paddies there, and Q, *R* and *S* worked on the ngebo with the permission of *N*. In 1959, *A*, *T*, *U* and *V* made their gardens and *W*, *Y* and *Z* cultivated rice paddies. Consequently, *Q* placed a taboo on the ngebo by "hanging leaves" (téo wunu) [to which he incanted a magical spell]. This news was brought to me, but I [the head of Wewa Sega] claimed that it was the head of Wewa Sega who held the the absolute right (hak mutlak) of the Ngebo Sipi.

This document reveals that a number of people cultivated Ngebo Sipi under the control and by permission of the successive heads of Wewa Sega until the 1960s. In other words, in the past, Ngebo Sipi did not consist of a number of clearly demarcated ngebo as depicted in Figure 9, and this seems to be true with other ngebo (except ngebo ledhe) in Maki Sega according to all available data. In that case, how have most of the ngebo depicted in Figure 8 come into being?

5. The Diffusion of Crop Ownership

The land policy executed in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur during the administration of Soeharto aimed at two objectives.[7] The first one was to put under the

[7] This paragraph draws on the following literature: Hasil Diskusi Masalah Tanah Adat dalam Pelaksanaan Undang-ndang Pokok Agraria di Nusa Tenggara Timur Tanggal 23 s/d 24 September 1983; Hasil-hasil Seminar Hukum Adat Tanah dan Hukum Adat Waris di Propinsi

control of the provincial government "communal adat land" (tanah ulayat) which was recognized as a potential hindrance to "development", in order to utilize the land for the fruition of "development" (PDPNTT 8/1974, PPDPNTT 8/1974). The second intention was to give legal guarantee (*kepastian hukum*) to the quasi-private property that naturally occurred and rapidly increased as "collective adat landownership" (hak ulayat) vanished. The latter process was inextricably connected with the National Land Registration Program (Proyek Operasi Nasional Agraria), which was implemented early in the 1980s (Sudjito 1987). On the other hand, the former antedated the latter by ten years and was formulated early in the 1970s when the Soeharto government started to enforce its land policy.

In the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur, as in other provinces in Indonesia, the land policy was carried out on the basis of Basic Agrarian Law (Undang-undang Pokok Agraria). Article 3 and 5 of this act stipulates hak ulayat as follows:

> Article 3.
> [...] the implementation of the "Hak-Ulayat" (The propriety-right of communal property of an Adat-Community) and rights similar to that of Adat-Communities, in so far as they still exist, shall be adjusted as such as to fit in the National and State's interests, based on the unity of the Nation and shall not be in conflict with the acts and other regulations of higher level.[8]
> Article 5.
> The Agrarian Law which applies to the earth, water and air space is Adat-Law as far as it is not in conflict with the National and State's interets [*sic*] based on the unity of the Nation, with Indonesian Socialism as well as with regulations stipulated in this Act and with other legislative regulations, all with due regard to the elements based on the Religious Law. (Act 5/1960; cf. UU 5/1960)

These provisions did not work as a brake against the formulation and implementation of the aforementioned land-policy in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur. The provincial

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Daerah Tingkat I Nusa Tenggara Timur yang diadakan pada tanggal 11 s/d 13 Nopember 1981; Kantor Agraria Kabupaten Ende 1984; Kesimpulan Hasil Symposium Terbatas Persoalan Tanah Suku Daerah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur (tanggal 15 Mei s/d Mei 1972 di Kupang); Notulen Rapat Diskusi Tanah Suku/Persektuan Adat Kabupaten Ende, tanggal 29 September 1984, Gedung Baranuri-Ende; PDPNTT 8/1974; PPDPNTT 8/1974.

[8] I think there is an ambiguity in the wording of Article 3. The National Land Agency recently interpreted this article as follows: "Article 3 of the Basic Agrarian Law stipulates that the hak ulayat and rights similar to that of adat-communities can be exercised by the adat-communities concerned in so far as the hak ulayat still exists factually." (PPPMNA 400-2626)

government, along with most legal scholars who were active during the period of the Soeharto administration (e.g. Boedi Harsono 1994: 167), regarded adat as being on the course of extinction. Furthermore, the land rights of adat chiefs were also denied in the following sense.

As we have seen, the land rights of adat chiefs have been personal rights similar in some respects to the modern concept of individual ownership. In the governmental perception in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur, however, it has been assumed that hak ulayat is a communal landownership held by a descent group (*suku*). The head, who represents the group, acts ex-officio as the manager of the communal property (tanah ulayat). If he were merely such a manager, however, his ability to exercise causal domination with respect to his aji-ana could not be understood.

It is of central importance to understanding land tenure in central Flores to comprehend the multiple-layered articulation of land rights and causal domination. As previously stated, a maki held by a chief is the principal source of living for his aji-ana. For this reason, the chief dominates his aji-ana. As remarked previously, although they could have ngebo lédhé, the right to it was subordinate to the chief's land right. Similarly, an eminent chief asserts authority over subordinate chiefs, since the former is recognized as the successor of an ancestral hero who granted land to the ancestors of the subordinate chiefs according to their merits in war. Nonetheless, this is not the endpoint of the causal nexus of domination. It further extends and ultimately reaches the supreme beings referred to as du'a ngga'é or "du'a above the moon, ngga'é beneath the earth" (du'a *gheta lulu wula,* ngga'é *ghalé wena tana*), who were conceived to be the first cause of the "universe" (*ulu ela*) (Arndt 1939; Rasi Wangge 1946c). Even though "du'a" and "ngga'e" are almost the only Lionese words which can be translated as "owner", they are hardly ever used to refer to human beings, whether or not they are eminent chiefs. This implies that even the land right of eminent chiefs has not contained exclusive right of disposal which comprises the heart of the modern concept of ownership.

To my knowledge, this layered character of land rights in central Flores has almost never been mentioned in the "development" discourse (cf. Seda 1983). In fact, the master narrative of land during the period of the New Order was monolithic and closed to the effect that it was based on the concept of ownership, whether communal or private, as well as the alternative relationship between communal and private landownership.[9] Therefore, even if an adat chief naively asserted his hereditary

[9] This description is based on the following literature: Anonymous a 1976; Anonymous b 1990; Anonymous c 1986; Badjo 1982; Daeng 1974; Gonstal 1976; Kesimpulan Hasil Symposium

land-right, he was generically censured for pretending to be a landowner for selfish purposes, or condemned as a holdover from the feudal times that were repugnant to a fixed line of national policy. Thus, adat chiefs could voice little dissent on their land and over the implementation of national land policy. In this situation, where adat chiefs could not but be silent about land tenure, the introduction of perennial cash crops was loudly promoted as part of the "development" policy.

A close relative of the head of Wewa Sega was in the position of village headman of Desa X through the 1970s and into the 1980s. He was, like many other village headmen, a pious supporter of the "development" policy enforced by the Soeharto government and undertook a project aimed at augmenting people's incomes by cash cropping. He, with the permission of the head of Wewa Sega, commenced with distributing to the aji-ana a pasture of some 100 hectares within Maki Sega, so that they would cultivate perennial commercial crops for themselves. This land distribution was launched in 1976. As Figure 8 shows, there are currently 96 pieces of ngebo within the former grazing land. This figure roughly corresponds with the number of family heads who got subsistence from Maki Sega in the 1970s.

With that as a beginning, the village headman continued to portion out land to the aji-ana on the condition that they would plant cash crops on their distributed ngebo. The head of Wewa Sega supported the village headman's policy by adopting the strategy that when the aji-ana did not fulfill that condition, he claimed back their unutilized part of ngebo. In addition, the village headman encouraged the heads of Wewa Paru and Wewa Laka to do the same thing. As a result, approximately 70 percent of ngebo in Desa X are now under cash crop cultivation. Therefore, most ngebo boundaries depicted in Figure 8 were originally the borderlines of newly planted perennial crops owned by each cultivator. In other words, the ownership of those crops "diffused" into the surface of land itself and transformed it into quasi-private property. I would like to label this phenomenon "diffusion of crop-ownership".

Figures 10 and 11 show how the 395 ngebo within Maki Sega are distributed among a number of patrilineal groups localized in Desa X. The composition of population in Maki Sega drastically changed through the 1950s into the 1970s, because many people transmigrated from Desa X to the northernmost part of Lise. After that, no population change of such a large scale has come about in Desa X. As understood from Figures 10 and 11, the distribution of land to each patrilineal group localized in Desa X correlates with the people who live in Desa X, rather than with the size of those

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Terbatas Persoalan Tanah Suku Daerah Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Tanggal 15 Mei s/d Mei 1972 di Kupang; Sowynau 1983.

patrilineal groups. This indicates that the "diffusion of crop-ownership" emerged in and after the 1980s.

Registered land-parcels increased rapidly during the period of the Soeharto administration and totaled around 10,000 in August 2002 in Kabupaten Ende (cf. Kantor Pertanahan Kabupaten Ende 1996). On the other hand, there exists more than one hundred administrative villages in Kabupaten Ende, and it can be safely inferred that there are a number of private-property-like ngebo that came about in each desa through the "diffusion of crop-ownership" in and after the 1980s.[10] In that case, numerous private-property-like land parcels came into being while the land registration program was going on, and the number of these amounts to several times the number of registered land-parcels in Kabupaten Ende.

Concluding Remarks

Adat has been conceived as a changeless entity not only in Kabupaten Ende, but in the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur generally. During the administration of Soeharto, it was considered the remnant of a past feudal social order that would become extinct in course of time. Since the downfall of the New Order, it has been treated like an endangered species vulnerable to "modernization" and "globalization". On the other hand, in this article, I have suggested that the present state of adat is not "genetically" determined but should be understood as the cumulative effect of the historical processes that central Flores has undergone since the early 20th century. Within the scope of this paper, two historical changes are highly important to understanding the present state of adat in central Flores.

The first change derived from the pacification and related to the circumstances surrounding adat, rather than to adat itself. As previously stated, the pacification undermined the economic foundation of the chiefs. Accordingly, they could not but ask frequently for financial support from their aji-ana. Nevertheless, the latter were not always willing to comply with their chief's request, since the pacification created a new situation in which they did not require a strong chief. The exploitation of aji-ana by "feudal" adat chiefs was condemned by governmental authorities and local intellectuals during the period of the New Order. I do not deny that there have been chiefs who have repeatedly extorted money and livestock from their aji-ana. Nonetheless, such an image

[10] Before the boom in desa fractionation began under the decentralization regulation, there had been 103 administrative villages in Kabupaten Ende. This boom continues, and the number of desa within the regency is probably well over 120.

of exploitive chieftainship is obviously a product of history after the pacification, because the fittest person prior to pacification was an entrepreneur-like leader who maximized both the efficiency of his limited resources and his return on investment, rather than a merely greedy chief.

The second change originated in the "development" policy that the Soeharto government implemented. As previously stated, chiefs clearly distinguish maki from ngebo. Nonetheless, I hesitate to state that this is true with aji-ana. People do not explicitly deny chiefs' right to maki. Nevertheless, it seems that the difference between maki and ngebo has become blurred and the right to the latter has merged into the right to the former. This is suggested by the fact that the ngebo of the head of Wewa Sega and the land parcels of his aji-ana are coplanar on the cadastral map drawn by the village headman of Desa X, and more importantly by the fact that agricultural taboos, which aji-ana must observe in recognition of chiefs' causal domination, have been frequently transgressed since the 1990s. If this blurring has in fact taken place, the emergence of quasi-private property through the "diffusion of crop-ownership" has been undermining chiefs' land-rights more fundamentally than ever before. This inconspicuous and creeping change has potentially a ruinous effect on adat, because the chiefs' land-right based on causal domination comprises the heart of adat.

It is unclear what policy should be applied to the present state of adat in central Flores. Nevertheless, whatever policy is adopted, I think it would be inevitable to take into consideration the above-mentioned two major changes which adat in central Flores has suffered.

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

Figure 1. Flores and neighboring islands



Figure 2. Lise and neighboring areas



Figure 3. Population density by *desa* in Lise



Figure 4. Population density by administrative unit in Onderafdeeling Maumere in 1911



Figure 5. Population density by administrative unit in Onderafdeeling Ende in 1917



Figure 6. Distribution of population by religion in Onderafdeeling Ende in the 1910s



Figure 7. Relationship between eminent chiefs



Figure 8. Cadastral map of Maki Sega



Figure 9. Cultivators of Ngebo Sipi



Figure 10. Number of *ngebo* held by people of each *aji-ana* catetory



Figure 11. Number of *ngebo* held by sublineages within Wewa Sega

Table 1. Annual rainfall in central Flores

Station	Year	Amount (mm)
South coastal area in Kabupaten Ende		
South coast	1917	1,885
Wolo Lele A	1984	2,653
Wolo Waru	1977	1,166
〃	1985	2,247
〃	1995	1,202
North coastal area in Kabupaten Ende		
North coast	1917	1,552
Maulore	1985	1,655
〃	1995	1,200
South coastal area in Kabupaten Sikka		
Paga	1998	879
Lela	1998	1,551
North coastal area in Kabupaten Sikka		
Maumere	1983	1,165
〃	1998	1,126
Waigete	1983	1,295
〃	1998	697
Waioti	1983	1,271
Ledalero	1983	1,656
〃	1998	1,408
Magepanda	1983	763
〃	1998	1,564
Kewapante/Habi	1998	1,011

Sorces: van Suchtelen 1921; Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Ende 2001; Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Sikka 1999; Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Ende 1986; Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Sikka 1985; Wolo Waru (1977): The measurement by Kantor Pertanian Kecamatan Wolowaru; Wolo LeleA (1984): My measurement.

Table 2. Cases of *ngebo* alienation

Ngebo no	Place		types of alienation	Alienee
1	In Desa X	Allied group A	Asking forgiveness	The head of Wewa Sega: *C*
3-1	〃	The head of Wewa Paru	Selling and buying	The head of Wewa Sega: *C*
3-2	〃	The head of Wewa Paru	Selling and buying	The head of Wewa Sega: *C*
3-3	〃	The head of Wewa Paru	Compensating for the war bereav	The head of Wewa Sega: *C*
12	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega	Dividing token	Sega's son: Sublineage MM's apical ancest
12	〃	Sublineage MM's head	Asking forgiveness	Sublineage ML's head
13	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Jama	Dividing token	Jama's yB: Sublineage ML's apical ancesto
14	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Jama	Dividing token	Jama's yB: Sublineage UW's apical ancesto
15	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Jama	Dividing token	Jama's yB: Sublineage NW's apical ancesto
15	〃	Sublineage NW's head	Asking forgiveness	C's son
16	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Jama	Dividing token	Jama's yB: Sublineage NL's apical ancesto
17	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Jama	Dividing token	Jama's yB: Sublineage NK's apical ancesto
18	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega	Dividing token	Sega's son: Sublineage WN's apical ancest
18	〃	Sublineage WN's head	Asking forgiveness	*C*'s son
19	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega	Dividing token	Sega's son: Sublineage TN's apical ancesto
19	〃	Sublineage TN's head	Giving dowry	C's son
20	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega	Dividing token	Sega's son: Sublineage DN's apical ancesto
21	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega	Dividing token	Sega's son: Sublineage MN's apical ancest
22	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega	Dividing token	Sega's son: Sublineage ND's apical ancesto
23	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega	Dividing token	Sega's son: Sublineage FN's apical ancesto
24	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Jama	Dividing token	Jama's yB: SublineageFW's apical ancestor
25	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega	Dividing token	Sega's son: SublineageNN's apical ancestor
26	〃	The head of Wewa Sega: Jama	Dividing token	Jama's yB: SublineageND's apical ancestor
28	〃	A man from a neighboring hamlet	Selling and buying	The head of Wewa Sega: *G*
29	〃	A man from a neighboring hamlet	Selling and buying	The head of Wewa Sega: *G*
I-1	Outside Desa X in Li	A neighboring eminent chief	Selling and buying	The head of Wewa Sega: *C*
I-2	〃	A neighboring eminent chief	Asking forgiveness	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega
II	〃	A neighboring eminent chief	Concluding nonaggression pact	The head of Wewa Sega: Jama
III	〃	A group of indigenous people	Concluding nonaggression pact	The head of Wewa Sega: Sega
IV	〃	A neighboring eminent chief	?	The head of Wewa Sega: *C*
V	Outside Lise	An eminent chief in Lise Detu	Remunerating for military merit	The head of Wewa Sega: *C*

*See Figure 9 and 11 concerning proper names in Table 2

第Ⅱ部　地域住民の応答

Part II　Local People's Response

Commodity and Labor on the Move:

Borderlands of West Kalimantan as Economic Infrastructures of Sarawak, East Malaysia

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Introduction[1]

People and things move around freely, often times beyond a national boundary. Such movements are, however, incompatible with the state's sovereignty and its realization of territoriality. The sedentarization of people and control of commodity movement are the oldest state undertakings in the world. The state is generally an enemy of mobile people and goods. There is something generic about the state's desire to fix people geographically and to control the unauthorized movement of commodity.

Such a state's undertaking of spatially circumscribing the flows of people and commodity within its territory has been, however, minimally pursued by Indonesia, if not non-existent from the beginning of its nation-making. From the Dutch colonial era to the present, Indonesia has functioned as one of the important labor reserves in the region, from which indentured labor force has long been mobilized for such foreign labor market as colonial rubber estates in British Malaya, oilfields in the Middle East, and downtown sweatshops in East Asia. Besides the movements of laborers, the illicit cross-border flows of commodities have also been practical source of income for local communities adjacent to the international boundary. The smuggling of copras in the maritime communities of North Celebes and rubber sheets from West Kalimantan are a few examples of transnational commodity chains formulated between Indonesia and neighboring countries.

When out-migration is tolerated by the state, and local institutions to support such labor flow emerge, people become reserve army for foreign production system. When the transnational movements of agricultural commodities and natural resources are

[1] This is a draft paper presented at International Workshop *The Micrology of Indonesian Local Societies,* (March 23, 2004, Auditorium Widya Graha, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)), organized by Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Bogor Agricultural University (IPB), National Coordination Agency for Surveys and Mapping (BAKOSURTANAL), ASAFAS and CSEAS, Kyoto University. Do not quote without author's permission.

incorporated into the production gears across the border, the expansion of capitalist production never comes to a halt.

There are individuals who profit from the transnational movement of labor and commodity. Such people are often located at the margin of national territory, and their profit gain is often contradictory to the economic nationalism disseminated from Jakarta. The formation of the peripheral nation space, *daerah perbatasan*, has led to the rise of heterogeneous social arrays than the development of homogeneous national or sub-national economic totalities. People combine diverse modes of living, learn to negotiate the contradictions, and take advantage of economic difference widened since the Asian economic crisis.

Residents at the national margin indeed take advantage of current economic difference between Indonesia and Malaysia, represented in the form of lopsided Rupiah - Ringgit exchange rate. For instance, despite economic downturn, borderland society has generally enjoyed the profit gain from border trading and labor migration. The depreciation of Rupiah against Ringgit has boosted the economic transaction between Indonesia and Malaysia, specifically one-way flow of commodities and laborers from Indonesia to Malaysia in pursuit of income in Malaysian currency.

In the age of political decentralization of Indonesia, at stake is how the decision-making of provincial government, which has direct bearing on the everyday life of local people, precedes that of Jakarta without losing synergy of policy implementation. The following is an attempt, through the ethnological enterprise of anthropology, to furnish empirical case studies to the generalities of political scientists as well as economists.

My undertaking as a team member of a research project titled "Anthropological Studies on Transitional Period in Indonesia" is thus set to examine the nature of international mobility and dynamics of human labor and commodity across the border between Malaysia and Indonesia in the island of Borneo. Focusing exclusively on peasant communities in Sambas District, West Kalimantan, this study intends to scrutinize the socio-economic condition of local communities located in the borderlands adjacent to Sarawak, East Malaysia, which have functioned as labor reserve as well as commodity supplier to the market across the international boundary.

The following ethnography is consisted of three parts with different units of analysis, deliberately set to better understand the dynamics of economic transnationalism, i.e., borderland community, trans-border market place, and migratory labor circuit. I shall first attempt to present a microscopic analysis of socio-economic relations between two peasant communities facing each other across the international boundary in the maritime frontier of western Borneo. Secondly, focusing exclusively on

the borderland region connected to the other side of border through *Border Crossing Post* (*Pos Lintas Batas*), I will look into the flows of goods out of Indonesia, both agricultural commodities and natural resources. Finally, I shall attend to the movements of contract workers (TKI) from a rural peasant village of Sambas to downriver industries in north Sarawak, East Malaysia, where thousands of Indonesian workers are employed for the production of plywood and sawn timber.

The Borderlands of West Kalimantan in History

The borderland community of Sambas District, West Kalimantan which faces Sarawakian territory in its vicinity is quintessentially a social space *in-between*, having been constantly situated between two contesting geo-bodies throughout its history; first between Islamic sultanates of Brunei and Sambas, then between colonial governments of the white Rajah Brooke (and subsequently the British) and the Dutch, and finally between the nation-states of Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia. On the side of the present Malaysia, the geo-body was inherited from Brunei sultanate, the Brooke dynasty, the Japanese imperial rule, the British colonial government and to the nation-state of Malaysia, while the present form of Indonesian West Kalimantan has its direct root in the age of Sambas sultan through Dutch colonial rule. The borderland has been divided by a contesting set of polities, but the boundary itself has been inherited by these transitional geo-bodies from pre-modern, to colonial and to modern state. Not only territory but also the communities in the borderland have divided by an international boundary, but the social as well as economic interaction across the border has continued for generations. Communal relations among villages have existed much earlier than the national boundary, both colonial and post-colonial. The national boundary has inscribed its territoriality on border communities, while locals have maintained amicable relations based on economic, kinship, social and cultural ties over national territories. Looking at such peripheral communities at the margin of nation-state, my research examined the positionality of these communities in the framework of nation-state as a socio-economic unit. The current research especially attended to the socio-economic nature of these border communities in relation to the dynamics of national as well as international labor market both during and after Indonesian economic crisis.

My research conducted in local peasant communities of Sambas, particularly focused on the cross-border mobility of human to elucidate the process of the formation of border economy. This study sees rural communities in *daerah perbatasan* of West

Kalimantan both as a labor reserve and supplier of locally produced commodities, functioning as an important economic infrastructure of Sarawakian production system. This study is the first study of its kind and designed to elucidate the socio-economic dynamics of a selected peasant community in the border region with a special attention to the local adaptive strategies with its attention to the pull factors triggering the influx of migrants and commodity chains to Malaysia. Placing the borderland in the historical spectrum, my analysis attends to the interplay among local communities and the larger structural power connecting the peripheral region of nation-state with international economic forces.

Locality of Borderland Community in the Nation-State and International Monetary Dynamics

Borderland is a special niche where the national order of things is very much ambivalent by nature: the state's rule is at one hand strong but on the other hand weak. The border represents a critical frame that makes the state independent. The borderland is, at the same time, a social field where the locals detach themselves from, critically objectify, and practically locate the state in their own daily life to make ends meet. While the state structures the border space through its boundary making, borderland locals create, construct and reconstruct their strategic locale in the nation space. In this sense, they are far from a mere passive periphery.

The residents of *daerah perbatasan* indeed take advantage of current economic difference between Indonesia and Malaysia, which is well represented by Rupiah - Ringgit exchange rate. For instance, despite economic crisis in 1997, borderland society generally enjoyed the profit form border trading. In the peripheral economy of *daera perbatasan*, the commerce in M$ Ringitt currency contributed to the local economy and the lower exchange rate of Rupiah against Ringgit boosted the economic transaction between Indonesia and Malaysia, specifically one-way flow of commodity and labor power from Indonesia to Malaysia in exchange with the income in Malaysian Ringgit.

The well-being of communities in the borderland indeed depends on the fluctuation of Rupiah value in the international market. The structural change of border communities is constantly induced by the outer economic dynamics. During the fieldwork in the border area of West Kalimantan, the value of Indonesian Rupiah in international monetary market greatly fluctuated against US Dollar as well as against Malaysian Ringgit. 1 Malaysian Ringgit which fetched 3,000 Rupiah at the height of

economic crisis after 1997 currently gives 2,200 Rupiah to the local merchants and peasants who sell their commodities and labor to Malaysians, while in the late 80s when 1 Malaysian Ringgit was exchanged at the rate of Rp.700. Local people are well aware of the fact that their labor and commodity value is much affected by the international monetary dynamics.

Border Scene 1.
Local Agency and Structural Determinants: Communal Symbiosis on the Border

The Indonesian migrant village, Temajuk, consists of hamlets of Tekam Patah, Temajuk Besar, Temajuk Kecil, Camar Bulan, and Meludin. Five hamlets are grouped together as Desun Temajuk. All the hamlets are lined up along a small path, which eventually leads to a Malaysian village, Telok Melano situated right across the international boundary between Indonesia and Malaysia. It takes only half an hour on foot from Telok Melano to Tekam Patah, located closest to the border. From Telok Melano to Temajuk Kecil it takes approximately two hours. Camar Bulan is one hour away from Temajuk Kecil.

After communist activities subdued following a series of arrests and surrenders in 1988, the migration of the Sambas Malays to the frontier land adjacent to the Cape Dato accelerated. In search of a better life, they left their overcrowded home villages in West Kalimantan coastal plain. Sporadic migration of individual families was followed by *en masse* chain-migration. As a result, within a decade five hamlets with a total population of 1,300 strong were formed.

These hamlets are linked by an unpaved road to Paloh to the south, the administrative center of Paloh District, Sambas Regency, West Kalimantan. From Camar Bulan, another nine-hour walk takes us to Paloh. From Paloh, access is easier to other Indonesian towns on the coast such as Sekura, Sambas, Pemangkat, Mempawah, and Pontianak, the state capital of West Kalimantan, situated 270 km away from Paloh. These towns are all connected by land transportation.

Temajuk is inhibited by the Sambas Malays who migrated from 40 villages in the Paloh and Jawai sub-districts. It was gradually formed by individually-motivated spontaneous chain migration called *spontan*, not by the government-led *transmigrasi* (transmigration). Firstly, Temajuk Kecil was opened by H. Syafari Bintolo with 10 households from Teba on 22 March 1981, followed by the opening of Temajuk Besar by Pak Tapa and his followers. Chronological development of Temajuk is as follows; prior to 1982 there were no permanent dwellers in Temajuk. People were back and forth

between this frontier village and their home villages. In 1982 there were seven households which decided to settle down. The permanent dwellers grew to 20 households in 1983 and to 165 in 1987 and to 284 in 1992. As of 2001, the population grew to 1,331 with 334 households.

The reason why the villagers decided to migrate to the frontier land near the Cape Dato is, according to the present residents of Temajuk, economic difficulty in their home villages. At the initial stage of migration, they have faced a series of obstacles. There were still many PGRS (Pasukan Gerilla Rakyat Sarawak) in the vicinity of Temajuk, which was labeled as clandestine communists by the people of Sarawak. Only after 1988, the military threat disappeared in the area. The distance from Paloh and other local communities and the rough water off the Cape Dato also prevent villagers from obtaining daily necessities. Shortage of food during *landas* monsoon season (from November to March) has always been a problem for Temajuk population.

Temajuk still retains the air of a typical frontier village. There is no electricity or piped water. In front of the houses, there remain half-burnt large tree trunks, reminiscent of the hardships experienced by pioneer settlers in clearing thick forests. Before the settlers' arrival, today's Temajuk compound was covered with primary forest and the old secondary forest once utilized by the forefathers of the Telok Melano villagers to cultivate hill rice. In 1981 a path was beaten between Temajuk Kecil and Temajuk Besar, which connected Temajuk to Malaysian territory through Telok Melano. At the initial period of migration, villagers cleared nearby forest for opening community compound. Receiving an advice from security officers (HANKAM), Temajuk villagers started to sell logs to neighboring Malaysian market for cash income, rather than burning or letting them rotten.

Many still maintain their houses in their home villages in Paloh and Jawai. Temajuk villagers, especially those in Temajuk Besar, Temajuk Kecil, Camar Bulan, and Meludin, are best described as circular labor migrants who maintain dual-residency, that is, one residence in the coastal villages of Paloh or Jawai and the other in the frontier community of Temajuk. During the *Hari Raya*, the most important Muslim new year holidays, the Temajuk village is deserted and quiet because inhabitants go home for family gatherings, leaving few behind in the frontier community.

At the initial period of their settlement, due to the dependency of the Temajuk economy on logging and its short history of migration, the majority of Temajuk residents were not engaged in agriculture, except for a small number in Tekam Patah located adjacent to the border. None of the Indonesian government's agricultural schemes were implemented in Temajuk village. Some of the residents tried to cultivate

cash crops such as pepper by obtaining seedlings from Telok Melano, but many failed because of the lack of agricultural expertise. Even cultivating staple foods such as hill rice and cassava was not an easy enterprise in Temajuk because wild boars often destroy the crops.

Among the five hamlets of the Temajuk village, Tekam Patah, which is composed of 50 households, has established a peculiar symbiotic relationship with the Malaysian village across the border. It is the newest hamlet in Temajuk, opened in the late 1980s, by migrants from Sarang Burung Danau in the Jawai District of Sambas Regency. Like the other five hamlets in Temajuk, the residents are all *Melayu Sambas* (Sambas Malays) except for three Dayak males. Tekam Patah maintains a strong tradition of village solidarity based on kinship relations existing in their home village. When the residents migrated to Temajuk, the population of Sarang Burung Danau exceeded 1,000. As population pressure mounted, chain migration began. Many inhabitants have already sold their houses and lands in Sarang Burung Danau. Even during festive seasons such as *Hari Raya,* the majority usually stay in Tekam Patah and celebrate the holidays in the frontier. What distinguishes Tekam Patah from other Temajuk hamlets is their engagement in cultivation and less dependence on exploitative logging activity. Along with cassava and banana trees, the residents planted coconut trees and pepper vines. Although they were young, still needing another couple of years to fruit, the existence of the cash crops exemplified the long-term perspective of the people. Although the villagers used to plant wet rice in irrigated fields in their home village, they are now successfully engaged in hill rice cultivation for their survival. Their neighbors in Telok Melano have contributed in no small way to their success by giving advice.

Appreciation of Malaysian Ringgit and relative depreciation of Indonesian Rupiah have affected social relations between two villages. Although defined by distinct ethnic nomenclature peculiar to Malaysia and Indonesia, *Melayu Sarawak* of Telok Melano and *Melayu Sambas* of Temajuk are both Muslims and share identical cultural traits. Economic difference, however, affects the value of labor in the daily exchange sphere. Many Indonesians seek employment opportunities in Telok Melano, which is perennially short of labor, and receive cash payment in Ringgit. The labor flow is one-way, that is, from Indonesia to Malaysia only. The employment of Indonesian workers in Telok Melano is arranged on an individual basis. Indonesians from Temajuk are usually employed to clear the secondary forest for swidden agriculture, for weeding, for pepper and clove harvest, and for household chores. These odd jobs are seasonal and occasionally become available. For instance, at the time of pepper harvest, the Malaysian villagers often have trouble finding Indonesian workers since demand for

pickers are quite high. Not a small number of Telok Melano villagers maintain a loosely structured patron-client relationship with Indonesians from Temajuk. Each employer has a small pool of regular laborers who have prior experience of working for him or her.

For instance, Mak Ngah, a Telok Melano woman whose two children are both away from the village for schooling and work, always has a problem finding a helping hand in her meager fields. She paid a total of M$42 to an Indonesian man to clear and burn off the secondary jungle for use as swidden rice fields. Later she hired two Temajuk women for weeding for three days. They were paid M$4 per day, and simple food was provided. One month later, the same two women from Temajuk were hired again for weeding. On another plot she hired an Indonesian man to clear the field for the planting of pepper vines. His wife had worked regularly for Mak Ngah. Since the employer, a widow, does not have much cash income, she suggested payment in the form of fertilizer, a packet of coffee, 1 kg of sugar and M$10. The relationship between this widow and the Indonesians is the loosest type of patron-client relationship, with minimal moral obligation. She constantly faces such disappointment as broken promises, unfulfilled duties, and requests for overpayment.

There are several Indonesians from Tekam Patah who maintain more stable patron-client relationships with relatively well-to-do Telok Melano villagers. Pak Yusoff is a descendent a pioneering immigrant from Dutch Kalimantan. Being one of the first Telok Melano settlers, his grandfather cleared a large tract of virgin forest for the planting of hill rice, part of which Pak Yusoff inherited. He operates the largest cultivation fields in the village, mostly used for the production of commodities such as pepper and cacao. His family owns more than five hundred pepper vines as well as a substantial number of cacao trees. The yearly harvest of pepper generates more than M$10,000. In addition to cash crop production, his family owns a boat, engines, and a dragnet. They often go out to sea for *mukat* fishing, casting a large dragnet. Its catch is usually divided among the helpers with a larger share for the boat/engine owner, and the rest is sold to villagers. He regularly hires Indonesian laborers, both men and women. There are usually three to six of them working for the Yusoff family at any one time. They commute to Telok Melano almost every morning (some of them stay overnight) to help the family with washing, cooking, picking pepper seeds in harvest season, and pulling the dragnet for *mukat* fishing. The Yusoff family's pepper vines produce approximately 2,000 kg of seeds yearly. If left unattended, the ripen seeds ready for harvest fall or are eaten by birds. It is thus crucial to retain enough workers for the labor intensive pepper picking. His *mukat* fishing also requires at least seven people, usually

four of whom are Indonesians. Although the profit from pepper production and fishing is substantial, so is the expense of maintaining a labor force. Pak Yusoff's wife cooks more than 2 kg of rice everyday for her family and the Indonesian workers. Monthly payments can reach up to M$125 per worker, which is quite a large amount in a village where the average income does not exceed M$200.

It needs to be reiterated again that the relationship between the village entrepreneur and the Indonesian workers is not one of strict dominance and subordination. The Indonesians are not bond laborers nor are they in debt, and come to work whenever they wish, although mutual trust is a factor. Malaysian employers often complain about Indonesian workers not showing up to work as promised. Some also claim that Indonesian employees never stop chewing betel nut and chit-chatting after lunch unless they are asked to resume work.

In addition to the Telok Melano villagers, there are three Malays who live in Sematan and occasionally come to Telok Melano to take care of their pepper gardens. They purchased land from the villagers and own large pepper gardens. They too recruit Indonesians as well as Telok Melano villagers during the pepper harvest.

Average Wage for One-day's Pepper Picking in Telok Melano and Sematan

work site	employee	daily wage
Melano	Indonesian (Temajuk)	M$3.50(w/ lunch) M$4.00 (w/o lunch)
Melano	Malaysians (Melano)	M$6.00 (w/ lunch)
Sematan	Malaysians (Sematan)	M$9.00 (w/o lunch)

The table above shows the daily wage variation recorded in Telok Melano village and Sematan town. There is a clear difference in the wage levels between Malaysians and Indonesians. The highest wage is M$9.00 paid to Malaysians in Sematan, while the wage decreases as the work site gets closer to the border. When Telok Melano villagers work for fellow villagers and for the Malay pepper owners from Sematan, they usually receive M$6.00 per day and lunch. Indonesian workers receive far less. Malaysians take advantage of their stronger currency to procure cheap labor, while Indonesians come cross the border to seek better value in wage paid in Malaysian Ringitt. Regardless of the low wages paid to Indonesians, there is a constant labor flow from the other side of the border.

As seen in the above case of the movement of labor across the border between Telaok Melano and Temajuk, there are two opposing attitudes toward national currencies. While the Malaysians in Telok Melano adhere to their own national currency,

the Indonesians across the international boundary try to accumulate their capital not in their own currency but Malaysian ringitt. The Indonesian's border transgression in terms of currency choice and the Malaysian adherence to their own ringitt leads to the asymmetric power relation between two border communities. The relative value of labor is determined by the relative value of national currency in the international foreign exchange market; the Malaysian villagers, taking advantage of their own stronger currency, exploit fellow Indonesian Malays for their economic maximization.

The downturn of Indonesian economy under the last phase of President Soeharto's ledership was regarded as favorable by the Indonesians of Temajuk community. Weak Indoneian economy means stronger Malaysian Ringitt. Saving capital in Ringitt is much safer and profitable to Temjuk villagers, simply because the longer they keep capital in the form of foreign currency, higher the monetary value becomes. In this sense, the Indonesians migrating to the national periphery adjacent to the border transgress the limit of national economy spatially determined through the compulsory usage of a single currency within national territory. It is intriguing many of villagers explicitly expressed their hope that the Indonesian economy continues to decline so that the value of Malaysian ringitt keeps higher value against their own currency.

When I returned to Temajuk in 2002, I found the villagers of Tekam Patah has already made a substantial profit through trading their pepper seeds with Malaysian middlemen from Telok Melano. At the height of Asian economic crisis in 1997, which was caused by the misled economic policies imposed on Indonesia by International Monetary Fund (IMF), Indonesian economy fought one of the worst recessions by which the price of daily necessities such as cooking oil and rice rose dramatically. In contrast, the villagers of Temajuk Kecil and Besar, Camar Bulan, and Tekam Patah villages sold their pepper seeds for Malaysian market to enjoy unexpected bubble economy.

For instance, Pak Jayadi originally from Jawai migrated to Tekam Patah with only Rp. 7,500 in 1987. After almost ten years of struggle, the Indonesian economic crisis finally gave him a boost. By that time he had already cultivated pepper field yielding up to 1.5 ton. In 1997 the exchange rate of Indonesian Rupiah went up to 3,500 against one Malaysian Ringitt. One kilogram of white pepper easily fetched 23 Ringitt and black pepper 16 Ringitt.

	Malaysian ringitt	Indonesian rupiah
White pepper/kg	RM 23,00	Rp 80.000
Black pepper/kg	RM 16,00	Rp 56.000

The pepper sold to Malaysian middlemen with the previous exchange rate of Rp 750/RM (1992) and Rp 1,200/RM (1994) was traded at the price of 23 Malaysian Ringitt with 3,500/RM. Inflated value of his pepper gave Pak Jayadi literally overnight success, who presently lives in his concrete made house and possesses a generator, and two motorbikes. As of 2002 in more than 65 households of Tekam Patah use their own generators and some of the family have three motorbikes.

An economic community based on the adherence to a single currency is one of the vital forms of social grouping. Under the state system, people have been divided by a national currency. Nationality and national currency supposedly form a strict one to one relation in the realm of national terrain. In the borderlands under analysis, however, national difference of economy as exemplified in the relative value of currencies leads to the formation of new kind of flexible, transnational capital accumulation based on the strategic usage of currency.

It is good to think about the relationship between two kinds of community observable in the borderlands: macro-level currency community (i.e., national community based on a common use of a single currency) and micro-level village community based on face-to-face relation of its members. Commodificaion of commercial goods and human labor is a universal process where use value is transformed into exchange value. Currency is a medium bridging this transformation, whose function lies in its homogenization; commodification deprives people and goods of all the attributes.

Border Scene 2.
From Jalan Tikus to Jalan Gajah: Flows of Commodities at the State Margin

Economic transaction reflects social relations, as we have just observed in the microscopic case study of Temajuk/Telok Melano relations. When the commodification process takes place in the borderlands between two nation-states with asymmetric economic relationship, the relative evaluation and devaluation of things and people also take place. Under such situation, the change of affiliation of commercial goods, specifically from Indonesian market to the Malaysian one, presents an interesting case

where the constant transnational flows and movements of commodities have become crucial prerequisite for the welfare of local communities on the Indonesian side of border.

The case illustrated above is an informal economic interface having been developed in the maritime frontier between Indonesian and Malaysia. In the following, I shall try to focus on larger structural arrangement by Indonesian and Malaysian governments, through which economic transnationalism has been institutionally supported by the construction of official border points of entry and exit between two countries. The cases to be dealt with are two transit points, namely Jagoi Babang (Indoensia)/Serikin (Malaysia) and Entikong (Indonesia)/Tebedu (Malaysia).

According to the 1984 Cross Border Agreement, West Kalimantan has 10 points of entry and exit. These points are Paloh, Sanjingan, Sungai Aruk, Saparan, Jagoi Babang, Sidding, Bantan, Merakai Panjang, Nanga Badau and Entikong. Among them, I shall focus on the two of the busiest points of entry and exit, i.e., Jagoi Babang and Entikong.

Kecematan Jagoi Babang is located at the peripheral area of Kabupaten Sambas. Even though the road connection, state capital, is good, it is 324 km away from Pontianak.[2] From there a few minutes ride of Indonesian motorbikes (5 Malaysian Ringitt) takes you to Serikin, a Jogoi Dayak village on the side of Sarawakian territory, only 4 km away. Kecamatan Jagoi Babang is consisted of five *desa* and 22 *dusun.* Currently the community is composed of 11 Bidayuh sub-dialect groups, and the majority is the Jagoi. There are two government immigration offices with 5 km apart, one in Jagoi Babang and the other in Kumba village. With the width of 2,200 square meter, Jagoi Babang covers the borderlands adjacent to Serikin, which can be reached by car from Kuching via Bau, within less than one hour. The fact that Jagoi Babang is more than 300 km away, while 40 km drive from Kuching takes us to this border point, is a good indicative of the peculiar locality of this economic interface. The following is the excerpt of my field note during my trip to Serikin from Malaysian side.

> It took only 20 minutes drive from Bau town. The unpaved road on the way to Serikin is now being upgraded to the paved one. New bridges are also in construction along the side of the old ones. This might be indicative of the Sarawak government's preparation for the increasing traffic volume from Kuching

[2] Pontianak – singkawang 145 km, Singkawang – Bengkayang 70 km, Bengkayang – Seluas 91 km, Seluas – Jagoi Babang 18 km,
Jagoi Babang – Serikin 4 km

area. Serikin village is composed of well-off houses. The village income derived from the payment made by the Indoneisan traders for securing plots for commerce should be substantial. Many Indonesian girls work at coffee shop where the basic understanding of such Malaysian peculiar way of ordering drinks as "Teh Peng (iced tea)", "Kopi O" (less sweetened coffee) and so on is missing among some of them.

The *tikar* (floor mat) seller I talked to is from Sanggau Ledo. Rattan was purchased and mats themselves are woven by the Indonesian locals. The price of 10 x 12 feet *tikar* is 75 Ringgitt. The market is full of Indoneisan products. Clothes, music CD, and VCD, kitchenware and utensils, leather shoes, rice, dried shrimp, dried squid, hats, toys, *kain* (Indonesian cloth), *tikar* floor mats, and Balinese stone carvings are placed on simple wooden stalls. Many of these Indonesian traders stay overnight on Saturday in Serikin, waiting for the weekend Malasyian shoppers from Kuching. Serikin market was regularly held on Thursdays and Sundays, but currently on Sundays only. Majority of customers is the Kuching Malays. Chinese people on the scene are largely traders buying in Indonesian goods. I myself was many times called "taukay" by Indonesian sellers, being mistaken as a Chinese shop owner.

Along the roadside, there are many warning signs restricting the selling of wild animals. At the roadside checkpoint, an officer asked me whether I purchased rice. I saw many Indonesian motorbikes hurriedly coming in and out with passengers as well as a large amount of commodities. Many of Indonesian youths are working as porters carrying goods from Indonesian territory.

According to Sub-district chief of Jagoi Babang, Desa Jagoi Babang and adjacent communities on the side of Indonesian territory have substantially benefited from the border trading:

The borderland villagers of Jagoi Babang are extremely well-off. Majority of villagers have gas cooking stoves (propane gas cylinders are obtained from Serikin), VCD players, and motorbikes. Some possess even automobiles. The village is strategically located adjacent to Sarawakian territory, where for the villagers-cum-petty traders to enter Sarawak only Cross Border Pass (Pas Lintas Batas) is required. With the pass, they are allowed to go as far as Bau and stay in Sarawakian territory from one week up to one month. Those who wish to go to Serikin only are not required to go through immigration post. Many of Jagoi

Babang villagers maintain kin relationship with the Dayak counterparts in Serikin. The daily interaction is dense. For them the international boundary is just a village boundary. Both Malaysian ringgitt and Indonesian rupiah are circulated and easily converted.

It is important to note that the transnational flows of people and commodities are not recent phenomena. Jagoi Babang has historically functioned as an economic hub between Sambas and Sarawak from the 1950s. The below is the recollection of a Sambas peasant who smuggled rubber sheets into colonial Sarawak via *jalan tikus* (mouse path) connecting Jagoi Babang and Serikin:

> Smuggling activities from Sambas to Sarawak had already took place in the 1950s, mainly in the form of illegal sale of rubber and timber. Rubber fetched a higher price per kilogram in Sarawak (Rp. 20) compared to local rubber prices (Rp. 6). Rubber sheets (approximately 50 kg per person) were transported by foot, following a footpath from Sambas that leads to Serikin or Biawak. The journey took 3 to 4 weeks to undertake. Rubber was usually exchanged with pepper, which could later be resold in Sambas at a higher price. People living closer to the border were involved in timber smuggling, and some men from Rambi were involved as tree cutters. Timber was usually sold to Chinese on the other side of the border. Smuggling activities declined during and after the Confrontation / PGRS period in the 1960s when the border areas were heavily patrolled on both sides of the border, and many smugglers were arrested and detained.

The local communities at the margin of the state territory have been functioned for generations as an important economic interface between a set of polities, both colonial and post-colonial. The village of Jagoi Babang as well as numerous Indonesian communities located adjacent to 2,800 km Bornean border are special social fields where the locals deliberately deviate themselves from the national order of things. If the usage of common currency is one of the most fundamental criteria for making people *the nation*, Jagoi Babang villagers are deviants from the territory-bound national terrain. They have actually no hesitation to say that they wish Indonesian Rupiah remain depreciated against Malaysian Ringgitt so that they would be able to enjoy their profit from trading and eventually saving money in Malaysian currency. The out-flows of commodities from Indonesian territory would continue as long as much depreciated

Indonesian Rupiah renders profit gain to the locals who are marginalized in the Pontianak-based commercial network of West Kalimantan.

Other official points of entry and exit such as the Border Crossing Inspection Post of Entikong also function as crucial channels where Indonesian commodities are brought into Malaysia. With the official opening of Entikong/Tebudu Post on October 1, 1989, the influx of Indonesian commodities has started to enter Sarawak. The border crossing trade has provided economic profit to West Kalimantan than to Sarawak. For instance, in 1998 the trade surplus reached three million US dollars due to the depreciation of the Rupiah during the economic crisis.

According to the study made by Dr. Fariastuti of Faculty of Economics, University of Tanjungpura, Pontianak, the opening of Entikong Post does not make traditional trade as well as smuggling activities disappear[3].

> The portion of traditional trade even tended to increase from 25 per cent in 1996 to 40 per cent in 1998. This might be due to the economic crisis which increased the supply of agricultural commodities (main commodities of traditional trade) from the border districts of West Kalimantan to Sarawak. For instance, the export values of black pepper and cocoa increased significantly from 4 per cent and 8 per cent in 1996 to 29 per cent and 22 per cent in 1998 respectively[4]. The traditional export values could be much higher than recorded values because it seems impossible to record all activities of the traditional export, which is carried along the border (Fariastuti 2000:10).

> The most common items being smuggled are cigarettes, rice, bird nest, clothing, household items and hewn timber (SDI 2000:11). Generally, illegal trading of timber is known not only by common people but also by high-ranking officials but illegal trading continuously occurs. Illegal trading of timber not only will increase environmental damage but also will reduce the local capacity to sustain economic development. Nowadays, processed wood industries in West kalimantan run out of timber and lay off their workers. Forestry Department, Pontainak reported that the export of logs by land through Lubok Antu is 10 trucks per day or around 9,500 tons per month (SDI 2000: 11-12). If this export of

[3] "Traditional trade" is defined as "an external trade carried out by people living in the border districts and having Border crossing Passes (Pos Lintas Batas). International trade is the one which has to apply export and import rules.

[4] Total value of export via Entikong Post reached US$2,980,785.78 and US$3,103,306.14 in 1996 and 1998.

log is through Nanga Badau, which has a border with Lubok Antu, it means that this export is illegal. According to Sosek Malindo meeting in 1987, external trade in the border crossing is only via the Entikong Post (Fariastuti 2000:10).

If the out-flows of commodities do not limit themselves to the sphere of traditional and petty trade and expand to the large scale movements of natural resources, the structural and much larger arrangements of production and mobilization of labor comes into the picture of economic transnationalism between Indonesia and Malaysia. In the following, I shall focus on the labor flows from the peripheral peasant communities of West Kalimantan structurally drawn into the production system of plywood industries on the side of Sarawak.

Border Scene 3.
Reproduction of Workforce for Sarawakian Timber Industries: A Case from a Sambas Peasant Community

It is important to note that West Kalimantan as a geographic periphery of the Republic of Indonesia has become an economic infrastructure of Sarawakian economy. Not only commodities exported from Indonesia, the flow of human labor has also become indispensable for the development of Sarawakian economy. So-called "3 D types of jobs (dirty, difficult and dangerous) are taken up by Indonesian migrant workers at work places such as sawmill factory, construction site and palm oil plantation. Female labor is also drawn to domestic households and restaurants in Malaysia. In addition to labor market, the commodity exported to Sarawakian market such as agricultural and forest produce have become vital commodities for the maintenance and development of industrial sector across the border. The following report is based on interviews with ex-TKI (Tenaga Kerja Indonesia), who are back in their home village in Sambas after working at Malaysian timber-related factories in Sarawak, East Malaysia.

Desa Sain Rambi is a typical peasant village in Sambas District of Kalimantan, which consists of 660 households, with a total population of 2,834 persons (Male: 1,437, Female). According to Data Monografi Desa (1999), approximately 75% of all household earners are small scale peasants, while 40% are reported to be landless peasants, and 25% are working as labor for the nearby rubber factory. The village has a typical outlook of peasant community located in the middle of *padi* field with scattered

karet fields. The economic activity of the locals is much dependent on rice cultivation for their own consumption and, the income from *karet* gives them extra cash income. Other than rubber tapping and cultivation of maize and coffee, there are no major agricultural commodities which render these *padi* farmers cash income. Unlike neighboring Tebas communities, Rambi has not cultivated *jeruk* at large scale. Average expenditure per household is Rp. 300,000 – 400,000/month. Extra income to partially cover household expenditures is generated through supplementary economic activities such as fishing, 'ojek' (motor taxis) and 'buka warung' (petty trade). The wage per laborer for those working at the rubber factory is Rp. 400,000 per month.

From this village, one of 180 desas in Sambas Regency, the influx of people has been constantly drawn to labor market in Sarawak, East Malaysia since the 1970s. The out-migration has been indeed indispensable for the life of the villagers of Sain Rambi. Before getting into detailed description of contemporary labor migration, I shall briefly explore the history of labor migration conducted by the villagers.

Labor out-migration from Sambas District in general and from Desa Sain Rambi to Sarawak in particular has already occurred since the 1960s, but increased during the mid-1970s after the military presence in the borderlands put a halt to the contraband rubber trade across Indonesian/Malaysia border, which rendered supplementary income to the locals. Labor migration to other parts of West Kalimantan was first undertaken in logging areas near Pontianak and Ketapang. Since then the people of Sambas have been famous for their skillful felling and hauling techniques sought after by the logging industries, usually owned by the Chinese (Taiwan, locals, i.e. PT. Barito Pacific near Pontianak). PT. Barito Pacific in the 1970s still utilized primitive logging techniques, and workers were contracted for a 6-month to 1-year labor period. During the 1970s, many local logging companies also recruited laborer from Sambas for the companies' other operation sites in Riau, Sumatra.

By 1975 labor migration to Sarawak has become common, largely oriented towards the new oil palm plantation projects (i.e. FELDA projects). From the 1970s to 1980s the main labor force from Sambas was male adults. Female workers began to work outside Sambas during the 1990s.

Transnational Labor Migration from Rambi to Sarawakian Timber-related Industries

The main reason behind labor migrations is economic pressure, i.e., low cash income from agriculture. Other reasons were to seek work experience (*'mengadu nasib' /*

'merantau') and the strong value of the Malaysian Ringgit. In the following, based on interviews with ex-TKIs in Sain Rambi, who have just come back from Malaysia, I shall report on such topics as recruitment process, wage, entitlements, remittance and motivations to return to Sarawak to describe general features of out-migration to timber-related industries in Sarawak.

1) Recruitment Process

Recruitment agents usually come directly to Sain Rambi village. There are distinctions between fees to be paid by men and female workers. The agency provides TKI candidates with choices of destinations (companies & location). Men have to pay Rp. 600,000 in advance which covers only the Malaysian working permits and transportation fares. Costs for preparing documents required to obtain passports (e.g. KTP, birth certificates, family certificates/KK/Kartu Keluarga, passport photo) are not included, and men have to arrange for passports by themselves. Working permits are arranged by the agencies. For female workers, the cost for passport fees and other necessary documents is paid for by the agencies in advance and are deducted 6 months later (RM 300) from their salaries. Recruiting agencies usually inform the candidates in advance about which companies they are going to work for (candidates may choose the companies of their choice). Selection criteria for recruitment are that applicants are at least 18 years old, with no history of immigration laws violated. Those who have overstayed or illegally exited Malaysia in the past usually resort to fake identities.

Approved TKIs are then transported by the agencies in groups (approximately in numbers between 50 and 200) to border point at Entikong (West Kalimantan side). The 'chop' process is taken care of by the agencies, and the TKIs are then divided in separate buses at Tebedu (Sarawakian side) according to work destinations (Sibu, Bintulu, Miri). Passports are handed to individual TKIs at the border points and again collected at their destinations. While they work in Sarawak, TKI's only possess photocopies of their passports, employment ID's and documents (see. Supplement Figure: Recruitment procedure of TKI on the last page).

2) Wage, Entitlements, and Remittance

Most informants viewed that general working conditions in the 'reputable' sawmill & plywood factories and some oil plantations are good (this also depends on the attitude of company managers involved). The cost of food and medication is covered by the companies. The average working hour is 12 hours/day. The payment is RM 13 (basic 8-

hour daily wage RM7 plus overtime fee RM 5). A daily RM 3 is deducted, which will be returned to the worker upon completion of the 2-year contract.

Health care and daily ration are provided by the company. Workers are only allowed to eat inside the compound during working hours. Some companies provide life insurance up to RM 26,000. In case of occupational death, companies usually pay insurances to fellow workers who come from the same village as the deceased person. In other cases, family members come over to Sarawak to collect the insurance and to transport the body back home. In other cases, the deceased are buried in Sarawak.

General complaint about their work condition centers on the strict time management by employers. There is not enough time for breaks (not even enough to finish a *kretek* cigarette), too much overtime (= longer than 12 working hours) and strict company regulations (workers not allowed to buy food outside the compound during working hours). If a worker wants to terminate his contract, s/he has to pay RM 1,500-2,000 to the company in order to have his/her passport returned.

Some workers open bank accounts (i.e. Maybank). Remittances are often sent back to their families through returning fellow workers, or sometimes transferred through the BRI branch. Some workers admitted that saving is difficult as living expenses in Sarawak are generally higher, and much is spent on additional food or clothing.

TKIs from Sain Rambi are usually able to bring back home RM 6,000 after 2 years of work. Considering the fact that 1 Ringgit is approximately 2,200 Rupiahs, their monthly wage amounts what is equivalent to Rp. 550,000. In Sain Rambi monthly wage is approximately Rp.150,000, if a young female works full-time for local *warung* and café. Earned Ringgits are exchanged into Rupiahs in Sambas. Most workers are spending their savings back home on consumer goods (i.e. motorcycles) or home renovations. Although it is generally expected that TKIs should send remittances back home, there is a growing tendency since 1997 of excessive spending among female workers on Malaysian 'designer' clothes instead of bringing cash money.

Many of workers interviewed have worked in Sarawak several times (1-3) before their last labor. It is evident that there remains a high motivation for those interviewees to return to Malaysia in the future. This is also expressed by those who have only worked once in Malaysia. Many admitted that the drive to buy new consumer goods, often after seeing new returnees spending their money back home, is a prime motivating factor for them to head back to Malaysia. In many cases, workers don't return after finishing their first term contracts, especially when their contracts are extended by the companies for another 2 years.

Although a large number of labor migrants from Sain Rambi are voluntarily working away, a small number of girls are reported to be pressured by parents to work in Sarawak, mainly because of economic reasons.

3) Labor Mobilization: Timber Industries and Local Recruitment Agencies

The following information is based on the interviews with local recruitment agents operating in Sambas, who send Malay villagers from Sambas exclusively to Malaysian plywood factories in Kuching, Sibu, Bintulu, and Miri. According to the labor agents, 80% of all families in the Sain Rambi and the neighboring communities expect their children to work in Malaysia. This also reflects the general conditions for other villages throughout Sambas. Majority of TKIs recruited by the agency come from Sambas, Tebas and Pemangkat and their vicinities. Recruiting agencies form other areas (Pontianak and Singkawang) are also operating in Sambas, and the estimated total number of Sambas Malays sent to Malaysia is around 600 TKIs per month.

Companies usually announce vacancies and place orders to recruitment agencies 4 months before contracts of the previous TKI batch expires. The total cost to recruit and send a female TKI is Rp. 1,150,000. The recruiting agencies receive reimbursement fees from companies (RM 500 for female TKIs), which the agencies usually collect between 1 to 6 months after workers have settled in their jobs.

It is difficult for agencies to reclaim passport fee and transportation costs (RM 300) from female workers once they are in Sarawak. Female workers are expected to save RM 50 per month in order to pay the costs back to the agency, which usually collects the money 6 months after the worker has been employed. Very often the female workers would run away when agency people come to collect the money.

The main problem with male workers is their low return rate (about 30% from the initial batch) before or after their contract expires. Switching jobs is fairly common for male workers, but most of them are extending their contracts without agency's consent. This is one reason why recruitment agency insists male applicants arrange for their own passports before registering to the agency, and pay all visa and transport costs in advance.

Another problem faced by recruiting agencies is that a large number of workers are extending their contracts with plywood companies without agency's consent, which means that agencies are not willing to take responsibility over any incident that might happen involving the worker during this extension period. However, in a number cases of workers running away from their workplace (usually switching jobs to neighboring companies, or ending up becoming construction workers) , companies are still asking

the agencies to hold responsibility and to search and locate workers who have disappeared. In the cases of accident leading to the death of worker, families would often hold the agency responsible to cover shipping costs of the body, or to hold agencies responsible for claiming life insurances to the companies. Another problem is the increasing time period needed to have the working visas issued by the Malaysian Consulate, which may take from 4 up to 8 months to complete. Fees paid by companies to recruiting agencies have declined. The Agency admits that the costs to send one TKI reaches up to Rp. 1,150,000 / person in 2003, while fees received from companies is only RM 300/person.

Since the agency started its operation in 1990, the highest number of TKI per month was sent to Malaysia between 1990 to 1995, when 700 workers on average were sent per month from Sambas. This is due to the fast and easy process for arranging working visas which usually took only one month to complete. The Agency only had to prepare lists of candidates and send them directly to the Jawatan Imigresyen in Kuching (without DEPNAKER involved in the process). It took usually two weeks before the working visas were issued. The working contracts were signed upon arrival.

Since 1995-96 the recruitment regulations were changed. The legal recruitment process now required companies to guarantee RM 1,500 for each worker, and workers are not allowed to enter Malaysia. More complicated regulation and longer period needed to issue working visas led to an increase of illegal labor. The agency was only able to send 250 TKIs per month.

The 1997 Asian economic crisis had little effect on recruitments for sawmill and plywood factories, notably companies with huge timber deposits. In fact, the agency still managed to send 1,500 TKIs in 1997. In 2003, the average number sent per month amounts to 150-200 TKIs. Lean periods are usually between January and September.

4) Ethnic Segmentation at Production Site

Companies in Sarawak now prefer to employ Sambas Malays over other ethnic groups, notably Javanese. It is known that Javanese workers tend to run away or shift jobs to other companies, largely to construction sector before their contracts expire. This is caused by recruiting agencies in Java that tend to make empty promises on wages to TKI candidates (promising candidates wages of RM 15/day). In addition, Sambas Malays have no language problems in Sarawak and they are known for their diligent work ethic. Given the problems generated by recruiting agencies in Java, most companies today also prefer to recruit TKI's sent by local West Kalimantan recruiting agencies rather than agencies located in Java. Another reason why Sambas Malays are

preferred is that they rarely involve themselves in inter-ethnic rivalry as well as conflict notably in Miri (Kuala Baram) factories, which employ substantial number of Javanese workers.

The ethnic composition of Indonesian workers in Sarawak (sawmills and plywood factories) consists of 60% Sambas Malays and 40% of mixed groups (Javanese, Buginese, Madurese, Dayaks). It is said that sawmill and plywood companies prefer to employ Sambas Malays, mainly because Sambas Malays rarely complain or protest about working conditions.

After the 1999 Sambas riots resulting in the expulsion of thousands of Madurese, the numbers of Madurese sent to Malaysia through the agency has been almost nil. However, sporadic violence between the two has been reported recently, involving a case resulting the deaths of 2 Sambas Malays and 1 ex-Sambas Madurese in Bintulu.

Conclusion

My research shows that the out-flows of commodity and labor have been generic to the rural societies of West Kalimantan. Timber-related factories such as sawmills and plywood manufacturers, and oil palm estates are dependent on Indonesian labor force mainly recruited from peasant communities in the region. Local peasantry in Sambas serves as economic infrastructures of industrial as well as agricultural sectors in Sarawak. The flows of peasant proletarians as well as natural resources have been directed toward Malaysian production sites, and the movements have been accelerated by the opening of 10 official immigration posts such as Entikong and Badau, and the construction of road networks directly connecting local villages with main Sarawakian economic hubs of Kuching, Sibu, Bintulu, and Miri.

Without proper implementation of governmental programs for the development of local agricultural sector, the transnational drain of labor and commodity from peripheral societies continues. The peculiar division of labor is maintained intact; agricultural sector based on *padi* cultivation functions for the maintenance of basic subsistence of villagers, while additional cash income is eagerly sought after by younger generation, especially in the form of female work force (TKW), seeking temporary contract job in Malaysia.

During the Dutch colonial period when *dual economy* was developed through colonial apparatus, Indonesian rural society was deliberately divided into two labor sectors, one for subsistence-oriented agriculture and the other for plantation-based

commodity production. Under the current division of labor observable in the borderlands of West Kalimantan in particular and rural agricultural community in general, the colonial production of agricultural commodity has simply been replaced by modern foreign capital located outside Indonesia. The production sites are located abroad, while rural agricultural communities serve to generate and maintain the steady flows of labor. With current economic difference having been widen after the monetary crisis, the drainage of labor as well as commodity has been accelerated, and the rural society situated at the national periphery remains as infrastructure for the economic development across the border until the resource supply gets exhausted.



Supplemental Figure: Recruitment procedure of TKI

From Mega-project to Illegal Logging:

Forest Resources and Decentralization in Central Kalimantan

Ken-ichi Abe

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1. Background; The Beginning and the End of a Mega-Project

Indonesia has substantial areas of peat swamp forest and has for many years made substantial efforts to exploit these peat lands for the sake of economic development. Since the late 1950s, for example, spontaneous immigrants from nearby Malay villages, as well as from as far away as Kalimantan and Sulawesi, have settled into the Sumatran parts of these peat lands, driven primarily by the need for land for small-scale commercial farming. Through manual labor alone, they converted the peat swamp forest into valuable commercial coconut plantations.

While this spontaneous migration was occurring, the peat swamp areas came to the attention of national planners and developers. Encouraged by the immigrants' success, the government authorities imposed state management on these forested lands. This resulted in the demarcation of areas for one of the leading state-organized trans-immigration projects, the *Perkebunan Inti Rakyat* (PIR: "Nuclear Estate and Small-holders Project"). The stated aims of the PIR Project were to increase the production of plantation crops and raise the income of the participating "farmers," as well as to contribute to regional development. In contrast to the arbitrary development by the spontaneous immigrants, this was planned and organized development on a large scale.

The development of peat lands was highlighted as a Mega-Project. In 1995, President Suharto launched *Project Pengembangan Lahan Gambut* in Central Kalimantan to convert one million hectares of peat swamp forest into paddy fields. To some extent, recent industrial development in Indonesia had in fact been using fertile Javanese lands for manufacturing rather than agriculture. National food self-sufficiency was achieved for the first time in 1985, but whether this will continue into the future is uncertain. The Mega-project in the peat area was intended primarily to make up for rice yield declines on Java.

Participants in the project were initially provided with basic living necessities and such agricultural materials as rice seeds, a hoe, a sickle, chemical fertilizer and

insecticides. However, following the first harvest, new settlers were obliged to buy materials from a certified company at fixed prices. The company leased tractors for tillage and machinery for threshing, and also bought the harvested rice. Participants thus became laborers working for a rice plantation rather than independent farmers.

From the very beginning, the threat of environmental destruction and the economic costs of running this Mega-project were obvious to its critics. Peat is, for example, chemically oligotrophic, lacking mineral nutrients. Crop yields drop suddenly in peat land once the initial nutrients have been depleted. Peat land inevitably requires large quantities of fertilizer and other agro-chemicals to keep it agriculturally viable.

Major problems dogged these projects. The development of infrastructure, for example, was not well coordinated. Canals were built but no dams were constructed, which made the canals useless for washing the acid water away from the peat. On top of these problems, most of which were feared before the project began, came the economic crisis of 1997. Thus, with no available financial support, the announcement came of the suspension of the Mega Project.

However, the vast project site had already been deforested for cultivation. Moreover, thousands of project participants had already settled in the area. They were still receiving official services and support from the local government to a limited extent, something originally neither planned nor promised. The lands allocated have turned out to be inadequate, both in quantity and quality, to provide livelihoods. Some people have been obliged to leave the project site, but others remain still. So, then, how do they survive in unfamiliar surroundings far from their *Kampong*?

2. Livelihood of ex-immigrants

I interviewed 30 farming households participating in the project. Table 1 shows the results of these interviews. They focused on the status of their agricultural activities and whether they derived their income from nonagricultural work. The interviews were conducted in the area called "*Lamunti.*" The project site was connected to the *Kapuas* River via a water channel, and the area named after a village on the river. It was called "UPT *Lamunti* A1" when the project was promoted, but at present the official name is *Eks UPT Lamunti A1*. With the promotion of decentralization, the area is applying for status as a village (*desa*), the name of which they expect to be *Desa Lamunti Permai.*

Since the government abandoned the project, the type of farming practiced there has diverged substantially from the original plan that was promoted.

It was initially planned that a "nuclear" company (NUSAAGRO), acting as sole agent under the guidance of the government, would supply rice seed, sell agricultural materials (*paket petani*) and purchase the harvests. Agricultural materials were supplied free of charge for the first growing season. After the withdrawal of the core company, the farmers generally began self-directed farm management, planning the cultivation themselves, while accepting administrative support from the local government. The objective of the project was to achieve a type of plantation farming, the commercial crop being rice. At present, however, the settlers pursue agriculture as a source of personal livelihood.

Two crop seasons were envisioned by the project, OKMAR (an acronym for October to March) and ASEP (an acronym for April to September). The former is the wet season and the latter dry. Planting of the IR-type high yield variety was planned for both seasons. However, the irrigation equipment did not meet expectations, making it practically impossible to grow two crops a year. Rice is grown almost exclusively in the wet season. Most of these farmers (23 households) plant upland rice of the traditional variety in the wet season rather than the IR-type. Respondent no. 23 said that he had no success planting IR-66 every year. The IR-type variety had yielded a poor harvest for the three years following the inauguration of the project, proving unsuited to the land. The farmers burn the weeds, then make holes in the earth with a digging stick and sow the seeds. They no longer cultivate the ground, in marked contrast to the days of the project, when a number of hand tractors formed rows in front of NUSAAGRO.

Crops other than paddy rice are dominant in the dry season. Although seven farming households still plant the IR-type variety, they plant it in areas where water is readily available, or they plant it rather than throw it away, which usually results in failure. Crops include corn, peanuts, watermelon, pumpkins, *kachang panjang* and sweet potatoes. They tried soy-beans, but that failed. The corn yield is relatively good, but there are no markets for it.

The crop the farmers expect to be a source of cash is cassava, *gaplek* in Javanese, which is sold in the form of dried slices. Eleven households, or about one-third of all respondents, grow cassava. "Cassava saved us," one respondent said, and another said, "I tell you I stay here (on the project site) and continue farming because cassava sells" (respondent no. 13). They knew that cassava would impoverish the soil, and planted it in their *pekarangan* (homegarden) rather than on their farmlands. Recently, however, an increasing number of farming households have given up on other field crops and plant three-month or six-month varieties of cassava on their farmland in the dry season (ASEP).

The current state of agriculture on the project site is far from helping to alleviate the food shortage in the country. Many farmers have left. The vast area of land once envisioned as a national granary is now wild, a large part of it thick with weeds at the end of the dry season. The land yielded a series of poor rice harvests during the three years in which the project was promoted. In 1999 in particular, the crop suffered catastrophic damage due to a heavy infestation of mice. It is unrealistic to have high expectations for agriculture here.

A total of 550 families, or 2,434 people, immigrated to Lamunti between 1996 and 1998, in ten phases (see table 2). Each family was given two hectares of paddy field and a quarter of a hectare of *pekarangan* (homegarden), as in other trans-immigration projects. Houses were laid at 25-meter intervals along the street.

One hundred and twenty families came directly from Java, accounting for 22 percent of all the immigrants. Half of the immigrants have left the project site. The government supplied them with living necessities for one and a half years after immigrating, as in other trans-migration programs. Special measures were taken in the PLG project to extend the supply by six months; however, many immigrants broke away from the project when the supply of living necessities ran out. Two hundred sixty-seven remained on the project site as of August 2003. Fifty-six (21 percent) of these came directly from Java. The breakaway ratio of those from Java is little different from that of local immigrants. Some of the local immigrants are ethnic Javanese. They came to Kalimantan for projects implemented in the 1970s and 1980s, and now they have children. Long-time Kalimantan residents, they participated in the project as local immigrants.

Local immigrants differ a great deal from those from Java in their commitment to the project. Many of the local participants, including the Javanese, who have been living in Kalimantan can return to their home villages without difficulty. In some cases, they have relatives or even family members and own land in their home villages, to which they can return whenever they wish. Although the ratio of returnees among these people differs little from that of the immigrants from Java, many of the local participants travel back and forth to their home villages, and don't rely completely on the project site. These are called "trans PP (*transimmigrasi pulan pergi*, or trans-immigrant in and out). They grow upland rice on their slash-and-burn farmland, as they have long been doing, and harvest *rotan* or tap rubber trees in the appropriate seasons. Rubber plantations are important economically and have acted as a safety valve, compensating for the failure of the project. The dry season is suitable for tapping rubber trees, which does not conflict with the growing of crops on the project site, which is

done virtually exclusively in OKMAR.

Economically, disappointed participants relied more on earnings from forest logging, and to a lesser extent on gold prospecting, than on the rubber plantations.

3. Strategies for Survival: Illegal Logging

There are several methods of prospecting for gold. Gold prospectors often work in groups and use machinery, although some people use a *dulang* (pan) to wash for gold on their own. One method is to direct a jet of pumped water at the wall of a cliff. Another is to pump mud up from the bottom of a river. Mud containing gold dust is passed through a tilted water shoot. Gold particles settle on mats at the bottom of the shoot, and are collected by mercury. Groups of several people traveling by raft or truck laden with a pump and other gold-prospecting tools are a common sight. The size of the group varies, but is usually four or five people. Of the heads of household participating in the project, four are engaged in gold prospecting, as shown in Table 1.

The logging these people do can be categorized as illegal. However, those who work at it are completely unaware that it is illegal. They believe that the forests belong to everyone, like the gold in the soil.

Around 1996, after the inauguration of the one million-hectare project, small lumber mills began to be established in Central Kalimantan. The forests on the planned project site were all lumbered prior to preparing the land. At the start of the project, the area supplied vast amounts of various types of timber. Large firms contracted for the development and logging companies that owned related IPK dealt in *ramin* (*Gonystylus bancanus*)and other quality timber, which was tradable in European markets. In contrast, the small, local firms traded in low-priced, low-grade timber.

Many Banjar people from the region downstream came to work on the project site, benefitting from the running of the lumbering business. They were at liberty to enter the forest areas, fell trees and sell the timber to the lumber companies and developers. The situation was not so serious until the *krismon* (economic crisis). During the *krismon*, unemployed Javanese came *en masse* from other states and began to log vast quantities of timber from the surrounding areas as well as from the project site. As a consequence, the villages scattered along the rivers on the outskirts are bristling with lumber mills in response to the huge supply of timber. Project participants can earn cash by carrying timber to those mills.

The area between the *Sebangau* and *Katingan* rivers is a center for illegal logging, and has more than 100 lumber mills. This is an area where a 20-year concession has

expired. There is another center located between *Mantangai* and *Taburu* on the *Kapuas* River, likewise with more than 100 lumber mills in the area. The large wooden boats of the *Madurese* and *Bugis* can come up to about the point where the *Mantangai* River meets the *Kapuas* River.

There are two types of lumber mills on the river: one has band saws and the other has circular saws. The band saw is capable of processing trees of large diameter and resinous hard timber for the production of quality plates. Lumber mills equipped with band saws are called *bangsau,* from the English. Likewise, those with circular saws are known as *sirkel*. Sirkel lumber mills have been turning into *bangsau* lumber mills, since the band saw can efficiently process timber in volume. For example, *Manusup* on the *Kapuas* River is a village that continues the tradition of building dugout canoes. Thus, lumber mills were established earlier there than in other villages (in the 1980s). Eight *sirkel* lumber mills turned to *bangsau* overnight in 1999, marking a turning point. At present, the number of *bangsau* lumber mills is approaching 30.

A substantial number of project participants were involved in illegal logging even after they began participating in the project, as revealed in Table [blank]. Working in logging is known as timber work, or *karja kayu*. Fifteen respondents, or half of the heads of household interviewed, have experience in timber work. A sizeable number (4) of respondents who were not so engaged said that they were too old to work in logging, which is physically demanding, although the author did not ask for specific details. However, some of them had gained logging experience before their participation in the project. Respondent no. 29 said, "I joined the project because I did not like timber work."

Another respondent (no. 3) was concerned about the possibility that timber work would result in neglect of farming, with the fields becoming overgrown with weeds. Indeed, a Javanese (respondent no. 5) placed priority on timber work and eventually sold off his farmland (but lives in the same house, "rented").

These people work as a logging group (*patran*) contracted by an agent. They live in logging camps and are supplied with the necessary food, water, cigarettes and the like by the agent. A contract is made in advance between the agent and the logging group about the price of various types of wood and other terms and conditions. Prices differ from contract to contract and from agent to agent. Table 3 shows the prices of different tree species set at lumber mills. The prices of export timber differ greatly depending on the tree species. Miscellaneous species placed in local markets are collectively called "*kayu hutan* (forest trees)."

Chainsaw operators are independent of these groups. They are contracted to log a

tree for Rp3,000, and crosscut the trees into lengths of 4 to 4.2 meters. Trees of all species but *Agatis* are barked on-site.

The wet season is the season for logging, as a rule. The logs are transported on rivers or channels, and a swollen river is suited to this. In fact, many people do logging in the wet season and leave the farm work in their families' hands, as shown in Table [blank]. The demand for *kayu hutan,* however, increases in the dry season, when building and road construction is intense. An increasing number of workers are shifting to the logging of *kayu hutan.* Being "farmers," they are willing to do timber work in the dry season when they have no farming work, since it has become an agricultural off-season.

Thus, agriculture is not the main source of cash income for the project participants. At present, the actual life of the farmers on the project site is far from the goal envisioned in the project. Below is a typical example of a local trans-immigrant (respondent no. 21).

In 1997, he emigrated from the nearby village of *Lamunti*, and was already doing timber work as early as December of the same year and February and March of 1998. The logging site was located between the *Kapuas* and *Kahayan* rivers, where a channel opened for the sake of the project served as a passage for the loggers. In the first month, he logged only 10 cubic meters of *ramin* (Rp200,000/m^3). The *ramin* in the area was quickly exhausted, so in the two months of 1998, he logged miscellaneous trees (*kayu hutan*). As the *ramin* grew scarcer the price increased, doubling to Rp400,000 per cubic meter in 2000. In 1999, he concentrated on farming, since the cost-effective, high-priced trees had been depleted. Then an infestation of mice damaged the crops, leaving him with almost no harvest. This compelled him to return to timber work in 2000. He went to an upstream area where there was a concession site and logged only miscellaneous type trees. He earned just Rp900,000 in the two months beginning that October. Trees were scarce and were only located in remote areas. It was tough for him to transport a total of three cubic meters of logs. That was the last year he engaged in timber work, as he considered the job not worth the labor.

With regards to farming, he plants upland rice in OKMAR. The harvest was as little as 1,500 kg last year. He does nothing in particular during ASEP. Another source of income is cassava, grown in his *pekarangan*, which has increased in importance since he quit the timber work.

He also has upland rice fields and a rubber plantation in *Lamunti,* his home village. He taps rubber trees there in the dry season (ASEP). Tapping is carried out once every two days within a period of about three months. He avoids intensive tapping to

protect the rubber trees from depletion. He wants to shift to an improved variety for increased rubber output, but has not achieved this yet. The yield is 15 kg a day, which sells at Rp1,400/kg. He is a typical trans-PP.

Another example, shown below, appears to represent the present-day community since the project's suspension.

Respondent no. 30 immigrated to the site with his wife in 1999, after the project was suspended. They had no children. Their reason for immigrating was because his wife's parents (Dayak people), project participants, were staying on the site.

He has not been engaged in growing rice on their farmland since they immigrated. Cassava is grown in their home garden, tended by his wife. Farming is not his job. He prospects for gold in the dry season and does timber work in the wet season, earning a livelihood not through farming but from other work.

He does timber work in a group of four. *Ramin* has already been depleted, so they log principally *meranti* and *kayu hutan*. They cut the *meranti* into four-meter lengths to sell at Rp150,000 per cubic meter, and the *kayu hutan* into 2.6-meter lengths, which are sold not by the cubic meter but at a rate of Rp2,500 per log of 15 centimeters in diameter, with the price increasing by Rp250 for every one-centimeter increase in diameter. He prospects for gold as a member of a group led by his uncle. The cost of fuel for running the pump is substantial. He hopes to buy a set of gold-prospecting tools and become independent in the future.

The immigrants are going to areas that are further inland and more remote for gold prospecting and timber work. They follow cycles, going out to work on remote sites for one to three months, then returning to stay at their homes for several days, and again going out to work. They have bought houses on the project site not for farming but as front-line bases for timber work and gold prospecting.

Decentralization, in which resources management was transferred from the central government to local governments, was expected to make use of detailed and efficient local government administration systems to manage the local resources, taking local situations into account, rather than the central government's inefficient administration system. In fact, however, unregulated development of forests progressed as a result of the loss of central government control, in what was shortsighted, unsustainable and ad hoc use of forest resources.

After decentralization, the forest resource development boom in a sense provided a valuable source of cash income, "timber work," for project participants who had no other means of earning cash. For the agents involved in logging, the project participants were a source of low-cost labor. Exploitation of wood resources advanced

more systematically and efficiently in the vicinity of the mega-project than in any other place, as indicated by the forest of lumber mills that emerged one after the other along the rivers.

Ultimately, decentralization accelerated deforestation in every part of Indonesia, not just in Central Kalimantan. The forests of Indonesia registered an annual loss of 0.8 million hectares in the late 1970s. In 2000, 1.31 million hectares were lost, after the peak deforestation rate of 1.7 million hectares annually in 1997-1999.

4 The Vision for the Development and the Children of Development Policy

From the very beginning, it was predicted that the project would likely not succeed. Taking into account the international price of rice, its cultivation as a commercial crop was not worth a large investment. Large-scale development of rice paddies was not economically viable. The government authorities turned a blind eye to these views for the great cause of achieving a national food-sufficiency target. The unavoidable ecological impact of the development of the peat swamp forests was also overlooked. "Technical difficulties and environmental impact do exist, but the project must be implemented."

The million-hectare project turned out to be the last extensive project for Suharto, who had espoused development policies for 32 years. Even though the Asian economic crisis was the direct cause of its suspension, the project itself was barely feasible.

The PLG project was mounted for nothing more than its own sake. The Suharto administration sustained itself with "visible development programs," presented one after another to the people of Indonesia. The people had amassed a series of complaints about corruption and nepotism in the Suharto administration, but these did not culminate in any calls for change in national policies so long as development progressed favorably and the people could enjoy economic prosperity. Development projects served Suharto as a device for maintaining his administration, and they served the people of Indonesia as a means of ensuring economic affluence. Both had high expectations for the projects, which turned out to be illusory when reality came to bear. The vision was to cut down useless peat swamp forests belonging to nobody and convert them into useful rice paddies valuable to everybody. That this vision was feasible turned out to be an illusion, so doubted in the early planning stages.

On April 23, 1997, Suharto visited the project site for an inspection. Participating farmers still remember what they had to do for that visit. They planted already grown

rambutan and coco in their yet poorly cultivated pekarangan, within the sweep of Suharto's eye. They transplanted rice grown elsewhere into the rice paddies. Fish taken from the river were released into a breeding pond constructed quickly for the inspection. In addition, they were forced to practice answers that they were to give the president. Suharto was the emperor of the fable "The Emperor's New Clothes," and the project participants were "accomplices."

Even today, none of the farmers who participated in the project criticize Suharto. People get nostalgic for him and his time, remembering the Suharto era as the good old days. They persist in admiring his administration, otherwise known as the development period. They are children of the development policy.

The children of development policy are still project-oriented. Without proper measures, they will reach a dead end, since the trees they sell for timber are being depleted, and they feel that they need some new project to restore their dwindling business.

The older participants hope to succeed in soliciting a project. They emphasize that the soil of the project site is fertile. For example, they show oil palms grown in their home gardens to stress how well plants can grow (they plant oil palms not to press oil from the nuts but to use the trunks as vegetables). This implies that the land is not completely unworkable and with some investment can be converted to oil palm plantations. They have collected signatures and submitted applications for a project to the provincial department of agriculture several times. Their dream is another project.

5. The Future of the Area

What will the community on the project site be like in the future? Will there be another project on the site someday? Can a project turn the area into what the people desire?

The family sizes presented in Table 1 show the interview results and indicate the number of family members living on a single family budget. Those of the respondents' children who work away from home or have left home for marriage are excluded.

Table 4 shows what the children who have left home are presently doing. The kinds of jobs the children of the project participants have should be indicative of the area's post-project future. For married daughters of project participants, their husbands' jobs are shown.

The children remaining on the project site hold a variety jobs. Only five are participating like their parents in the trans-immigration project. The children of project participants no longer have expectations of the trans-immigration project. Many of their

jobs are related to wood resources, some working at lumber mills (four persons) and others engaged in timber work (eight), which two jobs account for about 41.5 percent. However, the wood resources are being depleted, as was stated earlier. The present-day prosperity of the lumber mills is temporary, and is already declining. The future of forest-related work is not necessarily guaranteed.

Since the project has been suspended, the area will never be able to realize the future that was envisioned for it. What future picture for the area can be shaped, to replace the blueprint of the project? The answer is unclear, and has not yet come into view.

Table 1 Livelihood of Ex-immigrants Interviewed

	Age of HH	Origin	Status	Ethnicity	Family Member		Agricultural Practice		Pekarangan	Sideline		Note
					Present at house	No of Children	Fields OKMAR	ASEP		Illegal Logging	Others	
1	40	Java Timor		Java	5*	2	Upland rice	IR Palawija		–		*Living with wife's parents
2	42	Java Timor		Java	4	3	Upland rice	IR Palawija		–		
3	30	Java Timor		Java	3	1	Upland rice	Palawija	Cassava	No: Busy for Agriculture		
4	53	Java Timor		Java	3	4	Upland rice	Palawija	Cassava Banana	No: Too old		
5	43	Java Barat		Java	6*	6	–	–		From 1999 to present		Allotted Land was Sold in 2001. *Wife is dead in 2002
6	37	Java Timor		Java	4	2	Upland rice	Palawija		During ASEP in 2000		
7	45	Java Timor		Java	3	3	Upland rice	Palawija		During ASEP in 2001 & 2002		
8	40	Java Timor		Java	5	3	Upland rice	Palawija	Cassava	No: Too Dangerous	Wage Labor in ASEP	
9	40	NTB		Lombok	6	4	Upland rice	IR66		–		
10	61	Java Timor	Local	Java	11	9	Upland rice	Palawija		–		
11	33	Java Timor	Local	Java	5	3	Upland rice	–		From 1999 to present 2～3 months in ASEP		
12	36	Java Timor		Java	4	2	Upland rice	IR66		1 month in 2002	Wage Labor in ASEP	
13	42	Terantang	Local	O.Kapuas	7	5	Upland rice	–		3 months in 2002	Gold Mining	
14	35	Lamunti	Local	O.Kapuas	5	3	–	–		From 2000 to present during OKMAR		
15	48	Kaladang	Local	O.Kapuas	4	3	IR66	IR66	Cassava	–	Rubber Tapping	
16	38	Mantangai	Local	O.Kapuas	5	4	Upland rice	IR66		–	Transport business with own boat	
17	32	Pantai	Local	O.Kapuas	6	4	Upland rice	–		From 2001to present during OKMAR		
18	18	Pendahaur	Local	O.Kapuas	5	6	–	Upland rice		From 2001to present from December to May		
19	69	Lamunti	Local	O.Kapuas	2	3	–	–	Cassava	No: Too old		
20	41	Java Timor	Local	O.Kapuas	4	2	–	–	Cassava	In 1999 & 2000 from Sep. to Mar.		
21	32	Lamunti	Local	O.Kapuas	4	2	Upland rice	–	Cassava	In 1997,1998 & 2000	Rubber Tapping	
22	40	Kaladan	Local	O.Kapuas	5	3	Upland rice	–		From 1997 to present during OKMAR	Rubber Tapping Rotan collecting	
23	41	Lamunti	Local	O.Kapuas	5	4	Upland rice	IR66			Gold mining in 1998	
24	32	Basaran	Local	Java+Dayak	4	2	Upland rice	Parawija		From 1997 to 1999 during OKMAR	Carpenter Fishing	
25	37	Lamunti	Local	O.Kapuas	5	3	Upland rice	Cassava	Cassava	–	Fishing	
26	50	Pangkalan S	Local	Dayak	3	1	P.Gunung	–		In 1998 for 2 months during OKMAR	Transport business	
27	72	Kaladang	Local	Dayak	3	5	Upland rice	Parawija		No: Too old		
28	42	Kaladang	Local	O.Kapuas	7	6	Upland rice	Cassava	Cassava	–	Gold Mining	
29	74	Lamunti	Local	O.Kapuas	6	11	Upland rice	Cassava Banana		–	Rubber Tapping	
30	23	Mantangai	Local	O.Kapuas	2	0	–	–	Cassava	From 1999 to present in OKMAR	Gold mining in ASEP	*Joined in 1999 after Project*

Table 2 List of Immigrant to UPT Lamunti

Batch	Status	Origin	Date of Arrival	No of Family	No of Individual
1	Local	Lamunti	1996.12	103	503
2	Local	Tarantang	1996.12	28	110
3	Local	Kaladan	1997.01	160	715
4		Kediri(Jawa)	1997.02	10	37
5		C.&E..Jawa	1997.02	49	149
6	Local	Lamunti	1997.02	26	106
7	Local	Manusup,Sei Kapar,Tarantang	1997.03	95	487
8		Yogya & C.Jawa	1997.03	29	109
9	Local	Lamunti	1997.03	18	74
10		E..Jawa	1998.12	32	144

Table 3 Price List of timber at Swamill along the Kapuas River (In Rupia per cubic meter)

Tree Species		Timber Purchased	Processed Timber	Processed Timber
Local Name	Scientific Name		sold on the spot	sold at Banjarmasin
Agatis	*Agathis borneensis*	300,000	850,000	1,200,000
Meranti	*Shorea leprosula*	170,000	600,000	900,000
Keruing	*Dipterocarpus* spp	170,000	600,000	900,000
Banuas	*Shorea laevifolia*	400,000	1,200,000	1,750,000
Kayu Hutan		75,000	230,000	300,000

Table 4 Livelihood of Children living separately

	case	%
Illegal logging	8	27.7
Sawmill worker	4	13.8
Transimmigrant	5	17.2
Gold mining	3	10.0
Construction worker	3	10.0
Dugout canoe builder	1	3.4
(Having left in Java)	3	10.0
(Schooling)	2	6.9
Total	29	100.0

Local Press in Bali in the Era of "*Reformasi*"
An Appraisal of New Directions of Research[1]

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Introduction

In the hey day of the "New Order" regime, Shiraishi pointed out that Indonesia became 'sweepingly literacy society' as a result of the spreading and extending formal school education and that thereby publishing business of dailies and weeklies became feasible [Shiraishi 1992: 105]. One of the serious consequences, he remarked, was that the opinion-forming power became centralised in Jakarta, as the wealth of the nation was concentrated there with the government apparatus being concentrated under the "New Order" regime [Shiraishi 1992: 106].[2]

Indeed, in 1980s, media in Indonesia were integrated into a commercial media groups such as *Kompas-Gramedia* group, *Sinar Kasih* group, *Tempo-Jawa Pos* Group and other conglomerates. Apparently, as Hanazaki [1998] argues,[3] 'commercial journalism by mass communication industry' displaced 'politic-oriented journalism by "home industry"' in the course of "New Order" regime's suppression upon media. In the1990s, furthermore, a stratum of state leaders became dominating media: e.g., Bob Hasan's *Gatra*, and Abdul Latief's *Tiras*. Timber tycoon Mohammad (Bob) Hasan controlled PT Era Media Informasi, publisher of the *Gatra* weekly; Abdul Latief, the then labour minister of Suharto's cabinet, invested on a magazine *Tiras*, which appeared as an avatar of *Editor*. Before that, the Minister B. J. Habibie also established *Harian*

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[1] All my thanks goes to: LIPI and other governmental agencies which supported our research project; staffs of local press in Bali and in NTB; Stanley of ISAI; and Arief Budiman, who gave me precious suggestions in the early stage of the research and introduced me to Stanley.

[2] Similar observation was stated: '... the press had undergone a rapid process of industrialization and concentration in a small number of media companies, ... there was a strong feeling of marginalization among publishers, reporters and readers of the Islamic press in Indonesia.' [Aditjondro 1993: 22-23]

[3] "Two leading national papers, *Kompas* and *Suara Pembaruan*, multiplied their readers among the growing middle class city dwellers. The circulation of *Kompas* amounted to 525,000 in 1990. ... As opposed to this, *Merdeka*, once much prevailing nationalist paper, lost its circulation to 60,000 in 1992, while in 1980 it had been 89,000.... The 1980s was the end of politic-oriented journalism by "home industry" and the beginning of the new era of commercial journalism by mass communication industry." [Hanazaki: 54]

Republika. A close relative of Suharto, Sudwikatmono[4] possessed *Sinar* and other entertainment tabloids. Janner Sinaga, ex-director general of *Pembinaan Pers dan Grafika*, obtained *SIUPP* (publishing permit for press) for weekly *Economic and Business Review Indonesia*. *SIUPP*, a prerequisite for the press, was granted to the entrepreneurs who were known as "close" to the government. This tendency, which had been noticeable particularly since the beginning of 1990s, became even more obvious after the suppression of *Tempo*, *DeTIK*, and *Editor*, in 1994 [source: Info Harian, *Tempo Interaktif* 22 June 1996. http://www.tempo. co.id/ang/har/1996/960622_1.htm].

Thus, as Shiraishi argued, it seems to be evident that the opinion-forming power has been concentrated on the power elites in Jakarta, particularly those with close relation to Suharto. Consequently, the public opinion even among local societies could become strongly affected and controlled by the opinion-formers in Jakarta, as the mass media converged into the Jakarta-based conglomerates, due to the very nature of capitalistic economy and the suppressive politic of the "New Order" regime.

From the era of "*reformasi*" on, however, local press (not only printed media but also broadcasting) proliferated in everywhere in the Republic, apparently due to the fact that it became so easy to publish periodicals after the requirements for *SIUPP* were loosened and even easier after *SIUPP* was abolished.[5] Even if, however, the loosening of the requirements for applying for *SIUPP* and the annulment of it permitted local media to emerge, the concentration of media as well as of the wealth on the state centre itself could persist. Hence, as Shiraishi predicted, the concentration of the opinion-forming power into the centre should be inevitable. Nevertheless, the process of the concentration and of the resistance against it might vary from a locale to another. It is a main aim of anthropology to describe a locale.

In an anthropological convention, mass media have not yet been a part of fully acknowledged field of investigation. Concentrated on so-called "primitive cultures," anthropological studies had treated mostly the "traditional", which means "non-Western", and "pre-modern", simple societies and their institutions. Contrasting the "modern" to the "traditional", which has been represented by the lack of the items "modern" world had, anthropology has excluded things considered to be "modern" from

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[4] Sen and Hill (2000) refer to Sudwikatmono as Suharto's cousin, who owns 20 % of stocks of SCTV.

[5] "They [local newspapers] admitted that the sales of their papers were disturbed by newly emerged newspapers — including the expansion of national newspapers with large capitals — with the realization of the freedom of the press." [Gazali 2000: 321].

the proper objects of anthropological research.[6] This holds true for press and other mass media also. Surely anthropologists have made use of mass media as one of the sources to describe the societies they investigated. Yet still they have mostly used those data only to supplement their fieldwork data, but did not treated mass media themselves as an object of analysis. About ten years ago, Spitulnik [1993: ??] argued that there is no "anthropology of mass media" yet. Even though the interests on, and the recognition of, the significance of "indigenous media" such as Ginsburg [1995] have appeared and many anthropologists have been interested in and influenced by "Cultural Studies", the new directions of anthropological research are not fully explored yet.

In this treaty I will argue that the description and analysis of the local press in Bali circumstantiate the characteristics of Balinese society in the context of Indonesian state in the era of "*reformasi*", on the assumption that mass media in local societies could be a proper objects of anthropological/ethnographic studies. Anthropology in the 1980s to the 1990s might be characterized by reflexive considerations about what anthropologists have done in the name of anthropology, i.e., fieldwork and ethnography, through critically reviewing the conventional methods in anthropology and their premise.

Functionalist ethnographic descriptions, on which the methods of conventional ethnography were established, had been based on the premise that "primitive societies" are closed spatially and have been continued unchanged as if 'frozen' in time. This premise of temporal continuity and spatial discontinuity was collapsed, as anthropologists recognised not only the sheer fact of globalizing world but such a historicized view that, for instance, a capitalistic economy system and Imperialism had created the third world. There has been the exposure of the dark side of anthropological tradition such as the collaboration of functionalist anthropology with colonialism [Asad 1973; Murphy 1994], or the Orientalist premises that the Orient/non-Western people cannot represent themselves [Said 1978]. Since then, it has been the imperative for anthropologists to reflect upon anthropology/ethnography, through the review of the procedure through which anthropologists/ethnographers have described and represented other cultures, or to be more specific, non-Western societies. Realizing that there has been what you might call 'ethnographic authority' behind the theories that had supported anthropological conventions of writing ethnography and conducting fieldwork, anthropologists began questioning this 'authority.' Likewise, they became

[6] It might be mostly because anthropology / ethnography has been representing exotic Others for the Western consumption.

critical of the conventional mode of description, which might be called 'ethnographic realism' or 'classic norm' [Clifford 1988; Marcus & Cushman 1982; Rosaldo 1993]. This mode of ethnographic description is not confined to the functionalist anthropology as Marcus and Fischer pointed out: "While numerous theories or analytic approaches have developed since the heyday of functionalism, *the form of ethnographic writing itself has remained largely conservative*." [Marcus and Fischer 1986: 41 (My emphasis)]

To overcome the defects of conventional ethnography, whether functionalist or not, anthropologists have been experimenting various attempts of new ethnography: some situating it in wider context such as a world system, others argue for conducting participate observation at the multiple research sites [Marcus 1995; Canberra Anthropology 1999]. Even an anthropologist who should not be so sympathetic to postmodern projects of ethnography argues that anthropology should combine its microsociology on the locales with the studies on global phenomena [Harris 1999].[7] If anthropologists realise that the societies they study are their contemporaries, they should discard such a concept of culture as has persistently been associated with tradition, which in turn has been associated with 'past'.[8]

In the following, I should like to take up local press (newspapers, tabloids, and magazines) in Bali to combine microsociology of anthropological research with the national and global background. Though there have already been the bulk of studies on Indonesian press, so far, most studies are on those with national circulation or with the broadcasting of nation-wide coverage and done by such social scientists as political sciences, communication studies, and sociology. Press and government policy, particularly that of the "New Order" regime, are discussed in such studies as: Hanazaki [1998] (until the "Open Policy" in the late "New Order" regime); Hill [1994](the "New Order" regime; Hidayat, Gazali, Suwardi & Ishadi [2000](the collapse of the "New Order" regime); Nurudin [2003] (three periods: "New Order" regime, the Habibie presidency, the Gus Dur presidency). Studies focused on local press are not so abundant.[9] Gazali [2000] deals with to what extent local radio broadcasting and

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[7] 'Anthropology will find it increasingly difficult to justify its existence if it categorically rejects attempts to combine the study of the local microcosm with the study of these and other global phenomena.' [Harris 1999: 189]

[8] "... the concept of culture was entwined with an opposition between tradition and modernity. ... Whatever else 'tradition' be may thought to be, one of its strongest association is with the past." [Crehan 2002: 52-4]

[9] Gazali admits that he did not succeed in collecting enough data concerning the development of local radio and newspapers in Indonesia [2000: 302].

newspaper played a role "*reformasi*" movement. Spyer, Arps, Jurriëns, van Heeren and Sushartami [2002] deal with local media, but it is an on-going project, the result of which we are still expecting. As for Balinese studies, there have been such studies as Kagami [1991] and Warren [1998]. Kgami [1991] is an attempt to analyse Bali-related articles from weekly *Tempo*. Warren [1998] deals with the specific case such as anti-BNR campaign on local press. It displays such an interesting observation that 'culturally based solidarity was essential' for Balinese to resist the repressive centre as in the resistance against the development project of Bali Nirwana Resort [Warren 1998: 243]. Though both studies give us intriguing information through analysing articles in either national or local press, neither deals with local press as such. Anthropological studies on local media have not yet fully started.

In the following sections first we will see how the media in Indonesia had been treated under the "New Order" regime to clarify the frame in which local mass media emerged after the suppressive regime collapsed. Then, we will focus on the local media in Bali. "*Reformasi*" related changes permitted small media to appear in Bali, as in other parts of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the constellation pattern of local mass media, I should argue, displays Balinese particularity of the locale.

To provide the information on various constraints on Indonesian media, I draw upon mainly published sources and some web-based sources as mentioned above, though I should admit that I was given general information on Indonesian press at ISAI. Turning to local media in Bali I draw upon my own interviews and reading of media, either electric ones (i.e., on the web) or conventional ones (i.e., on the printed material) to clarify the local media scene. I do not attempt to approach in analysing media through quantitative methods such as content analysis. It is not because I do not appreciate its importance, but simply because I was not trained for these methods. Nor can I analyse texts of articles appeared in local press in depth in this treaty. The character of this treaty is only that of appraisal of one or other directions of anthropological research. Further researches may necessitate more detailed analyses with both quantitative methods and qualitative methods.

1. Media and the State Apparatus: Media under the "New Order" Regime

With various means, the government have been trying to control the media. The major

tool for controlling media in Indonesia has been a licensure system.[10] In 12 December 1966, the Basic Law concerning Press was enacted [*Undang-undang No. 11 Tahun 1966 Tentang ketentuan-ketentuan Pokok Pers*], which was to be amended in 1982. The law declared that the State should be engaged in developing press [*pembinaan pers*] based on the article 28 and 33 of '45 Constitution, no. 32 decree [*besluit*] of '66 Temporary National Congress, and Pancasila. The Press Law article no. 4 decreed that no censorship or restrictions should be imposed on press. On the other hand, however, it resolved to continue Publishing License [*Surat Izin Penerbit*], which became imperative first in Jakarta area since October 1 by the Army after Sukarno placed the capital under martial law on March 14 1957.[11]

In the 1982 amendment of the Press Law [*Undang-undang RI No. 21 Tentang Perubahan Atas UU No.11 Tahun 1966*], the *Surat Izin Penerbit* publishing license was abolished. Nevertheless, the licensure of publishing as such still persisted because of the imperative of operation license [*Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan*]. The minister of Information had been authorized to revoke the publishing operation license by the issue of the Ordinance no. 1 of Minister of Information in 1984 [Hanazaki: 69-70]. In practice, the press under the New Order regime was highly dependent on the ministry of Information, as we can see in the minister's authority to revoke *SIUPP*.

The Article no. 6 of the Press Law stipulates the establishment of Press Council [*Dewan Pers*], and the Article no. 7 also stipulates that the council is to be headed by the Minister of Information. It is operated by the funds from the Ministry. Hence, it is obvious that the Press Council could hardly be in a position to resist the regime. Similarly, a supposedly independent organization of journalists, Indonesian Journalist Association [*PWI*], has been more a part of than an independent of the governmental authorities. It was instituted as an independent organisation of journalists in February 1946. Later, however, the government authorized it as the only organization of journalists in the Republic and the Ministry of Information stipulated that an Indonesian should be a member of *PWI* to work as a journalist.

It is Harmoko who represents best the New Order Indonesian media suppression. Harmoko had been in the chair of PWI for ten years since 1973. In 1983 he assumed the

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[10] Other tool for controlling media is the control of supply of material needed for publishing. Indonesian government indirectly aided press by keeping cost of news print paper low. For instance, it subsidized domestic papermils 11 billion Rupiahs and exempted taxation for imported news print paper, which was equivalent of 18.7 billion rupiah subsidy in 1989. Both subsidies amounted to about 30 billion rupiah worth of indirect subsidy for press [Hartarto 1989, cited in Hanazaki].

[11] The Publishing Licensure was extended to all over the republic of Indonesia in 1960.

office of the Minister of Information, and in 1993 he ascended the chair of GolKar, the party then in power. Harmoko is said to hold considerable shares in many media companies, such as *Pos Kota*, *Citra*, *Jakarta Post*, *Suara Pembaruan,* etc [Hnazaki 1998].

Suppressing or threatening to suppress (by revoking *SIUPP*) might be one of the most effective means to control the press. During the New Order regime, the government suppressed media several times: In 1974 twelve newspapers (including magazines) were suppressed; In 1978, 14 newspapers (including magazines) were temporarily suspended in connection with the protest campaign against President Soeharto's re-election; in 1982, *Tempo* was suppressed temporarily; in the following year, *Jurnal Ekuin* was wrecked; in 1984, *Topik* and *Fokus* were suppressed; 1986, *Sinar Harapan*; 1987, *Prioritas*; 1990, *Monitor*; 1994, *Tempo, Editor, Detik* were suppressed and shutdown.

'*Keterbukaan*' (open) policy in the twilight of the Suharto's regime allowed the media to enjoy somehow more freedom. Then, the stepping down of Suharto and the collapse of the New Order regime lead the republic to the *reformasi* (reformation) era. The limit of issuing *SIUPP* (publishing permit for press) was much loosened,[12] then, the Habibie regime abolished the Ministry of Information regulation of 1984, and stipulated the annulment of *SIUPP*. Even the Ministry of Information, which was notorious of its censorship, was abolished during the Gus Dur presidency. Eventually, various publications emerged everywhere in the Republic, including Bali.

2. Local Press in Bali

According to the data obtained at *Badan Informasi dan Telematika Daerah Propinsi Bali*, currently (in 2003) there are 48 local press in Bali registered [see Table 1]. Since the abolition of the Ministry of Information, the *Badan Informasi dan Telematika Daerah Propinsi Bali* (*BITD*) has replaced the Bali Branch of the Ministry. It is this newly established regional agency (*BITD*) that makes up for the task to take an inventory of mass media in Bali. They only have, however, the data of publications that publishers voluntarily registered, because the *BITD* has no authority to force publishers

[12] According to Stanley of ISAI, 180 *SIUPP* were issued by the 21 Mei 1998 , and in 1999 (when the general election was to be held) about 1400 [Personal communication].
According to Nurudin citing AJI's data there were 852 SIUPP by the 15 April 1999, while during the "Orde Baru" era (for 32 years), only 321 SIUPP were issued [Nurudin 2003: 86].

to register their publications. Some publications do not appear on the list because they have never been registered: such as *Suara Desa* (which was discontinued recently) and *Bali Mula*. Even major publications such as *SARAD* and *Raditya* do not appear on the list. Meanwhile, I suspect, some discontinued publications still appear on the list, since I have never seen in the market some titles that appear on the list. The list also lacks the information on the figures of the circulation nor the date of the first issue.

Table 1. Registered periodical publications in Bali [Source: BITD. Modified (several columns omitted)]

No.	Title	Media	Genre	Language	Period
1	*Bali Post*	Newspaper	General	Indonesian	Daily
2	*DenPost*	Newspaper	General	Indonesian	Daily
3	*Nusa*	Newspaper	General	Indonesian	Daily
4	*Koran Bali*	Newspaper	General	Indonesian	Semi-weekly
5	*Bisnis Bali*	Newspaper	General [sic.]	Indonesian	Biweekly
6	*Fajar Bali*	Tabloid	General	Indonesian	-
7	*Bali Soccer*	Tabloid	Sports	Indonesian	Monthly
8	*Bali Advertiser*	Tabloid	-	English and Japanese	Biweekly
9	*Bali Travel News*	Tabloid	Tourism	English	Biweekly
10	*Magir Wave*	Tabloid	-	English	-
11	*Bali Aga*	Magazine	*Adat* and culture	Indonesian	Weekly
12	*Majalah DPR*	Magazine	-	Indonesian	-
13	*Wacana Bali*	Magazine		Indonesian	-
14	*Bog-Bog Bali carton* [sic.]	Magazine	Tourism	English	-
15	*Warta Hindu Dharma*	Magazine	*Agama*, *Adat* and Hindu culture	Indonesian	Monthly
16	*Forum Arkeologi*	Magazine	Archaeology	Indonesian	semi-annually
17	*Suara Astira Bali*	Magazine	Tourism	Indonesian	Bimonthly
18	*Warta Pemda*	Magazine	-	Indonesian	Monthly
19	*Agape*	Magazine	-	Indonesian	Monthly
20	*Q. Media*	Magazine	Tourism	Indonesian	
21	*Bali Echo*	Magazine	Tourism	English	Bimonthly
22	*Warta Berkala Seputar*	Magazine	Health	Indonesian	Monthly

	AIDS				
23	*Advertise Promotion Informedia*	Magazine	Tourist information	Japanese	-
24	*Singamanggala*	Magazine	general	Indonesian	-
25	*Pialang*	Tabloid	property	Indonesian	Biweekly
26	*Tabloid Remaja2 Bali*	Tabloid	?	Indonesian	Biweekly
27	*Surya Pradja*	Tabloid	General	Indonesian	Monthly
28	*Radar Bali*	Newspaper	General	Indonesian	Daily
29	*Profit Advertiser*	Tabloid	tourism	English	Monthly
30	*Manggala*	Tabloid	General	Indonesian	-
31	*Wisata* [sic.] *Mandala*	Tabloid	Youth	Indonesian	-
32	*Exekutif Bali*	Tabloid	General	Indonesian	Biweekly
33	*Wanita Bali*	Tabloid	Women/general	Indonesian	Biweekly
34	*Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis*	Magazine	economy/Business	Indonesian	Monthly
35	*Bunga Rampai*	Tabloid	General	Indonesian	Monthly
36	*Bali Orti*	Tabloid	General/Tourism	English/Japanese	Biweekly
37	*Bali Tribune*	Tabloid	Tourism	English	Biweekly
38	*Adpar*	Tabloid	General	Indonesian	Semi-monthly
39	*Prestani Anak Indonesia*	Tabloid	Children	Indonesian	Twice a three months
40	*Bali Travels's* [sic.] *Guide*	Tabloid	Tourism	English	Monthly
41	*Elektra Indonesia*	Majalah	Education	Indonesian	Weekly
42	*Keluarga Sehat*	Tabloid	Health	Indonesian	Weekly
43	*The Poleng*	Magazine	Tourism	English	Quarterly
44	*Pamor*	Tabloid	Law	Indonesian	Weekly
45	*Tabloid Semeton Bali "TAKSU"*	Tabloid	Culture	Indonesian	Monthly
46	*Metro Pos*	Broad Sheet	General	Indonesian	Daily
47	*Majalah Elektronik "Bali Hit"Z*	CD	General	Indonesian	Monthly
48	*Ecomoda*	Majalah	Business	Indonesian	Monthly

Table 2. Local press in Bali

No.	Media	Title	Period	Pages	Price (Bali)	Notes
1	newspaper	*Bali Post* (+ *DenPost*)	daily	20	2,500	new price (Mar. 2004)
2	newspaper	*DenPost*	daily	12	1,000	
3	newspaper	*Bisnis Bali*	semiweekly	12	1,500	
4	newspaper	*Harian Umum NUSA*	daily	16	2,000	
5	newspaper	*Fajar Bali* (+*Fajar Nusra*)	daily	16	2,000	17/7/2000
6	newspaper	*Warta Bali*	daily	12	1,500	
7	newspaper	*Koran Bali*	semiweekly	12	2,000	
8	newspaper	*Radar Bali* (*Jawa Pos*)	daily	32	2,000	
9	tabloid	*Bali Aga*	weekly	24	5,000	
10	tabloid	*Bali Mula*	biweekly	24	4,000	
11	tabloid	*TAKSU*	bimonthly	32	4,000	
12	tabloid	*Remaja Bali*	biweekly	20	5,000	
13	tabloid	*Bali Rebound*	biweekly	16	4,000	English
14	tabloid	*Manggala*	weekly	16	3,500	
15	tabloid	*Suara Desa*	semimonthly	16	4,000	
16	magazine	*Wacana Bali*	monthly	38	5,000	
17	magazine	*SARAD*	monthly	64	6,900	
18	magazine	*Raditya*	monthly	64	7,000	since Jan. 2004 new format and price
19	magazine	*Veda Prayascitta*	-	40	3,500	
20	magazine	*Buratwangi*	semiannually	40	6,000	Balinese

I had an opportunity to read some publications. Table 2 shows these dailies and periodicals, including some journals of very limited readership, such as on Balinese literature.

Among publications in the table 2, only *Bali Post*, *NUSA* and *Raditya* are established before *SIUPP* licensure was abolished. Certainly the changes in constraints on media described in the previous section caused the proliferation of printed media in Bali as well as in other parts of Indonesia. An application for press publishing license

necessitated the applying publisher to possess a huge capital [Nurudin 2003: 8]. Thereby, the licensure system prevented local small capitals from publishing periodicals in the "New Order" era. We could reasonably assume that it is the annulment of *SIUPP*, which directly caused this proliferation.

Among those periodicals in Bali, I shall give some information firstly ones that require immediate reporting, i.e., daily newspapers, and then, on ones that do not, i.e., weekly or monthly tabloids or magazines.

Bali Post

Bali Post is counted among one of the eight big local newspapers that do not belong to Jakarta-based large capital [Hill 1994: 119]. The predecessor of *Bali Post*, *Suara Indonesia* was first published on August 16, 1948, by K. Nadha, Md Sarya Udayana and I Gusti Putu Arka. They had been working as journalists at *Bali Shimbun*, a newspaper published in Denpasar during the Japanese occupation 1943-1945. In 1966 its nameplate was changed into *Suluh Indonesia*, which was to be renamed into *Bali Post* in 1972 [Bali Post 1982].[13]

They say *Bali Post* has a daily circulation of about 100,000.[14] *Bali Post* group has become a (sort of) media conglomerate to be compared to *Kompas-Gramedia group* or *Jawa Pos-Tempo group*. It has its headquarters in Denpasar, Bali, with branch offices in Jakarta and Mataram. There are bureaux at eight Kabupaten-s and Denpasar City in Bali, at Yogya and Surabaya in Java, and at Bima in Sumbawa, NTB. PT Bali Post (the publisher of *Bali Post*) publishes newspapers such as *DenPost*, *Bali Post*, *Bisnis Bali*, *Bali Travel News* (either in English or Japanese edition), *Wiyata Mandala* (for students), *Lingtang* (for preschool children), *Tokoh* (for women; published by the Jakarta office).[15] *Bali Post* group has two printing offices (one at the *Bali Post* headquarter and the other at the *DenPost* office), which also print such as calendar,

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[13] At first, they wanted to rename into the former name *Suara Indonesia*, which they found to have already been used by the paper in Malang.

[14] One of the problems in researching mass media in Indonesia is that Indonesia lacks the third party authorities such as Verified Audit Circulation in the USA, to monitor mass media circulation. Concerning he data and information about mass media in Indonesia such as circulation, there is *laporan tahunan penerbitan media.* However, according to Stanley of *ISAI*, the data are liable to be manipulated. There are also ones that published by independent research institutions, such as *Indonesian Media Guide* (Masindo) or *Media Scene: an official guide to advertising media in Indonesia* (Persatuan Perusahaan Periklanan Indonesia). Even these data are not so trustworthy. Publishers very often tend to announce inflated figures to attract more advertisers. The staffs of BIKD NTB and BITD Bali admitted it is hard to obtain accurate data on circulation. They say publishers tend to be reluctant to disclose them as a 'company secret'.

[15] By long distance printing system, it can be published on the same day (Tuesday) both in Jakarta and in Bali.

other magazines and books to order. Recently they began to explore electronic media such as radio and television broadcasting. Since May 2002, *Bali Post* has operated TV broadcasting business "Bali TV".

As Bali Post Group grows and becomes what you might call "Balinese version of Kompas-Gramdeia", *Bali Post* becomes more like a "*Kompas*" in Bali. In fact, a *Bali Post* staff claims that *Bali Post* is a national newspaper, not a local newspaper. Indeed, since *DenPost* is published everyday (except Sunday) and usually sold as a supplement to it, *Bali Post* can concentrate reports from Bali (particularly criminal reports) upon its supplement (*DenPost*). It has a more national-newspaper-like appearance, though it still devotes considerable space to Bali related news.[16]

The other instance, I believe, displays *Bali* Post's move from local-oriented to national-oriented paper. When I had conducted fieldwork during the 1980s, *Bali Post* had a weekly supplement called *edisi pedesaan* (rural edition), which Bali specific contents with larger font size (and plain Indonesian). *Prima*, which was said to succeed to the rural edition, was a newspaper that specialised in agriculture and gardening. PT Bali Post discontinued *Prima* and began publishing *Bisnis Bali*. Though *Bali Post* claims that it is *Bisnis Bali* that replaced *Prima*,[17] it seems to me that its readership should be much different from that of *Prima* or of *edisi pedesaan*. I suspect that, although it must be the fall of KMD that directly caused this discontinuation of *edisi pedesaan*, *Bali Post* became so centre-oriented that it left the rural edition out and replaced it with business newspaper. This move, however, was to be changed in a 180-degree turn, as we will see later.

NUSA: Yang Penting Britanya Bli!

NUSA (formerly called *Nusa Tenggara*)[18] is Bali's second largest daily newspaper, which claims the circulation of 98,631 [NUSA profile brochure].[19] Since 1994 (when its circulation drastically dropped), *NUSA*'s publisher PT Sinar NusraPress Utama has been owned by the Bakrie Brothers Group (55% of its share), KODAM (25 %) and

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[16] Until February 2004, it had two pages devoted to NTB. From 1 March 2004 on, *Bali Post* has a new 4-page supplement devoted to NTB, *Suara NTB*. Thereby, two pages devoted to NTB reporting were displaced by one page for Denpasar City and another for other areas in Bali.

[17] The discontinuation of *edisi pedesaan* should have something to do with the fall of *KMD*.

[18] In January 1966 Indonesian Army started publishing newspaper titled *Angkatan Bersenjata*. which was later renamed *Nusa Tenggara*.

[19] *Radar Bali* (*Jawa Pos*) estimates it as 10,000 to 20,000. Similar observation was obtained at the BITD Bali, they said *NUSA* claimed its circulation as five times as high, on the assumption that one copy should be read by about 5 person.

NUSA employees (20%). It holds the second place with a considerable margin, both in my observations and in opinion of Balinese whom I interviewed, although it claims in its company profile that its volume of circulation is almost as large as *Bali Post*. People seem to regard it as characterised by sex-related episodes and have an opinion that it is far behind *Bali Post*, both in the volume of circulation and in the contents.

As the catch-phrase of the paper, '*Yang Penting Britanya Bli!*', clearly displays, it is targeted to the Balinese readership, though formerly they aimed at the market of whole Nusa Tenggara area.[20] A *NUSA* staff admits that the marketing of *NUSA* is now concentrated on Bali, which is, according to him, 'more mature in the purchasing power than other Nusa Tenggara': "Hence, *NUSA* should try to enhance the quality of reports on the local (Balinese) contents, particularly those on Balinese culture. To accomplish this, the native Balinese ('*orang sini*') write about their own culture. We do this with improving the quality of manpower concerning culture (*budaya*). We will offer 'Bali' to 'Bali(nese)'."

Newly emerged papers: Fajar Bali, Radar Bali, Koran Bali

While *Bali Post* and *NUSA* had been started before the annulment of *SIUPP* licensure, other newspapers based on Denpasar are those which published after *SIUPP* had been abolished: *Fajar Bali, Koran Bali, Warta Bali.*

Fajar Bali was established on 17 July 2001. This daily newspaper is targeted at the local readership in Bali and Nusa Tenggara. A supplement called *Gita Darma* covers what they call *ciri khas Bali* (Balinese idiosyncrasy): rural news and cultural aspects in Bali. They claim that its mission is to support the government's program to enhance literacy ('to stimulate people's lust for reading'). In the 1980s, KMD was a program done by the Ministry of Information to enhance literacy in rural area by spreading newspaper there.[21] Thanks to it, newspaper can be spread to NTT. *Fajar Bali* replaces the role that the program played to enhance literacy in NTT.

According to a staff, most subscribers of *Fajar Bali* are local government employees. *Fajar Bali* applied for a support from local governments, such as support for printing in NTT. Also, they sent letters of solicitation of subsidies to all the *kabupatens*

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[20] *Bli (Beli)* in Balinese is used as an intimate address to a male person.

[21] The informant was a civil servant working at KODAM, for helping management at *Nusa Tenggara*, which was spread to rural area through *Primkopda (Prima Koperasi Angkatan Darat*). In 1979, the government began collaborating with local press on the project of KMD (=Koran Masuk Desa), in which 34 papers took part in 1979/80. In 1993/94, 58 newspaper and magazines took part in. 50 of them got financial aid from the government. Being active in through the 1980s, then, the project tapered off.

in Bali, among which Tabanan gave approval.

Radar Bali: Jawa Pos edisi Pulau Dewata

As its subtitle (*Jawa Pos edisi Pulau Dewata*) displays, *Radar Bali* is a part of the local edition project of *Jawa Pos*, which is a Surabaya based newspaper with national circulation and which is published by one of the large media conglomerates, *Tempo-Jawa Pos group.*[22] In July 1999, *Jawa Pos* published 7 local newspapers in East Java: *Radar Banyuwangi, Radar Bromo, Radar Bojonegoro, Radar Jember, Radar Madiun, Radar Kediri*, and *Radar Madura.* One year later, it also published local editions (*Radar*) in Central Java: *Radar Semarang, Radar Jogja, dan Radar Solo. Radar Bali* was first published on 12 February 2001.

The circulation is claimed as that of 42,600. They claim that since the establishment of the printing facilities[23] of PT. Temprina Media Grafika (Jawa Pos Group) in Denpasar on the 26th September 2002, the circulation of *Radar Bali* experienced a significant increase. They claim that printed in Denpasar, *Radar Bali* with *Jawa Pos* can be delivered earlier, not only in Denpasar, but also in every Kabupaten in Bali, NTB and NTT.

It takes up aspects of quotidian life of Balinese to be accepted by Balinese society. *Radar Bali* editor-in-chief has an opinion that Balinese are the most fanatic in their region. *Jawa Pos* is aware that Balinese tend to feel strong antagonism toward anything with a flavour of Java. Because only Balinese journalists can know special terms of Balinese ritual, it is Balinese who write articles while the editorial staffs only directing them. While *Bali Post* takes Hindu-centrism, *Jawa Pos* takes pluralism accommodating all the religions. Nevertheless, Hinduism takes the most portions, because Bali's majority is Hindu.

Besides these daily newspapers,[24] there has been a semiweekly newspaper, which also newly emerged. *Koran Bali* was started by Candra Wijaya from Krangasem, who runs real estate business (first issue published on 1-4 November 2001 as an issue not for sale). The paper is published only twice a week, and hence, costs much less, which makes it attractive to those who cannot afford to subscribe to a daily. The number

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[22] "In the era of independent press now, Dahlan Iskan [*Jawa Pos* Group] is carrying out *aggressive marketing*...Jawa Pos Group has already own 97 papers."[Batubara 2001: 45]

[23] The printing office makes much more profit than the newspaper. It earns six billion rupiah a year, while the sales of newspaper (most of its income is from advertisement) amounts to only 2 billion rupiah in a year.

[24] *Warta Bali* was not published yet when I had fieldwork in August 2002.

of subscribers in Kecamatan Rendang and Selat, where I had my fieldwork, is about 300, while it has the circulation of about 5,000. It is claimed that the mission of *Koran Bali* is to offer news about each region (*Kabupaten*) of Bali, particularly, about its culture (*budaya*) as well as about social economy and social politic. It is asserted that 'Regional Autonomy' is reflected in the format of *Koran Bali* in that every *kabupaten* freely makes decisions including the organisation of page space. Pages made at every *kabupaten* are collected at Denpasar to be edited and published.

The editor-in-chief of *Koran Bali* told that the response of the market was very good, and he attributes it to the fact that the majority of Balinese are those who believe in *Agama Hindu Bali* (Balinese Hinduism). *Koran Bali* has already penetrated into various offices, both governmental and private corporation, in every *kabupaten*. At the rural level, they collaborate with *lurah/kepala desa* (village head) and offer special price, which varies depending on *kabupaten*. No governmental (provincial or local) agency gives any (financial) support yet. The government only recommends *Koran Bali*.

As in every other part of Indonesia, the abolishment of publishing licensure caused the proliferation of tabloids in Bali. Among them *Bali Aga* represents best the characteristics of Balinese locale.

Bali Aga

Bali Aga is a weekly tabloid with a circulation of 7,000 (the figure was given by the editor in chief). Formerly, it was published by a subsidiary company of *NUSA*. Since the *Bali Aga* department was closed down in the end of December 2003 by the management department, it has been operated by its ex-staffs, who were dismissed at its closedown. This tabloid stresses *budaya Bali* (Balinese culture) but scarcely carries social-politic issues. As far as I observed, it is the most popular in a similar kind of tabloids. Perhaps because of its populism (and sensation seeking editorial policy), *Bali Aga* seems to sell well despite its relatively expensive price for rural Balinese (Rp. 5,000).

TAKSU

Jiwa Atmaja, who is a lecturer at Udayana University, published a tabloid. Since December 2000, two issues of the tabloid had been published under the title of "*Warta Bakti*", which turned out to sell so poorly that Atmaja decided to change the title. From the 3rd issue on, the tabloid has been named *TAKSU*.[25] During the first month of

[25] It is an acronym of "Telaah Adat, Kebudayaan dan Susila" as well as a Balinese word.

publication of *TAKSU*, i.e., January 2001, it was published weekly in the bigger format. Then, it became published biweekly (now bimonthly), in tabloid size (now return to the bigger size), and with the total pages of 16 (now 20 pages). Printed profile says it has a circulation of 5,000, but he admits actually it has that of 3,000. He claims that it is distributed all the local governmental offices in Bali, businesspersons, educators, village cooperative credit union and co-op, as well as public in general.

Jiwa Atmaja claims that he started *TAKSU* because of his own idealism. It has made a loss, which has been made up with his printing business and loyalties paid on his books. According to him, there has been *distorsi pemikiran* (the distortions of thoughts) in Bali these days. He claims he started publishing *TAKSU*, which treats aspects of culture such as symbols and issues particular to Bali (Balinese culture), to correct these distortions. *TAKSU* stresses philosophy, symbols and their meanings, but it does not seek for their origins in India.

MAJALAH GUMI BALI: SARAD

It is a monthly magazine with a *TIME*- or *Newsweek*-like (or *TEMPO*-like) format and with total pages of 60. The magazine, however, is not newsmagazine, though every issue features contemporary topics. It concentrated only about issues around Bali, particularly concerning Balinese culture. They claim that the aim of the magazine is to offer 'the way Balinese understand Bali.' In spite of its rather expensive price (Rp. 6,900), it seems to sell very well. It is claimed that it has a circulation of 10,000, about 90 % of which are sold out. Most subscribers subscribe to it through agents.[26] Where there is no agent, like in the case of Irian Jaya, it can be subscribed directly from the publisher. About twenty people subscribe to it directly.

It is published by Yayasan Gumi Bali. The editor in chief of *SARAD*, quit *NUSA* in September 1999. Six journalists including him worked out together a project of a new magazine, which eventually was established in November 1999. They argue that it was a new type of media that offered Bali from inside ("*Bali oleh Bali*"), while other media offered Bali from outside, that is, touristic and 'exotic' Bali. To publish it they established Gumi Bali Foundation (*Yayasan Gumi Bali*). The first issue appeared on 22 January 2000 in print and on-line form. It turned out to be such a response as the informant himself was surprised.

[26] There are 11 agents in Bali, 3 in Jakarta, 2 in Yogyakarta. A n agent in Riau, Bandar Lampung, Cilegon, Bandung, Cimahi, Bogor, Malang, Sidoarjo, Surabaya, Banyuwangi, Mataram, Makasar, Balikpapan, Kupang, and Kab. Luhuk Utqara – Sulawasi Selatan.

3. Bali Post and its contenders

As for newspapers, as a staff of *NUSA* put it, newspaper companies now compete one another aiming at the Balinese market. It is said that *Kompas* is planning to enter the Balinese market with launching a local edition. *NUSA* admits that they are prepared for it by intensifying the reporting on Bali. Meanwhile, *Radar Bali* or *Jawa Pos* does not seem to worry too much. *Radar Bali* claims that *Jawa Pos* and *Kompas* are different in the market segmentation. According to *Radar Bali*, while *Kompas* targets to the middle class and above, *Jawa Pos* narrow the potential readership to the middle class. Likewise, a *Bali Post* staff claims that other newspapers, such as Jakarta or other big city based national newspapers (e.g., *Kompas* or *Jawa Pos*) are not regarded as a threat to *Bali Post*, because the segment of market is different,[27] and that *Bali Post* targeted the potential readership for the middle class and above. If the segmentation is different between *Bali Post* and other newspapers of large circulation, it should be understood that its potential readership is mainly Balinese or those domicile in Bali. In spite of its claim mentioned above that it is a 'national' paper, it displays that it still is a local paper. Recently the tendency becomes even clearer. As I mentioned in the previous section, *Bali Post* turns to a strategy of strengthening the local reporting of Bali. By launching *Suara NTB*, *Bali Post* devotes more pages to the news reporting from Bali, while news from other part of Indonesia appear on the first page and the last but one page only.

Fajar Bali admits that it plays a game in the segments that *Bali Post* left out. As mentioned above, *Bali Post* used to have rural edition (*edisi pedesaan*), which changed name as *prima* and then discontinued. It is this segment that *Fajar Bali* tries to take. *Koran Bali* sees that it is almost impossible to compete with *Bali Post*, which has a history of more than fifty years. While *Bali post* seemed to tend to be more national (at least until in 2002), though of course it also included more news about Bali than national newspapers, *Koran Bali* is characterised by much more articles on local (Bali) news in depth. While newly emerged local media contend one another for the market, *Bali Post* seems to take lion's share. Considering the case that recently *Surabaya Pos* lost to *Jawa Pos* (owned by another media conglomerate) by an overwhelming margin,

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[27] As for the incident that *Surabaya Pos* lost to *Jawa Pos* by an overwhelming margin recently, a *Bali Post* staff admitted that they had discussed it in the firm to conclude that the failure of *Surabaya Pos* had been caused by its mismanagement. Then, they have been checking quality control through the evaluations of the smallest units in the firm weekly and monthly.

it should be noted that *Bali Post*, which is aimed at Balinese with Bali centred articles, has still been on the top and that its contenders concentrate themselves even more at local issues.

As for tabloids, we also see an interesting pattern of Balinese market. Among tabloids and magazines published by Balinese, those that stress Balinese traditional culture are the most popular. Both *Bali Aga* and *SARAD* seemed to find their market niche, while *TAKSU* could not. *SARAD* targets the educated and relatively wealthy stratum, while *Bali Aga* targeting at commercialism and populism. *TAKSU*, however, being in-between, it could not succeed in taking a certain segment of the market. Recently it changes its format and takes up more mystic issues. Thereby, it gets more and more resembling *Bali Aga* both in its format and in its contents, though it is still too high-brow to be popular among the uneducated.

It is also circumstantiated by the comparison with the data from NTB, where no publication is concentrated upon a single ethnic culture. Table 3 shows local media in NTB. Some newspapers are particular to even smaller part of the region such as *Gaung NTB* (Sumbawa), *Bima Ekspres*, and *Dompu Post*. From my reading of some publications in NTB, I have an impression that they do not stress any 'ethnicity' such as Sasak-ness or Sumawa-ness, in comparison with Balinese local press, which always stress 'Bali-ness'. It may be too immature to commit to any answers to this difference between Bali and NTB without more empirical data, particularly the comparison with the data from other regions. Yet, it might not be so fallacious to say that the process and the result vary from locale to locale, even if the "*reformasi*' caused some changes everywhere in the Republic.

Table 3. Name and Editor in chief Local Press until November 2003 [SUBBID PELAYANAN INFORMASI BIKD PROPINSI NTB]

No.	Title	Name of editor-in-chief	Ket.
1	SKH. Lombok Post	H. Ismail Husni	Daily
2	SKH. Gaung NTB	Rindha Rahzen	Daily
3	SKH. NTB Post	Partu Rendra	Daily
4	Buletin KILAS	Muslimin Hamzah	Weekly
5	Tabloid CITA KITA	Chairul M. Syah	Weekly
6	Weekly SINAR LOMBOK	M. Nazri	Weekly
7	Bima Ekspres	Ir. Khairudin M. Ali	Daily

8	Dompu Post	Ir. Khairudin M. Ali	Daily
9	Sumbawa Ekspres	Antony Mithan	Daily
10	Tabloid LINTAS	Drs. Zaenul Arif	Weekly
11	The Wonder of Lombok-Sumbawa	Rosa Stuart	Annual
12	Media Unram	Kusmayadi	Monthly
13	Praya Post	Suhardi, SH.	Daily
14	Jaring Sumbawa Ekpress	Antony Mithan	Daily
15	Tabloid Perspektif	Drs. HL. Fadlullah MS.	Weekly
16	BIDIK	Drs. Salahuddin	Weekly
17	Sk. Sawah	Hasan Masat	Weekly
18	SKM. Gema Persada	L.M. Kamil AB.	Weekly
19	Tabloid Dwi Weekly Suaka Hukum & Keadilan	Buyung Sutan Muchlis	Weekly
20	Minggun [sic] BIMA News	M. Arqam Nur Islam	Weekly
21	Media Rakyat	L. Burni	
22	Suara Rakyat	Adhar Hakim	
23	DETIK NEWS	M. Arqam Nur Islam	
24	Rakyat BIMA	Ahyar HM Nur	Daily
25	Nurani Rakyat	M. Suhardi	
26	Suara Mataram	Khairul Taufiq	Weekly
27	Rakyat Bima	Sahas	Weekly
28	Sumbawa Post	Zakariah Asin, SE	Daily
29	Tabloid Gema Indonesia	Nasrudin Bachtiar	Weekly

Even Balinese local media, which emphasise Balinese cultural tradition, are not monolithic at all, but every media has its own idiosyncratic approach to Balinese "tradition". It should be anthropologists' task to depict in detail such regional media as *Bali Post*, *TAKSU* and others, when it is national media that has been studied by other social scientists. I believe that anthropological studies on regional media contribute much to the study of local societies in Indonesia that has undergone the decentralisation process.

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From Paddy to Vanilla, From Elephant Tusks to Money

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1 Introduction

In the introductory part to a paper of mine which deals with the Endenese labour migration to Malaysia, I wrote "People live the lives which I have been used to for 20 years. I do not discern any drastic change in their lives — they still talk about kinship relationships between their friends and relatives, and the accruing bridewealth transaction as well as witchcraft and sorcery" [Nakagawa 2003: 36].

The paper analyzed this stubbornness of the Endenese way of life from the theoretical point of view. In a way, the said paper was written from the anthropologist's point of view which is, hopefully (as naïvely I hope), congruent with the native point of view. I am going to write this paper, more from the economist's point of view, emphasizing the agricultural activities and modern market economy of the people of Ende of central Flores, eastern Indonesia.

* * * * *

One day during my recent field work, a villager of Rhepa Dori, name of Pa'o, complained to me about the recent "changes" in the village — "Nowadays, rice comes from the shops in the town of Ende, so we don't know the season for the marriage ceremonies. It's so exhausting." On hearing this, I thought "this's it!" This is the point I should have made (or at least I could have made) in the migration paper mentioned above. So, this paper is going to pursue the line Pa'o set for me on that day.

Let me add some pieces of preliminary information to better understand this fragment of conversation. In mountain part of Ende,[1] one is expected to contribute in one way or another to the ceremonial gift exchange according to one's relationship with the couple—marriage ceremonies are occasions which cause the big expenses to those

[1] Roughly speaking, on the mountain side of the Ende region, people are Catholic and retain more or less "traditional" ways of life while along the coast, live the Muslim Ende who accord their lives by the Islamic codes.

involved. Formerly , since there was a sort of fixed season of ceremonies, once one went through a hectic month or two, one could live one's life without much financial anxieties. But, according to Pa'o, "there is now no season for the ceremonies (*ghoma*)" so that one has to prepare oneself for expenses throughout the whole year.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the changes in Ende insinuated in the above conversation, focusing on the rôle of money.

1.1 Settings of the Story

I will write this paper as a narrative of history. This historical story has three stages in it. Robé was my main informant through my field work in the village of Rhepa Dori in Ende. He talked much about his renowned father Nipi, famous for his wealth. The first stage of my historical narrative deals with the age of Nipi, from before the WW2 up until 1960s. Then comes the second stage, the age of Robé, which I myself witnessed, ranging from 1970s up to the early 1980s.

After Robé's age, comes the present situation ranging from the latter half of the 1980s up to now, which I will dub, "the age of Hane," Robé's sister's son as well as Robé's daughter's husband (because of the matrilateral cross cousin marriage) (*ané*).

2. Prestige Economy— "Bridewealth Exchange"

I would like to begin my arguments by tracing the classic study about the impact of the introduction of money by Bohannan [Bohannan 1967]. Bohannan divides the three spheres of the economic activities of the Tiv people as follows: (1) Subsistence (*yiagh*) (vegetable, chicken, goats, tools etc), (2) Prestige (*shagba*) (brass pod, slaves, cattle etc), and (3) Rights on human beings (except slaves), especially on women. [Bohannan 1967: 125–126].

2-1. Three Field of Economic Activities

À la Bohannan, let me start by dividing the field of the Endenese economic activities into three parts. They are the spheres of: (1) Prestige economy ("Bridewealth Exchange" (*wai rhaki*)), (2) Subsistence economy ("Working on the Field" (*kema uma*)) and (3) Market economy ("Market" (*nerhu*)).

Prestige Economy (*wai rhaki*) is the sphere the Endenese people regard as the most important sphere of all. When people gather together and chat, it is often

ceremonial gift exchange (*wai rhaki*) and bridewealth (*ngawu*) that they talk about.

2.2 Ngawu (bridewealth)

"Bridewealth" is my translation of the Endenese word, *ngawu*, which means "property" or "wealth" in general.

Main items of bridewealth are (1) elephant tusks (*sué* or *nopo kaju*) and (2) gold earrings (*wéa*) and (3) live stock (*éko*).

There used to be many elephant tusks flowing in the sphere of Prestige economy. One was supposed to give tens of elephant tusks as bridewealth.

In 1980s, many tourists came to the island of Flores. Chinese merchants in the town of Ende tried to sell rings and other ornaments made from elephant tusks to the tourists, and it turned out that they sold well. As the villagers needed cash, they went down to the town of Ende to sell elephant tusks to these Chinese merchants. Tusks were sold by their weight and not by their length (which is the way tusks were evaluated in villages). So, the villagers were not so willing to separate from their precious tusks; yet, they needed cash badly (mostly for their sons' schooling expenses). Tusks were sold and there were few tusks remained in villages.

Even though there are few elephant tusks available in villages, there should be a few, at least one or two, elephant tusks in a set of *ngawu* paid for a woman. People still claim that they gave ten, for example, tusks as bridewealth even when they gave only one or two "real" tusks — the imaginary, so to speak, eight tusks are paid in cash.

2.3 Cross-cousin marriage

To understand fully the significance of bridewealth in Ende, we have to grasp one of the most important principle underlying the Endenese marriage ideology — what anthropologists have called "matrilateral cross cousin marriage" or "asymmetric prescription" à la Needham.

Let me explain the ideology in the native terms which are simpler and easier to understand.

The ideology or the institution of asymmetric complex is the anthropological translation of the Endenese idiom, *mburhu nduu // wesa senda*, "tracing the path and connecting the track." The path (and the track) refers to a woman's path from her natal group to her husband's group. Thus, *mburhu nduu // wesa senda*, refers to another woman's (the woman's brother's daughter) movement tracing the previous path. The woman who came via *mburhu nduu wesa senda* is called *tu'a*.

For consecutive cross-cousin marriage contracts they say:

rua tunda // terhu ndeni	Let us accumulate *tu'a* twice // pile up thrice
tuu tunda // nawu ndeni	Bring (*tu'a*) to be accumulated // show in to be piled up
téta ma'é mbeta // towa ma'é nggéra	May the thread not be cut when we are winding // may the thread not come loose when we are spinning.

By this institution two groups are closely woven and knit into one pattern—one group becomes a wife-giver (*ka'é embu*) and the other wife-taker (*weta ané*). They are so close that they are, as the Ende people say, *kombé weta // rhera nara*"(like) a sister at night and a brother at the daytime," and *tona iwa ka ono // bhekaiwa ka rina* "when in want, they do not ask (but just take) // when short, they do not beg."

2.4 Function of bridewealth in matrilateral cross cousin marriage

Mburhu nduu // wesa senda is sometimes called *nai se imu // wa'u se imu*, "one (person) gets on and another gets off." If a woman (A) marries out of her natal group (*wa'u se imu*), then the group, or more specifically, her father or her brother, gets bridewealth (*ngawu*) paid for her. Consequently if a man (B) uses this set of *ngawu* for his own bridewealth and thus new wife gets into the group (*nai se imu*), then this series of marriages are referred to as *mburhu nduu // wesa senda*, since this special treatment of bridewealth ensures the next marriage — B's daughter is, in a way, now obligated to marry A's son.

If A and B are real sister and brother, then A's son's marriage with B's daughter is matrilateral cross cousin marriage. In some cases, A and B are not real sister and brother, yet in these cases, A's son and B's daughter are expected to marry each other and the marriage is conceived as *mburhu nduu // wesa senda*. In a way, the path is not so much the path of women (as I described above) as the path of bridewealth (*ngawu*).



I can expound on the meaning of the bridewealth of Ende much longer but here suffice it to say that the relationships that people often talk as couched in kinship are actually in most cases the relationships accrued from bridewealth transaction (*wai rhaki*).

In short, in Ende, not only friends make gifts but also gifts make friends. Bridewealth transaction create a new kinship relationship, sometimes a kinship relationship between persons without any genealogical connections.

* * * * *

When a certain marriage ceremony is to come shortly, people begin to be fidgety and wonder how they are to be involved in the transaction. Villagers talk about many, presumably relevant, past cases of bridewealth transactions. And once one's rôle has been defined in the coming ceremony, one now begins to acquire a reasonable amount of wealth using various means already defined in the Endenese cultural scenarios.

Those ceremonies are called *ghoma*, but are often coupled with *rugi* (thus, *rugi ghoma*). The word *rugi* means "expenses" or "loss" — marriage ceremonies are so burdensome to those households involved. To hold a *ghoma* as well as to join a *ghoma*, one needs a large amount of preparation, among others, paddy. Marriage ceremonies used to be held in a period after the harvest when there were abundant supply of paddy. Nowadays, Pa'o said, as paddy comes from the shops, ceremonies keep going the whole year.

3 Subsistence Economy—"Working on Field"

Rice now comes from the shops in the town of Ende, as Pa'o says. Where did it come from before? It came, as I said, from the harvest, that is, it came from the dry field (*uma*). Now, let me explain how rice (as well as bridewealth, as I will explain presently) came from the dry fields — let us now shift our attentions to the sphere of Subsistence Economy in Ende.

The Ende people were mainly slash and burn agriculturists. To live in a village in mountain Ende was to cultivate a parcel (or two) of dry field (*uma*).

The Ende people began opening the forest (*ghagha*) around September. When the felled down woods were dry, they burned (*jenggi*) the field. When rain came, planting

(*tendo*) began in December. Planting was followed by such arduous labour as weeding, cleaning and guarding the field. Harvest of rice was conducted around February to March. After the harvest of rice, came harvest of maize and millet. *Songga* (collaboration) was carried out almost every day in one parcel of field or in another. Ritual called *kaa uwi*, "eating yam," marked the end of the year for the Endenese [Nakagawa 1982, 1991].

After *kaa uwi*, people enjoyed a slack period called *mera méré*, "living big." And this was the "fixed season" for *ghoma* implied by Pa'o, when people were busy holding marriage ceremonies. In this time of the year, when I walked around the village, people often called me from their dwellings and invited me to have dinner— Dishes were full of rice.

In a marriage ceremony, everybody is served generously, so generously that one cannot finish one's dish. All the remaining rice and other foods are fed to the dogs and sometimes just thrown away.

To grasp the gist of their agricultural activities, let me quote a passage from an Endenese chant at the time of planting (*tendo*).

asa usu // wa'u na'u	From the time immemorial [we] have handed down [the ritual]
téké dhii // pama pii	we have guarded the generations and defended our layers
kajo embu // ema iné	Our great grandparents, grandparents and Our fathers, mothers
ata kafi // ata Endé	The Kafir and the Muslim
bou si tembo // ingi si rhoo mu	Gather your bodies and assemble your trunks
Kaa aré // pesa manu	Eat the rice and partake of the chicken
tungga ka né'é wurha ki //	It is now the proper moon and
morho ka né'é rhera ki	the right day
ndu'a tungga né'é ura //	May the rain fall enough and
wa'u sambu né'é apu	may we have meet with dew drops
kema mbo'o // kéwi 'aé	May we work and be satisfied and we tap the trunk and the palm yield water

People treat rice (*aré*) with the highest regards—guests should be served with rice even when there are scarcity of rice in the household. Yet, they plant various kinds of

crops in their field along with paddy—maize (*jawa*), millet (*orho*), beans (*mbué*), pumpkins (*bési*), cucumbers (*timu*), cassava (*uwi xai*) and lots of others.

Thus,

kema mbo'o // kéwi aé	May we work and be satisfied and we tap the trunk and the palm yield water
jawa padha // aré rasé	May maize grow with ears and paddy have bending spikes
mbué mboko // xorho worhé	Beans grow in plenty and millet have ears

Like many people in other societies classified as "peasants," (see, for a Floresian example, [Metzner 1982: 128]) people in Ende try to spread the risk by planting several crops with different moisture requirements.

* * * * *

Every day, as the sun rose, people left the village for the dry field. They worked all day long in their fields. And as the night approached, people would come from their respective fields, back to the village. Men carried almost nothing; women and children usually carried, sometimes over their shoulders, sometimes upon their heads, bundles of vegetables as well bunches of fire wood collected in their *kopo* (permanent garden). Those vegetables were to be served at their supper table. In a way, *kopo* functioned as a sort of convenience store, where one could easily get various foods.

3.1 Harvest

Let me, now, proceed to the productivity of the Endenese agriculture. In 1980s, I would say, the staple was cassava in the sense that it constituted a large part of the Endenese dietary; yet when asked what was their staple food ("manakan pokok" (in Indonesian)) , the Ende people would answer that it was rice. Cassava has no ritual significance and is a newly introduced crop, while rice cultivation is surrounded by various ritual activities and regarded highly by the people as I already mentioned. People like to talk about the harvest — how big such and such person's harvest was and who was the good agriculturalist (*kasa ba'i*) and who was not. It is always the harvest of rice that matters to them; nobody cares about the harvest of cassava.

Roughly speaking, one household cultivated around one hector of land. My data collected in the early 1980s showed the the harvest of rice per a household (that is, per a

hector) was ranging 200 kg to 500 kg — average harvest, I would say, being around 300 kg.

3.2 Subsistence And Prestige

"We used to have tons of harvest (*nuka ngasu*)," Robé used to say to me. This statement may mean that the land was more fertile before. It may be the case but more importantly it suggests that the number of the people working in one parcel of land was much bigger than now. Robé described the situation of Nipi's household when he was a boy:

> We had many elephant tusks (*nopo kaju*) and gold earrings (*wéa*). Nipi had many wives. Besides, there were many *tu'a*s in our house. All the members (including *tu'a*s) of the household used to work together. We worked while singing (*dowé*). We organized a big collaboration (*songga*), consuming a number of bamboos of palm wine (*moké*) and two or even three pigs at one *songga*. Harvest was big (*nuka ngasu*). Yet, we ate little rice. Most of the harvested paddy were converted into elephant tusks (*nopo kaju*).

There used to be several *tu'a*s in a rich man's (*ata bhanda*) household. They were the extra labour power to the household and contributed considerably to the harvest of rice.

It is difficult to explicate the word *tu'a*. I have already used this word in this paper and in the context, *tu'a* is a "married-in woman via matrilateral cross cousin marriage (*mburhu nduu wesa senda*)." *Tu'a* here refers to a slightly different category of women. A man without enough bridewealth sometimes "sold" (*téka*) his sister in order to acquire *ngawu* for his future marriage. A rich man (*ata bhanda*) "bought" (*mbeta*) the woman and gave *ngawu* to the poor man for her "price."[2] Thus, *tu'a* means, roughly, a "woman bought (*mbeta*)." Both usages of *tu'a* refer to a "woman who come in as *ngawu* goes out" but in one case it is "give and take" (*pati* and *simo*) transaction, a kind of transaction which is conducted between wifegiver and wife-taker *par excellence*, while in the other the transaction concerned is "sell and buy" (*téka* and *mbeta*) transaction, a kind of transaction which is predominantly conducted between non-kin (*ata*).

*Tu'a*s were expected to work in the dry field as well as at home. Embu ("Granny") Mbémbé was the oldest woman in the village when I started my field work in 1979. She

[2] There is no native term for "poor" in Ende.

was a *tu'a* of Nipi. On several occasions she sung to me a *nangi* (song) she composed herself. The *nangi* depicted her life as a *tu'a*, how she was forced to work from the morning to the night without rest. Also in the song, she kept blaming her merciless brother Pani who sold her to Nipi.[3] Another old woman, Ine ("Mother" or, maybe,"Auntie") Ka'o, was also a *tu'a* of Nipi. Ka'o was expected to marry with Robé but did not. She married a man without enough bridewealth. The man (Ka'o's husband) was forced to work in Nipi's field.

As Robé said, even though there were abundant paddy in the household, "they ate little rice." Paddy were converted into elephant tusks.

At the age of Nipi, said Robé, they had a fixed rate for exchanging items of Subsistence economy, paddy *par excellence*, into items of Prestige economy, elephant tusks *par excellence*.

Rice was measured by *ndeka* which contains around 16 kg of paddy (or around 8 kg of husked rice). According to Robé, 11 ndeka of paddy (88 kg) was exchanged with one *sué*, a short elephant tusk (around 60 cm); 22 ndeka (176 kg) with a *minu aé* (around 90 cm); 44 ndeka (352 kg) with a *wesa* (around 120 cm); and 88 ndeka (704 kg) with a *repa* (around 180 cm);

ndeka (8 kg)	tusk
11 (88 kg)	sué (60)
22 (176 kg)	minu aé (90)
44 (352 kg)	wesa (120)
88 (704 kg)	repa (180)

In this way, a rich man would acquire, with his abundant wealth (*ngawu*), many *tu'a*s; then he could invest larger labour force into his parcels of land; then he could get larger harvest. And the surplus rice could be converted into wealth (*ngawu*) again. And the cycle would close itself and would begin again. So the mechanism for rich men is: the more wealth (*ngawu*), the more *tu'a*; the more *tu'a*, the bigger harvest (*nuka ngasu*); the bigger harvest, the larger wealth (*ngawu*).

The process did not go for ever, though. Some of the acquired wealth was consumed at the time of marriage ceremonies and on other suitable occasions. Nipi was famous for his generosity in paying bridewealth and Robé was proud of the large number of elephant tusks paid as bridewealth for his wives. It is in this instant when the

[3] Mbémbé never spoke ill of Nipi.

harvest was converted and then was used in bridewealth that we could say that the Subsistence economy supported the Prestige economy.

4 Market Economy —"Selling and Buying"

Now to the third sphere, the Market Economy of Ende.

Bohannan, in his essay on the influence of money upon Subsistence economy in an African society, concluded his essay as follows:

> In short, because of the spread of the market and the introduction of general-purpose money, Tiv economy has become a part of the world economy. It has brought about profound changes in the institutionalization of Tiv society. Money is one of the shatteringly simplifying ideas of all time, and like any other new and compelling idea, it creates its own revolution. The monetary revolution, at least in this part of Africa, is the turn away from the multicentric economy. Its course may be painful, but there is very little doubt about its outcome. [Bohannan 1967: 135]

The introduction of money has indeed had a profound influence upon the Endenese "traditional" economy. That is what Pa'o claimed anyway. Yet, as is clear from Pa'o's statement, the change has not occurred along a "market economy entered into a traditional economy and the traditional gift exchange system has been destroyed by the newly introduced all-purpose money"-type-of-scenario. To the contrary, the "traditional" economy ("marriage ceremonies") has been augmented by the Market economy ("the shops"). This is, I would like to argue now, because the Ende "traditional" economy has a ready-made niche for the world-widecapitalist-modern-type-of market. There is the third sphere (along with Prestige Economy (*wai rhaki*) and Subsistence Economy (*kema uma*)) of the Ende traditional system which may well be called "market" (*nerhu*), which functioned as a receptacle for receiving the "new" or "foreign" idea of all purpose money and what not of the world wide capitalist market economy.

To avoid unnecessary confusion, I will use Market economy (t) or Market (t) ("t" for "traditional") as denoting one of the tripartite Ende "traditional" economy and Market economy (c) or Market (c) ("c" for 'capitalist") as denoting one based on the modern, world wide, capitalist market economy. Let it be noted, though, that the

distinction between Market (t) and Market (c) is made only for "our" convenience's sake and that both are one and the same for the Ende people, which is the main point of the following argument.

Let me expound Market economy (t) a little further.

An exemplar or a model case of Market (t) is, first of all, weekly market (*nerhu*) which are usually held in coastal (Muslim) villages. When villagers go to a weekly market, they leave their village when it is still dark (around 4 am) with bananas, rice, maize and other crops and go down to the coastal village. People from one village tend to gather together in one area of the market place as they are almost strangers (*ata*) in the market. They sell (*téka*) those things carried from the village in the market. And then with the acquired money, they buy (*mbeta*) such commodities as fish, salt, soap and kinds of vegetable which are not available in their mountain area. As they do not expect any social contact in the market, when the planned transaction is over, they come back to the village as early as 10 am.

A weekly market is, to quote Augé's term, a "non-place," "a space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned with identity" [Augé 1992: 77–78]. It is also, to extend Augé's terminology, a place for "non-kin" (*ata*) where "non-gift" transaction ("selling" (*téka*) and "buying" (*mbeta*)) takes place. In short, Market (t) is a (1) non-place, for (2) non-gift, among (3) non-kin.

The town of Ende, the northern coast, Jakarta (the capital of Indonesia), or Malaysia where many young people go nowadays,[4] are other examples of Market (t) or non-places.

4.1 Subsistence and Market (t)

Subsistence economy is contrasted against Market economy (t) (non-place) so that it becomes an "anthropological" place, a meaningful place, concerned with identity and history [Augé (1992)]. Lands are said to be used only for Subsistence economy (*kema uma*) and never to be sold or bought. People say — "We work in order to eat and tap the palm tree to drink" (*kema tau kaa // kéwi tau minu*).

kema tau kaa // kéwi tau 'aé	We work in the field so as to make food, and tap a palm tree so as to sap water.
powi tau nuwa // pagha tau jangga	We feed ourselves to be satisfied,

[4] See [Nakagawa (2003)] for the impact of labour migration to Malaysia in Ende.

and raise ourselves to be tall.

When the ownership of a certain parcel of land is transferred, it is not by "selling and buying," a non-gift transaction, but only through a fixed scenario of "giving to the sister and handing to the sister's son" (*pati weta // ti'i ané*).

pati weta // ti'i ané	[I have] given to my sister and handed to my sister's son
iwa ka wiki // ti'i iwa ka rhai	[I will] never take it away and never retrieve it away
pati wiki // ti'i rhai	If ever I give and take away and hand and retrieve
kojo koé rhia // mbungé tembu rhewu	A crab shall dig a hole and mushroom shall grow under my house (implying the annihilation of the household).

It is always wife-givers that give land and wife-takers that take the land. When asked of the meaning of the institution of *pati weta // ti'i ané*, an Endenese would answer in narrating a story without special reference to any actual personage. The story goes like this:

> Suppose, there are two *rhimé*s. (a man and his wife's brother's wife, between whom there are various taboos, such as not to mention his/her name and so on.) When the woman (WBW) mentions the man's (her HZH's) name by accident, then the man will keep crying because he is ashamed. The woman (and her group, that is wife-givers) asks what he (wife-taker) wants for the compensation. After a long series of asking questions and getting no answer, they (the woman's group, the wifegiver) finally say: what about a piece of loin cloth (*rhuka rhawo*) and the man says yes. The loin cloth is a metaphorical rendition of a parcel of land.

In this way, the source of every Subsistence economy, that is, land, is processed only through the gift-transaction in the sphere of Prestige economy and never in the sphere of Market economy (t).

4.2 Prestige and Market (t)

Above, I emphasized the significance of Market (t) (the sphere of "non-place" as well as "non-gift" and "non-kin") in the sense that it is strictly excluded from the bipartite composition of the so-called "anthropological" place (along with "anthropological" gift and "anthropological" relations) of Subsistence and Prestige economy. Here I am going to point another significance of Market (t) in that it is embedded in the tripartite Ende economy along with Prestige and Subsistence, especially with Prestige economy.

Market (t) is not only located in far away places. It sometimes manifests itself in the middle of the villagers' every day life. Let us be reminded of the institution of the bridewealth-connected brother and sister. If a man uses, for his marriage, bridewealth which was paid for a woman, then he is regarded as a kind of brother to the woman to the extent that his daughter has to marry the woman's son. Say, I am in good terms with a man, who, even though he is going to marry, happens to be devoid of the bridewealth needed for the marriage; If I happen to have some wealth, it seems quite natural to hand the wealth to the man so that he can carry on the process of his intended marriage. If the wealth I transferred to him was what was paid for my sister, then, according to the ideology of *nai se imu wa'u se imu*, his future daughter is to be destined to marry my sister's son.

If everything were arranged this way, a poor man would be destined to become poorer (and become dependent, a kind of slave (*xo'o*)) and a rich man would become the richer. It is not the case. In Ende, there is a space where one could transact without invoking any kinship obligation, that is, Market (t). It is true that land is never to be transacted in the Market (t) way, but elephant tusks (and gold earrings and livestock, for that matter) are allowed to be transacted in this way. Thus, instead of describing the transaction concerned in ways of the Prestige economy, that is, among other, as "give and take" (*pati simo*), it can be described in ways of the Market (t) economy, that is, "sell and buy" (*téka mbeta*) and "borrow and reimburse" (*gadhi nggé rhu*) etc. So even if a rich man transfers to a poor man an elephant tusk, if the transaction is agreed to be described in the Market economy (t) way, the movement of the elephant tusk does not form a "path" which should be "traced back" by a woman (the Endenese version of matrilateral cross cousin marriage, or "tracing the path and connecting the track" (*mburhu nduu wesa senda*)). What the poor man has to do is only to reimburse (*nggérhu*) the tusk in due course, when he is well off — there will be no path to be traced and no track to be connected.

5 Enter the Market (c)

Now our narrative passes to the final stage, the age of Hane, beginning from the middle of 1980s up to now.

In the middle of 1980s, things began to change drastically in the Ende villages from the economist point of view — a change which had possibly to do with the principle of dispersing the risk I mentioned earlier. Firstly, it is the time when Endenese youths began to go to Malaysia as (illegal) labour migrants. Hane himself went to Malaysia and stayed there for a year. The remittance from abroad flowed into the village life and influenced the economy profusely. Secondly, in addition to the interculture of several crops, people tried to introduce such new cash crops as clove ("cengkeh") and cacao ("coklat"). In short, it was time when Market (c) entered the scene. As I already dealt with the labour migration in a previous paper, I will, in this paper, focus my attention on cash crops.

5.1 Subsistence— "Working on Field"

Let us pay attention to the "economic" situation of the age of Hane. First, we will look at Subsistence Economy or more precisely "Working on the Field" (*kema uma*).

Formerly, *kema uma* was full of ritual activities (*nggua*) — beginning from *kaki*, the opening ceremony of the forest, *pa mopo*, the offerings to the spirits (*nitu*) of the forest and ending with *pesa uta*, a ritual for maize, *neté piso*, one for paddy, and finally *kaa uwi*, one for yam.

People used to work in the traditional way of co-operation called *songga*. In a *songga*, many people came to the host's field and worked together. Sometimes, they sang a kind of work song (*dowé*). They had lunch and drank palm wine (*moké*) in the host's field. At night after the work, they gathered at the host's house and ate big meals with pigs slaughtered and lots of *moké*. They usually sat to the dead of the night, talking and drinking.

People perform almost no rituals (*nggua*) nowadays. Nor is *songga* carried out as often as before.

As I mentioned above, in the 1980s, the harvest was around 200 to 500 kg per one hector (that is, per a household as well) and before that, at the age of Nipi, a parcel of land (which was bigger than a hector) must have yielded tons of paddy. Every year, from 1997 to 2003, I made a short field trip to Ende and collected data of the harvest of paddy for each year. The figures have never exceeded 200 (kg). I was most surprised, above all, that not a few people answered my question saying that they did not open the

field (*ghagha*) that year. Many people do not plant paddy nowadays.

That is why they now do not perform rituals (except perhaps *kaa uwi* which is a collective ritual and is still conducted in several villages). People do not perform rituals because they do not cultivate those crops (rice, maize and yam) which need ritual undertakings. They have almost entirely shifted to cash crop cultivations (such as coffee, cacao, vanilla, clove and son on). Permanent type of gardens (*kopo*) are still cultivated; but they are planted mostly with cash crops.

One day, I saw my "Mum" Sofi (Robé's wife) reprimanding her granddaughter, Hestin, Hane's daughter of age 12. I asked why Sofi got angry. She replied: "I saw Hestin up in a clove tree. The tree is so tall and climbing the tree is so dangerous. I was afraid if she should fall down." I asked my Sofi what Hestin was up to. It turned out that Hestin often climbs a clove tree and picks up a few buds which she deposits to her grown-up relative to be sold at a weekly market. She asks the relative to buy some cookies for her (Hestin) in the market with the money paid for the buds. Weekly market was, like other non-places, a far way place, not only physically but also socially. The mountain people did not go often to weekly markets before. Nowadays, people go to every weekly market. The Market (t) as well as Market (c) is now so close to the villagers, so close that a little girl treats it like our "convenience store" where one can buy cookies and such commodities
easily, just like *kopo* before.

5.2 Development Aids and Cash Crops

Planting cash crops is not a foreign idea to the Ende people. Most of coconut palm trees of Robé's were planted by Nipi. Yet throughout the age of Nipi and Robé, cash crops were mere addition to a household's finance. Many household did well without any cash crops.

In 1980s people began to introduce new cash crops beside coconut palm and coffee. It may have been due to the success of the Toradja cultivation (of the island of Sulawesi) of clove and subsequently the introduction and the success of clove cultivation in the Lio region, a western neighbour of the Ende people.

Still, in 1980s the Market (c) came into the life of the Ende villagers mostly via the remittance money from Malaysia. It was in 1990s that cash crops began to play a significant rôle in the economy of the villagers.

I suspect it was development aids that caused the shift of the planting pattern in Ende.

In December 1992, people of the island of Flores had a traumatic experience; a

big earthquake hit the island and there were everywhere a big number of casualties, especially in Ende and Sikka. Aids were sent from everywhere in the world to this small island of eastern Indonesia. Various NGOs functioned as intermediaries between donors and the receiving people. Several people in the village Rhepa Dori received a certain amount of money. As is the case with other aids which I will mention presently, I presume, the aids for the earthquake was meant to be used as microcredit. The idea behind microcredit, that is, the idea of entrepreneurship was foreign to the villagers, I guess. Anyway, people did not know what to do with the money. Some bought pigs and others bought chickens. None of them, it seems, succeeded.

In 1994, the governmental project IDT (Inpress Desa Tertinggal) was set in motion. Every desa (the smallest administrative division) received 20 million rupiah. The money was then divided to self-help groups of the village level. This was when self-help group ("kelompok" in Indonesian) were formed in the villages. Two kelompok were formed in the village Rhepa Dori. Each kelompok submitted a proposal of what they were going to do with the money and almost automatically received a certain amount of money. Each member was said to receive from 60,000 to 100,000 rupiah in the first year.

The kelompok thus formed in 1994 are the groups working together in a parcel of land these days, replacing *songga*. Workers go to the assigned place, each with his/her own lunch. They work together until the evening with a lunch break at around noon. Then in the evening they just go back to their respective houses. There is no communal eating, no collective drinking session and no talking-to-the-dead-of-the-night. "It is much more efficient than *songga*" people say, sometimes with a tinge of nostalgia in it.

In 1996, aids came to the village via another NGO. Several of the villagers received vanilla vines. After being taught how to plant vanilla vines, they planted vines in one place. As the price of vanilla was not so high, people were not so enthusiastic; they did not take good care of the seedlings and the vines withered away.

In 1999, cacao seedlings were distributed among the villagers of Rhepa Dori. The seedlings were given to them by the department of labour in Jakarta.

In 2001, PPK (Proyek Pengembangan Kecamatan or Kecamatan Development Program) started. It was meant to replace IDT and is much bigger in its budge than IDT. Every kecamatan (an administrative unit one level above desa) receives about a billion rupiah. At the village level, via a self-help group (kelompok), one member can receive 2 to 3 million rupiah.

I could continue mentioning the aids received in the village Rhepa Dori longer; But the above examples are sufficiently convincing for the point that I am going to

make—that is, the shifting pattern of cultivation was, at least partly, caused by the coming development aids.

In 2003, in my last trip to Ende, villagers were busy planting vanilla because the price of vanilla was going extremely high.

5.3 A Few Inventories

Just to show how cash crops planting are embedded in the villager' lives now, I will list up some inventories of a few villagers of Rhepa Dori.

The inventory of MBAHA, Robé's younger brother, goes like this: (1) one clove tree, which yielded 3 kg this year. He got 30,000 rupiah for it. (2) 60 trees of cacao, each yielding around 2 to 3 kg. In one year, he harvested 30 kg in all and got 200,000 rupiah for cacao. (3) 30 coconut palm trees, for which he got 600,000 rupiah that year. (4) He just planted vanilla that year. No harvest was expected yet. He has several candle nut (*héo*) trees and some 40 banana trees (*muku*). People do not count either candle nut trees or banana trees as constituting their property; they pick up some candle nuts and carry bunches of bananas and go down to the market to sell them for buying a bit of cigarets, a bit of soap, a bit of salt, a bit of dried fish. Those are like our small cash for them (remember Hestin's episode).

Now let me pick Pa'o's inventory. [. . . to be continued . . .]

6 Mutliple Conclusions

Thus ends my story of the history of Ende in terms of economics. It is time I should add some concluding remarks to the story .

I will write two conclusions here: the first one is me writing as an anthropologist of economists persuasion and the second, me as a "cultural" anthropologist.

As I am not really an anthropologist of economic orientation, my first conclusion will be short. Yet it will serve, I hope, well as an introduction to what I want to say as a "cultural" anthropologist in the second part.

6.1 Economist's —"The Scene Changes"

In this sub-section of the concluding section, I will talk as an economics-oriented anthropologist as I promised at the beginning.

My conclusion is that "the scene changes".

Changes are obvious—no rituals (*nggua*) are performed; instead of traditional

inefficient *songga*, modern "kelompok" type of co-operation is now in vogue. No Subsistence economy is in sight; people plant mostly cash crops in their gardens. In short, capitalist economy is spreading all over the lives of the villagers. There used to be, indeed, a tripartite economy, consisting of Prestige, Subsistence and Market (t). Now Subsistence economy has dwindled to almost nothing and Market (t) has been replaced by Market (c), the capitalist version of it.

So, to put it in a nutshell, the Ende society is simply yet another society which has belatedly become involved in the world system as a negligible peripheral item. As Bohannan says, "there is very little doubt about its outcome".

6.2 Anthropologist's—"The Song Remains the Same"

My conclusion as an anthropologist is that "the song remains the same".

It is true that the tripartite economy has now become almost a bipartite economy. And the scene seems to have really changed. But it is because you are looking from the outside. Let us look the "scene" from the native's point of view. It is Prestige economy that matters to the people. They do not care what's become of Subsistence and Market (whether it be (t) or (c)) as long as Prestige economy remains the same. It was, in the age of Nipi and Robé, Subsistence economy that supported Prestige economy; it is now Market economy that supported Prestige economy.

As Pa'o says, things have indeed changed but the point is that Prestige economy keeps going and the importance of Prestige economy has actually increased nowadays.

Let me recapitulate the story here. The starting point of the story is the outflow of elephant tusks from the village scene that took place in the early 1980s. That set in motion the series of changes, labour migration to Malaysia, cash crop planting, decile of rituals as well as *songga* and finally the disappearance of Subsistence economy as it was at the age of Nipi.

Let us stop to ask ourselves, "why?" — why the outflow of elephant tusks caused people to acquire, instead, money?

To understand the why, let me give you one specific Ende device of perceiving, or more precisely, controlling the world, what might be called "dubbing" or "reckoning."

As I said above, land is a thing which wife-giver gives to wife-taker. It is not only land but also other things whose directions of transference are defined — pigs are what wife-givers give to wife-takers; other livestock such as cattle, waterbuffaloes, horses are what wife-takers give to wife-givers; rice are what wife-givers give to wife-takers; bananas are what wife-takers give to wife-givers, and so on and so on.

In a way, Endenese life is strictly governed by sets of rules. To escape from these

rules, I mentioned earlier, one sometimes has recourse to "non-place" (Market (t)) so that the transaction should not invoke any kinship obligations. A transaction carried out in non-place is a unencumbered transaction. There is another way to circumvent the strict rules— that is by dubbing.

When you receive your wife-giver at your home, you have to serve him with beef or water-buffalo meat or horse meat or dog meat and what not, but never with pork. Pork (pig) is what wife-givers are supposed to give to wife-takers; you should never serve pork to your own wife-givers. But it sometimes happens that you have only pork at hand and nothing else. In that kind of predicament, dubbing comes to rescue you — you only have to say to the wife-giver, when serving him with dish full of pork, "this is dog meat." Dubbing changes the world and meat is now dog meat; the guest, your wife-giver, will perhaps say something like "Hmm, thank you. This is a good dog meat," and starts eating without further ado. Thus words changes the world.

You hand an elephant tusk to another person and "dub" the transaction "to help" (*rhaka*), another piece of "non-place" vocabulary, then the transaction becomes a part of Market (t) economy and will never invoke any kinship obligation with the person who received the tusk. This is an example I used at one point of this paper. In the same way, if you hand money to another person, and "dub" the money "elephant tusk" and "dub" the transaction as "to give", then the said transaction becomes a part of Prestige economy and will invoke kinship obligation in the future. This is the critical difference between Ende and Tiv, where "Tiv deplore the fact that they are required to "sell" (*te*) their daughters and "buy" (*yam*) wives." [Bohannan 1967: 134] Simple mechanism of "dubbing" ensures the transaction is never to be treated as "buying and selling" even when the medium exchanged is money. One does not have to "launder" money to be used in "ceremonimal exchange" [Toren (1989): 158] as in Fiji nor does one have to "cook" money [Carsten 1989: 139] as in Malay fishing villages. What one has to do is only to "dub" or "declare" in Ende.[5] And it is in this connection that people were driven to search for ways of making money (such as going to Malaysia and planting cash crops in their gardens) after the outflow of elephant tusks, because the dubbing ensures, without further ado, that money is to replace with, or to take place of (*tau nia*), elephant tusks.

[5] For more detailed theoretical treatment of "dubbing" see my [Nakagawa forthcoming].

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